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INTRODUCTION

According to the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC" or
"Commission"), its "mission is to administer Federal securities laws
that seek to provide protection for investors."' In particular, "[t]hese
laws were designed to facilitate informed investment analyses and decisions by the investing public, primarily by ensuring adequate disclosure of material (significant) information." 2 However, this goal of
protecting investors often conflicts with the SEC's policy objective of
promoting capital formation.3 The Commission has struggled recently to balance these competing policies in its efforts to facilitate
initial public offerings ("IPOs").
The SEC has sought to encourage IPOs because they (i) frequently serve as the most effective means for corporate entities to
1

SEC, THE WORK OF THE SEC 3 (1986). In 1992, SEC Chairman Richard Breeden

explained:
When thinking about the missions of the SEC, the subject of investor protection is invariably the first thing that comes to mind. That is an appropriate reaction, for protection of the more than 40 million Americans who

own securities directly-more than 50 million if you count participants in
stock mutual funds-is unquestionably the first and foremost assignment of
the SEC.
Richard C. Breeden, Financing America's Growth, Remarks Before the National Press Club
(Feb. 18, 1992), in [1991-1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 84,927, at
82,465, 82,465-66 (Feb. 18, 1992) [hereinafter Financing America's Growth].
2 SEC, supra note 1, at 3-4.
3 See, for example, section 2(b) of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, which
requires, for the purposes of the Act, that "[w] henever... the Commission is engaged in
rulemaking and is required to consider or determine whether an action is necessary or
appropriate in the public interest, the Commission shall also consider, in addition to the
protection of investors, whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation." 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (Supp. II 1996). For an example of the Commission's
efforts to promote capital formation, see Small Business Initiatives, Securities Act Release
No. 6924, [1991-1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 84,931, at 82,481 (Mar.
11, 1992) [hereinafter Proposing SBIs Release].
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raise capital and (ii) benefit the capital markets and the economy.4
Unfortunately, the costs incurred in undertaking an IPO preclude
many companies from pursuing this avenue of capital formation. As a
result, the SEC has taken measures to reduce these costs to help companies launch IPOs.
"Testing the waters" represents such a step towards facilitating
IPOs. Controversially introduced in 1992 via the Small Business Initiatives (the "SBIs Release" or "SBIs") 5 in the form of Rule 254,6 the testing-the-waters rule enables small businesses to solicit indications of
interest in a potential Regulation A offering before incurring the costs
and burdens of preparing an offering statement and filing it with the
SEC. 7 The results of this solicitation would play a large role in the
calculus that a small business uses in deciding whether to proceed
with a Regulation A offering.
In June 1995, the Commission published a release entitled Solicitations of Interest Prior to an Initial Public Offering (the "Testing Release"),8 In the Testing Release, the SEC heralded Rule 254 as a
success and proposed new Rule 135d, which would extend the scope
of testing the waters beyond Regulation A to registered IPOs. 9 As proposed, Rule 135d would "allow companies [of all sizes] to gauge investor interest before incurring the significant expense required in the
preparation of IPO disclosure documents."' 0 This proposed extension is controversial because it represents a radical departure from the
fundamental policy embodied in section 5 (c)11 of the Securities Act of
1933, as amended ("Securities Act").12 Section 5(c) protects investors
by requiring, absent an exemption, the filing of a registration statement before an issuer, underwriter, or dealer may make any offer to
sell or buy a security.' 3 The SEC has been committed to achieving
section 5's goal of protecting investors from fraud and misrepresentation. 14 In the Testing Release, the SEC reiterated its commitment "to
4 See infra Part II.A.
5 Small Business Initiatives, Securities Act Release No. 6949, 57 Fed. Reg. 36,442
(Aug. 13, 1992) [hereinafter SBIs Release].
6 17 C.F.R. § 230.254 (1997).
7 See SBIs Release, supra note 5, at 36,470.
8 Solicitations of Interest Prior to an Initial Public Offering, Securities Act Release
No. 7188, [1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
85,639, at 86,885 (June 27,
1995) [hereinafter Testing Release].
9 See infra note 379 and accompanying text.
10
See Testing Release, supra note 8, at 86,887.
11

See 3A HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, SEcuRIEs AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW § 6.09,

at 6-30 (1996) (opining that "the Commission seems to be testing the waters itself").
12
15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
13 Id. §§ 77(d)(1), 77e(c).
14 See Financing America's Growth, supra note 1, at 82,466 (explaining that
"[p]rotecting investors against fraud and manipulation is a task that is deeply ingrained in
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assuring that the interests of investors are not compromised." 15 Additionally, the Testing Release invited public comment on numerous
provisions of, and issues in connection with, proposed Rule 135d;
however, it posed two fundamental questions for commenters:
[First, is] the proposed "test the waters" rule... appropriate and in
investors'interestin the context of registered IPOs[?] ... [Second,
w]ill the proposed process effectively accomplish the Commission's
goal of allowing businesses to assess the capital market's potential
interest in their businesses on a cost-effective basis, without causing
investors to overlook the full disclosures mandated by the federal se16
curities laws?
In short, the SEC is concerned that the testing-the-waters proposal
may strain the balance between protecting investors and promoting
capital formation.
Although the SEC has been pleased with the results of the testingthe-waters amendment to Regulation A introduced in the SBIs Release, 17 many states, as well as the North American Securities Administrators Association ("NASAA"),' 8 opposed Rule 254 because it
inadequately protects small investors. 19 Commentators have explained that the SEC needs the support of the states and NASAA for
Rule 254 to succeed.2 0 Proposed Rule 135d, which would enable businesses contemplating registered IPOs to test the waters, differs only
slightly from Rule 254. Therefore, the SEC has tried to address the
concerns of the states and NASAA regarding investors' vulnerability to
fraud and misrepresentation.
The SEC apparently is struggling to solve the foregoing problems
because the comment period for the Testing Release ended on September 8, 1995, and the Commission has yet to revise or adopt the
testing-the-waters proposal. 2 ' Even the passage by Congress in October 1996 of the National Securities Markets Improvement Act of
the traditions of the agency, and it is a mission that is every bit as important today as it was
when the nation's federal securities laws were first enacted in the 1930s).
15 Testing Release, supra note 8, at 86,886.
16 Id. at 86,890 (emphasis added).
17 See infra text accompanying notes 341-43.
18 NASAA consists of securities regulators from all fifty states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Mexico, and certain Canadian provinces. See NASAA Comment Letter to
SEC Secretary, Jonathan Katz, Regarding SEC Release 33-6924, on Small Business Initiatives, [1986-1993 Transfer Binder] NASAA Rep. (CCH) 1 9346, at 9372, 9373 n.1 (July 24,
1992) [hereinafter NASAA Comment Letter Regarding SBIs].
19 See infra Part III.B.1.
20
See infra notes 289-93 and accompanying text.
21
Testing Release, supra note 8, at 86,885. By contrast, the SEC adopted the SBIs
about six weeks after the end of the public comment period. See infra text accompanying
notes 155-59. Cf. infra Part IV.D (offering reasons why the SEC has taken more time with
proposed Rule 135d than with the SBIs).
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199622 (the "NSMIA"), which (i) exempted certain securities and securities transactions from state securities law registration requirements and (ii) granted the Commission general exemptive
authority, 23 has not yet prompted the Commission to take action with
respect to proposed Rule 135d. Nevertheless, the SEC still considers
the adoption of the proposal a priority.2 4 In short, after getting its
feet wet in the Regulation A waters, the SEC currently has developed
cold feet about extending the proposal to the registered IPO market.
This Note discusses the Regulation A testing-the-waters rule the
SEC adopted in 1992 and the similar proposed Rule 135d currently
under consideration. It focuses on proposed Rule 135d's likely impact on potential issuers, actual issuers, underwriters, investors, the
registration process, and the capital markets.2 5 Part I begins with a
brief introduction to the statutory framework that governs public offerings. This historical perspective will set the stage for a discussion of
the ways in which testing the waters appears to undermine the equilibrium between protecting investors and encouraging capital formation
that section 5 of the Securities Act has maintained thus far.
Part I describes the need for a testing-the-waters rule. It summarizes the advantages of an IPO and the difficulties facing companies
that aspire to go public. This Part explains the reasons underlying the
SEC's decision to introduce the testing-the-waters initiative as part of
the SBIs Release, thereby enabling only small businesses to benefit
from testing the waters.
Part I begins with a detailed analysis of the testing-the-waters
rule the SBIs Release introduced in 1992. It then surveys the reactions
of scholars, practitioners, the private bar, states, NASAA, and the
Commission to the testing-the-waters provisions, many of which also
apply to the Rule 135d proposal in the Testing Release. Part I also
addresses the problems posed by the lack of coordination between
state securities laws and Rule 254. Additionally, this Part assesses the
testing-the-waters rule, and discusses its impact since its enunciation in
the SBIs Release. It concludes that testing the waters under Rule 254
22 Pub. L No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78a note (Supp. II
1996)) [hereinafter NSMIA].
23 See infra Parts HII.C.3, V.D; infra notes 226, 541-43.
24 See infra text accompanying note 539.
25 Many authorities maintain that after the close of trading, the stock of a company
that has gone public usually underperforms. See, e.g., Christopher Farrel, Should You Join
the IPO Stampede, Bus. Wa-, Dec. 18, 1995, at 72; Phillip L. Zweig & Leah Nathans Spiro,
Beware the IPO Market: IndividualInvestorsAre at a BigDisadvantage,Bus. W., Apr. 4, 1994, at
84, 88. While the performance of an issuer's stock after it has tested the waters and completed an IPO is relevant to an evaluation of a testing-the-waters rule, this Note does not
focus in its analysis of proposed Rule 135d on the long-term performance of the stock of a
company that has gone public because there are many reasons why a stock may
underperform.
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poses significant risks for investors, and that the SEC's declaration of
the initiative's success was too hasty.
Part IV delineates proposed Rule 135d and proposed revisions to
Rule 254 which the SEC introduced in the Testing Release. It compares proposed Rule 135d with Rule 254 and with the NASAA model
implemented by states that participated in a two-year pilot program.
Part IV also reviews the comment letters submitted in response to the
Testing Release.
Part V assesses the testing-the-waters proposal currently before
the SEC. This Note recognizes the need for testing the waters as well
as the advantages of expanding its availability. However, it concludes
that proposed Rule 135d is irreconcilable with the language and policy aims of section 5(c) of the Securities Act. Current Rule 254 does
not adequately protect investors from making decisions to purchase
securities solely or largely on the basis of the testing-the-waters solicitation, that is, without a careful review of an offering circular. Proposed
Rule 135d does not go far enough beyond Rule 254 to provide adequate safeguards.
Although this Note finds that the proposal, as drafted, is potentially harmful to investors, Part V praises the Testing Release for increasing the availability of testing the waters. Rule 254 helped neither
small businesses that sought to raise more capital than the $5 million
that Regulation A permits nor larger businesses whose needs typically
prevent them from enjoying shelter under Regulation A. Proposed
Rule 135d would enable larger issuers to test the waters prior to a
registered IPO of any size. Therefore, proposed Rule 135d corrects
the asymmetry the Commission created when it reserved the testingthe-waters rule only for issuers contemplating a Regulation A offering.
This Note welcomes the Commission's effort to restore uniformity. It
contends that this uniformity is justified because testing the waters
before a registered IPO is actually less likely to expose investors to
fraud and misrepresentation than testing the waters before a Regulation A offering. 26
Part V argues that as long as testing the waters remains permissible under Regulation A, it should also be available uniformly to issuers
considering a registered IPO. But, as proposed, the Commission's
Rule 135d insufficiently protects investors. This Note recommends
collapsing Rule 254 and proposed Rule 135d into a single rule that
would contain additional safeguards. These safeguards would enable
potential issuers of any size to reap the benefits of testing the waters
before either a Regulation A or registered IPO, while minimizing the
risk that investors will make uninformed investment decisions. In this
26

See infta Part V.E.3.
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manner, the SEC could at least reconcile proposed Rule 135d with the
policy goals of section 5(c) of the Securities Act.
I
STATUTORY FRAMEWORK

The Securities Act, enacted four years after the 1929 stock market
crash, regulates and oversees securities offerings, including IPOs, with
an eye towards protecting investors. 2 7 The Securities Act protects investors by requiring an issuer to register its securities, absent an exemption. An issuer must file with the Commission a registration
statement that the SEC will review to ensure that investors receive adequate and accurate disclosure. Section 5(c) of the Securities Act,
which prohibits gun-jumping, protects investors during the prefiling
28
period.
A.

Gun-Jumping

The SEC has historically prohibited gun-jumping, which is the
making of an offer, as defined in section 2 (3) of the Securities Act, by
an issuer, underwriter, or dealer, 29 before the issuer has filed a registration statement.3 0 Section 5(c) of the Securities Act codifies this
prohibition. Section 5(c) stipulates that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any
person... to offer to sell or offer to buy through the use or medium
27 See United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 777-78 (1979) (explaining that "the 1933
Act was primarily concerned with the regulation of new offerings"); Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 752 (1975) (clarifying that the Securities Act is "chiefly
concerned with disclosure and fraud in connection with offerings of securities-primarily,
as here, initial distributions of newly issued stock from corporate issuers"). The SEC also
considers the protection of investors its primary purpose. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
28 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (1994). This represents the period of time between when a
company is "inregistration" and the filing of its registration statement.
29 Section 4(1) of the Securities Act states that section 5 does not govern "transactions
by any person other than an issuer, underwriter, or dealer." 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1).
30 See generally 3A BLooENTmrra., supranote 11, § 6.09 (assessing the current status of
the gun-jumping proscription); Eric A. Chiappinelli, GunJumping. The Problem ofExtraneous
Offers of Securities, 50 U. Prrr. L. REv. 457, 492-511 (1989) (advocating the legalization of
gunjumping via, inter alia, a repeal of section 5(c) and a revision of the definition of
"offer" in section 2(3) of the Securities Act); Nathan D. Lobell, Revision of the SecuritiesAct,
48 Cot.um. L. Rxv. 313, 320-22 (1948) (identifying gun-jumping as "one of the 'classical'
problems that haunt Securities Act administration"); Morton A. Pierce, Current and Recurrent Section 5 GunJumpingProblems, 26 CAsE W. Ru.s. L. REv. 370 (1976) (discussing chronic
gunjumping problems); John K. Hoyns, 'Gun-Jumping'inOffering Securities, N.Y. LJ., Dec.
9, 1996, at 7 (describing gunjumping issues in connection with "stock-for-stock transactions"); Joseph P. Richardson &Joseph E. Reece, GunJumping, Rxv. SEC. & COMMODITIs
RPG.,Jan. 13, 1993, at 1 (discussing gun-jumping in the context of IPOs without addressing
testing the waters).
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of any prospectus or otherwise any security, unless a registration statement has been filed as to such security." 3 1 Under section 2(3),
[t]he term "sale" or "sell" shall include every contract of sale or disposition of a security or interest in a security, for value. The term
"offer to sell", "offer for sale", or "offer" shall include every attempt
of an offer to buy, a security or
or offer to dispose of, or solicitation
32
interest in a security, for value.
Section 2(10) defines a "prospectus" as "any prospectus, notice, circular, advertisement, letter, or communication, written or by radio or
television, which offers any security for sale or confirms the sale of any
security." 33 Therefore, commencement by an issuer, underwriter, or
dealer of a "public sales campaign" through a notice issued before
34
registration violates section 5 of the Securities Act.

The SEC further clarified in several releases that section 5 (c) may
35
proscribe prefiling publicity that falls short of an "express offer.
The Commission therefore broadly construes the term "offer" in section 2(3). According to the Commission,
publicity efforts . .. made in advance of a proposed financing,

although not couched in terms of an express offer, may in fact contribute to conditioning the public mind or arousing public interest
in the issuer or in the securities of an issuer in a manner which
raises a serious question whether the publicity is not in fact part of
the selling effort.

36

31
15 U.S.C. § 77e (c). For a discussion of liability arising from gunjumping under the
federal securities laws, see Chiappinelli, supra note 30, at 463-66.
15 U.S.C. § 77b(3). However, section 2(3) states that "preliminary negotiations or
32
agreements between an issuer... and any underwriter or among underwriters who are or
are to be in privity of contract with an issuer" are outside the purview of these definitions
and the term "offer to buy" in section 5(c). Id.
33
Id. § 77b(10). Section 2(10) (b) exempts from this definition "a notice, circular,
advertisement, letter, or communication in respect of a security" issued after registration
that discloses (i) "from whom a written prospectus meeting the requirements of section 77j
of this title may be obtained" and (ii) only certain limited information permitted by this
section and by Rule 134. Id. § 77b(10) (b); see 17 C.F.R. § 230.134 (1997).
34 Publication of Information Prior to or After Effective Date of Registration Statement, Securities Act Release No. 3844, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 3250, 3254-56, at
3147, 3149-52 (Oct. 8, 1957) [hereinafter Publication of Information Release] (offering
examples of pre-filing publicity that violated section 5(c)).
35 Id. at 3149.
36
Id. The Commission used essentially the same language in a controlling case regarding gunjumping as its rationale for holding that a press release issued by an underwriter six weeks before filing a registration statement, which described the nature of a
proposed public offering and the value thereof, "must be presumed to set in motion or to
be a part of the distribution process and therefore to involve an offer to sell or a solicitation of an offer to buy such securities prohibited by Section 5 (c)." Carl M. Loeb, Rhoades
& Co., 38 S.E.C. 843, 851 (1959); see also Guidelines for the Release of Information by
Issuers Whose Securities Are in Registration, Securities Act Release No. 5180, [1970-1971
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 78,192, at 80,578, 80,579 (Aug. 16, 1971)
[hereinafter Guidelines Release] (explaining that "the publication of information and
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The Commission and the courts thus have been concerned about the
effects of prefiling disclosure on investors. 3 7 When investors, who lack
either a sufficient opportunity or capacity to determine the inherent
risks of a public offering, participate in a transaction primarily as a
result of sales-oriented, prefiling publicity, the courts have deemed
the publicity a violation of section 5 (c). For example, in CarlM. Loeb,
Rhoades & Co., the Commission found that a prefiling press release
the underwriter issued "arous[ed] and stimulat[ed] investor and
dealer interest" in the offering. 38 The SEC held that the press release
constituted an illegal offer to sell and thus violated section 5(c) of the
39
Securities Act.
The intent of the issuer or its agent is also a factor the Commission and the courts have considered in conducting a section 5 (c) analysis of preffling publicity. The SEC has explained that prefiling
publicity that is "published by various means for the purpose of conveying to the public a message designed to stimulate an appetite for
securities" may represent an offer under section 5(c). 40 In Loeb,
Rhoades & Co., the Commission found that the press release was "of a
character calculated, by arousing and stimulating investor and dealer
interest in [the] securities and by eliciting indications of interest...,
to set in motion the processes of distribution."4 1 In short, "the purpose of the release was [no] different from its effect-the stimulation
of investor and dealer interest as the first step in a selling effort."42
The intent of the underwriters, the content and timing of the release,
and the manifest effect on investors led the Commission to conclude
that the publicity violated the Securities Act. 43
The SEC's Guidelines for the Release of Information by Issuers
Whose Securities Are in Registration (the "Guidelines Release") 44 reiterated that the "phrase 'offer to sell' [in section 5(c)] is broadly destatements, and publicity efforts, made in advance of a proposed financing which have the
effect of conditioning the public mind or arousing public interest in the issuer or in its
securities constitutes an offer in violation of the [Securities] Act").
37 See Guidelines Release, supra note 36, at 80,579 (emphasizing the significance of
the "effect of conditioning the public mind or arousing public interest" in the issue).
38 Loeb, Rhoades & Co., 38 S.E.C. at 851. The Commission concluded that the press
release was successful as a means of attracting the attention of interested investors. Id.
39 Id. The Commission explained that the term "offer" must be construed broadly in
order to achieve the legislative intent behind section 5. Id. at 848. See infra Part I.B for a
discussion of the purposes of the gun-jumping prohibition. After comparing the press
release with the prospectus, which the company circulated six weeks after the issuance of
the press release, the Commission concluded that the press release contained material
omissions that led investors to underestimate the risks involved in the financing. Loeb,
Rhoades & Co., 38 S.E.C. at 854.
40 Publication of Information Release, supra note 34, 1 3255, at 3149.
41 Loeb, Rhoades & Co., 38 S.E.C. at 851 (emphasis added).
42
Id. at 853.
43 See id. at 853 n.20.
44 See source cited supranote 36.
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fined by the [Securities] Act and has been liberally construed by the
courts and Commission." 45 Despite requests to "promulgate an all inclusive list of permissible and prohibited activities" under section 5 (c),
the SEC has declined to provide such a list because compliance with
the statute is determined on a case by case basis. 46 Nevertheless, the
Guidelines Release cautioned issuers that are in registration to "avoid
...[i]ssuance of forecasts, projections, or predictions relating but not
limited to revenues, income, or earnings per share

.

.

.

[and]

[p]ublishing opinions concerning values." 4 7
Although the SEC was reluctant to publish a so-called "all inclusive list," the Second Circuit recognized that Rule 13548 of the Securities Act serves this purpose with respect to the formal announcement
of an offering. 4 9 The court conceded that "the line drawn between an
announcement containing sufficient information to constitute an offer and one which does not must be to some extent arbitrary."50 However, according to the court, Rule 135 sets forth a "checklist of
features that may be included in an announcement which does not
also constitute an offer to sell."5 1 The court encouraged interpreting
Rule 135 as "an exclusive list."52 Pursuant to the provisions of Rule

135 most relevant to IPOs, an issuer may give notice that it seeks to
undertake a public offering without violating section 5 (c) if the notice
is limited to: (i) an announcement that "the offering will be made
only by means of a prospectus" and (ii) disclosure of only the identity
of the potential issuer, the fundamental terms and timing of the offering, and a short statement regarding the nature and goal of the offering without identifying the underwriter. 53 Rule 135 thus establishes
36, at 80,579.
See id. at 80,580; see also Loeb, Rhoades & Co., 38 S.E.C. at 853 n.20 (acknowledging
that "[w]hether in any particular case publicity is an offer depends upon all the facts, and
the surrounding circumstances including the nature, source, distribution, timing, and apparent purpose and effect of the published material").
47
Guidelines Release, supra note 36, at 80,580.
48
17 C.F.R. § 230.135 (1997).
49
See Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Bangor Punta Corp., 426 F.2d 569, 574 (2d. Cir.
1970).
50 Id. (holding that "the assigning of a value to offered shares constitutes an offer to
sell"). The court reasoned that "[o]ne of the evils of a premature offer is its tendency to
encourage the formation by the offeree of an opinion of the value of the securities before a
registration statement and prospectus are filed." Id. The court recognized that a prefiling
announcement of a future sale of securities, coupled with "an attractive description of
these securities and of the issuer," conveys information that would be found in a prospectus. Id. (citing S.E.C. v. Arvida Corp., 169 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1958)).
51 Id.
52
Id.
53
17 C.F.R. § 230.135 (1997). The Rule allows the notice of a proposed offering to
contain additional information in the cases of rights offerings, exchange offerings, and
offerings to employees. Id.
45

46

Guidelines Release, supra note
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limits on the content of legal prefiling publicity that announces an
offering.
The SEC has liberally recognized that offers need not "take any
particular legal form."5 4 This position is consistent with the Commission's broad construction of the meaning of "offer" for the purposes
of section 5(c) and its strict definition of the contours of legal prefiling disclosure. "Offers" include a number of means of dissemination.
For example, prefiling announcements delivered via a speech, press
release, advertisement, article, broadcast, the Internet, or electronic
mail about an offering may constitute an illegal offer under section
5(c).
This treatment of all modes of communication as potential "offers" under section 5(c) has led to de-emphasis of the scope of the
dissemination as a measure of whether a communication is an "offer."
The SEC has not set forth a bright line test which would require that
the publicity reach either a certain audience or a minimum number
of those comprising that audience. In fact, publicity that is merely
55
publicly available may still constitute gunjumping.
In short, through sections 5 and 2(3) and Rule 135, "Congress
has specified a period during which, and a procedure by which, information concerning a proposed offering may be disseminated to dealers and investors." 5 6 Further, the Commission has explained that
"[t]his procedure is exclusive and cannot be nullified by recourse to
public relations techniques to set in motion or further the machinery
of distribution before the statutory disclosures have been made and
upon the basis of whatever information the distributor deems it expe57

dient to supply."

This limited statutory tolerance of prefiling publicity reveals that
the SEC could not broaden the availability of testing the waters to
registered IPOs under the current federal securities laws. As Part V
discusses, testing the waters, which allows prospective issuers to communicate an unlimited amount of information to potential investors,
54

Carl M. Loeb, Rhoades & Co., 38 S.E.C. 843, 849 (1959); see also Chiappinelli, supra

note 30, at 467-69 (discussing the various forms "offers" can take).
55 See Chiappinelli, supra note 30, at 468-69. Such publicity represents a "passive offer." Id. Of course, if the prefiling publicity does not actually reach investors, a court may
be less inclined to hold the issuer liable if it finds that the dissemination had little or no
impact on investors. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text. However, this may be a
difficult conclusion to draw because prefiling publicity that does not directly reach the
ultimate investors may affect the investors in other ways. For example, the publicity may
influence the purchase price of the securities by driving away other investors or leading
analysts and dealers to promote the offering to their customers. Consequently, investors,
who cannot establish that they relied on the pre-filing communication, may still have a
section 5(c) cause of action against an issuer.
56 Loeb, Rhoades & Co., 38 S.E.C. at 850-51.
57

Id. at 851.
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would not find shelter from section 5 under current Rule 135.58 Rules
135a-c currently exempt specific forms of publicity in particular circumstances from section 5, but none of these apply to the usage of
testing-the-waters materials before a registered IPO. 59 In the Testing
Release, the Commission seeks to add a new exemption: Rule 135d.
The heart of the controversy underlying the testing-the-waters proposal remains that although the Commission may have "previously
dr[awn] a not-always-clear line between those forms of preregistration
publicity that were permitted and those that were not... no doubt
existed that direct attempts to solicit the investor would not be tolerated." 60 The testing-the-waters proposal invites issuers to pursue such
a direct solicitation.
B.

The Purpose of the Statutory Prohibition of Gun-Jumping

As discussed above, Congress enacted the Securities Act to protect investors, and imbued the Commission with the responsibility of
fulfilling this objective through the administration and supervision of
the federal securities laws. 61 The gunjumping prohibition represents
the primary safeguard protecting investors during the prefiling period. The proscription of gun-jumping begins the "period of enforced silence" during which Congress, through section 5 of the
Securities Act, comprehensively channels all communications from
the issuer to prospective investors through the SEC. 62
Congress intended for section 5 to protect the public from misleading, fraudulent, illusory, or incomplete statements made by issuers or underwriters, who, in their efforts to persuade investors to
participate in a financing, might fail to disclose material information. 63 The Securities Act sought to afford the public an opportunity
to carefully examine the particulars of the issuer and its offering as
58 See infra Part VA2.
59 17 C.F.R_ §§ 230.135a-c (1997).
60 John C. Coffee, Jr., Re-EngineeringCorporateDisclosure: The Coming Debate over Company Registration, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1143, 1151-52 (1995) (footnote omitted). In
addition to the disclosure permitted under Rules 135 and 135a-c, there are other forms of
prefiling publicity that the Commission currently appears to tolerate. See 3A BLOOMENTHAI., supra note 11, § 6.09, 6-14 to 6-21 (discussing the SEC's liberal attitude towards the
following types of prefiling publicity- "product advertising and industry publicity," "appearances before analysts," and "research department publications").
61 See supra notes 1-2, 27 and accompanying text.
62 Coffee, supra note 60, at 1151.
63 See S. REP. No. 83-1036, at 2 (1954); S. REP. No. 73-47, at 1-2 (1933); H.R. REP. No.
73-85, at 1-5 (1933); see also Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 638 (1988) (stating that "[tihe
primary purpose of the Securities Act is to protect investors by requiring publication of
material information thought necessary to allow them to make informed investment decisions concerning public offerings of securities") (citing SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S.
119, 124 (1953); A.C. Frost & Co. v. Coeur D'Alene Mines Corp., 312 U.S. 38, 43 & n.2
(1941)).
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described in a prospectus the SEC had previously reviewed." 4 Prefiling publicity causes investors "to form... premature opinion[s] ...
without [the] benefit of the full set of facts contained in a prospectus," the accuracy of which the SEC can attempt to verify.65 Professor
Coffee candidly articulated why investors need protection and .how
the gunjumping prohibition provides this protection:
The obvious premise to Section 5 was that if investors could receive
glossy, promotional literature from the issuer, they might pay little
attention to the dull, formalistic prospectus prepared in accordance
with the rules of a government agency. Understandably, the government is not as slick, persuasive, or enticing as Madison Avenue,
and thus, if its mandated disclosure document is to receive investor
attention, the state needs a monopoly for at least a limited period
on access to the investor. Section 5 essentially provides that
monopoly...

.66

Prefiling publicity may have ramifications reaching far beyond
the obvious harm to individual investors, which the gunjumping prohibition seeks to address. For example, prefiling publicity may artificially interfere with the market price of the securities at the time of
the offering. 67 Further, the Commission suggested in Loeb, Rhoades &
Co. that investor reliance upon such publicity may endanger "the
health of the capital markets."

68

When dealers or investors suffer

losses as a result of a misleading statement made before the filing of a
registration statement, they will be less likely to participate in similar
offerings in the future. This threatens the success of future new
issues.
C.

Gun-Jumping as Applied to IPOs
The section 5(c) gun-jumping prohibition is particularly signifi-

cant in the context of IPOs. 69 Prefiling publicity regarding an IPO
64
65

See Carl M. Loeb, Rhoades & Co., 38 S.E.C. 843, 849 (1959).

66

Coffee, supranote 60, at 1151.
See Publication of Information Release, supra note 34, at 3149.
Loeb, Rhoades & Co., 38 S.E.C. at 854.

67
68

Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Bangor Punta Corp., 426 F.2d 569, 575 (2d Cir. 1970).

69 The legislature and the SEC often discuss gunjumping in terms of a balancing
dilemma. The Commission seeks to protect investors while simultaneously encouraging
companies to disclose material information to its shareholders and the public. See, e.g., id.
at 852. Full and fair disclosure to shareholders and the public represents the underlying
purpose of the reporting requirements under the Securities Exchange Act. See Santa Fe
Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477-78 (1977) (explaining that the primary purpose of
the Securities Exchange Act is to "implement[ ] a 'philosophy of full disclosure'"); S. REP.
No. 73-792, at 1-5 (1934); Guidelines Release, supra note 36, at 80,580; Publication of Information Prior to or After the Filing and Effective Date of a Registration Statement Under
the Securities Act of 1933, Securities Act Release No. 5009, [1969-1970 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 77,744, at 83,705, 83,706 (Oct. 7, 1969); Publication of Information Release, supra note 34, at 3147. However, this Note does not flesh out this argument
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may be more likely to have an effect on dealers and investors because
there is much less information available to the public regarding private companies. Private companies are not subject to the reporting
requirements prescribed by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as
amended ("Exchange Act").70 There is typically less public familiarity
with private companies. Private companies, especially smaller companies, usually have fewer shareholders than their public counterparts.
Moreover, analysts primarily track public companies. Therefore, because there is comparatively less information available about private
companies to compete with prefiling publicity, investors may need
even more protection before an IPO than before a subsequent public
offering by a seasoned issuer. In addition to this information gap,
sellers of securities offered in an IPO may use exceedingly aggressive
marketing tactics. Because the offering constitutes an issuer's first sale
to the public, the issuer, especially eager to consummate the offering,
may engage in puffing and overreaching to ensure the success of the
offering.
The consequences of gun-jumping by small issuers who offer securities to the public pursuant either to Regulation A or another exemption may be even greater than those for registered IPOs. Smaller
businesses that cannot afford a registered IPO may rely on Regulation
A to conduct an offering via a short-form registration. 7 1 Alternatively,
these small issuers may choose to raise capital via an offering that is
exempt from registration, for example, in reliance on Rule 504 of
Regulation D. 72 The aforementioned information gap may widen because businesses that contemplate these smaller public offerings often
sell to investors who are less financially sophisticated. 73 Conversely,
professional underwriters often market registered IPOs to institutional investors, mutual fund companies, and brokerage houses74
which usually have more financial sophistication than the individual
investors who are likely to purchase securities in a Regulation A or
Rule 504 offering. Such investors are more susceptible to fraud and
75
misrepresentation and thus need the protection of section 5(c).
Illegal prefiling publicity before both registered and exempt IPOs
poses the same systemic dangers discussed earlier in the context of
because it is not as relevant in the context of a private company considering an IPO. Private companies have far fewer shareholders and are not subject to the Securities Exchange
Act.
70
15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (1994 & Supp. i 1996).
71 See infra Part II.B.2.
72 See infra Part II.B.3.
73 See NASAA Comment Letter Regarding SBIs, supra note 18, at 9374.
74 See Zweig & Spiro, supra note 25, at 85-86.
75 SeeJoel Seligman, The HistoricalNeed for a Mandatory CorporateDisclosureSystem, 9 J.
CoRe. L. 1, 33-36 (1983) (discussing how fraud is more common in small issues).
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registered IPOs. Such publicity can artificially inflate the market price
76
and potentially harm the capital markets.

II
THE

NEED FOR TESTING THE WATERS

The promotion of capital formation has been a parallel policy
aim of the Securities Act.7 7 Although there are a host of means by
which a corporate entity can raise capital, public offerings, especially
registered IPOs, offer issuers substantial benefits. 78 As a result, the
SEC in 1995 proposed testing-the-waters legislation in the form of
Rule 135d that should help issuers to undertake registered IPOs. But
before attempting to promote registered IPOs in this way, the Commission in 1992 first introduced the testing-the-waters concept via
Rule 254 to help small businesses raise capital under Regulation A.
A.

Introduction to Registered IPOs

In a registered IPO, an issuer registers securities in compliance
with federal and state securities laws and sells shares of its stock to the
public for the first time. A company chooses to go public in order to
avail itself of the advantages of public ownership. 79 After a successful
IPO, a newly created public company has access to capital and gains
financial flexibility with which it can accomplish many ends. For example, the company can use the funds to satisfy debts, expand production, increase inventory, promote research and development,
acquire or merge with another entity using its liquid stock to pay the
See supra text accompanying notes 67-68.
See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
78 See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 1.6, at 61-62 (3d ed.
1996); FREDERICK D. LIPMAN, GOING PUBLIC: EVERYrHING You NEED TO KNOW TO SUCCESSFULLY TURN A PRIVATE ENTERPRISE INTO A PUBLICLY TRADED COMPANY 5-9 (1994); CARL W.
76
77

SCHNEIDER ET AL:, GOING PUBLIC: PRACTICE, PROCEDURE AND CONSEQUENCES 2-3 (1995);

StanleyJ. Friedman, Going Public: Some Basic Considerations,in How To GO PUBLIC: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SECURITIES LAws, at 13, 13 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice Course Handbook
Series No. 38, 1970); Richard Salomon, Second Thoughts on Going Public, HARv. Bus. REv.,
Sept.-Oct. 1977, at 126, 127; Ernest L. Ten Eyck, Why Go Public, in FINANCING A SMALL
BUSINESS IN THE SECURITIES MARKETS 1993, at 95, 97-100 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice Course
Handbook Series No. B-816, 1993); Robert L. Frome, GoingPublic, N.Y. LJ., Apr. 1, 1992, at

3; John F. Olson & D. Jarrett Arp, What Makes a Company a Good Candidatefor GoingPublic?
Citeria,Advantages, and DisadvantagesRelated To GoingPublic, SB09 A.L.I.-A.BA. 21, 25-29
(July 18, 1996); Philip W. Taggart et al., Deciding Whether To Go Public,NATION'S Bus., May
1991, at 51, 51.
79 For a discussion of the disadvantages of an IPO, see HAZEN, supra note 78, § 1.6, at
62-65; LIPMAN, supra note 78, at 9-13; SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 78, at 3-5; Friedman,
supra note 78, at 13-14; Salomon, supra note 78, at 127-31; Ten Eyck, supra note 78, at 10003; Olson & Arp, supra note 78, at 29-32; Harry L. Henning, So Your Client Wants To Go
Public,A.B.A. J., Mar. 1, 1986, at 58, 59-60; Roberta Maynard, Are You Ready To Go Public?,
NATION'S Bus.,Jan. 1995, at 30, 32; PrivateLives, FORBES, Dec. 5, 1994, at 184; Taggart et al.,

supra note 78, at 51-52.
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purchase price, improve compensation, launch a marketing campaign, and make investments.8 0 The offering also enables the company to diversify management's risks, yet retain its current
managers.8 1
The establishment of a public market translates into liquidity for
owners of the company. 82 This is in stark contrast to the situation
prior to the IPO, when shareholders, seeking to sell all or part of their
83
shares, may find themselves without a ready market. The listing of
the company's stock on an exchange or national broker quotation system increases its net worth and enables management to turn to the
public market in the future to raise capital through subsequent public
offerings.8 4 Furthermore, if the stock performs strongly, banks and
other financial institutions will be more inclined to loan the company
money.8 5 Finally, the company's new public status enables the public,
suppliers, and customers to become more familiar with the company.8 6 This may trigger greater demand for a company's products
and better sources of supply. An IPO can thus help a company both
in the short term and in the long run.
The Commission encourages registered IPOs because scholars
and industry experts recognize that IPOs benefit the capital markets
and economy at large. According to an IPO expert, "' [t]he IPO market is the most efficient allocator of capital ever devised in the
world.' 87 Although the IPO market concededly delivers much of its
fruits to institutional investors, this does not undermine the benefits
of the allocation. A successful IPO generates substantial capital for an
issuer in a short period of time and gives investors an equity interest
together with an opportunity for capital appreciation. Moreover,
IPOs pave the road for entrepreneurs to fulfill their visions. James H.
Clark, founder and Chairman of Netscape, which completed an astoundingly successful IPO in August 1994, commented that absent
IPOs, startup companies would not exist.8 8 Startups make important
contributions to the economy, creating jobs, introducing new products into the marketplace, rejuvenating aging industries, spawning
new industries, and injecting a fresh and energetic spirit into the
market.

82

See SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 78, at 2; Olson & Arp, supra note 78, at 25-26.
See generally Christopher Farrell et al., The Boom in 1POs, Bus. WK., Dec. 18, 1995, at
(citing the retention of management as the reason why "[gloing public is the preroute" of raising capital).
See SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 78, at 3.

83

See id.

84

See id. at 2.

85
86

See id.
See id. at 3.

87
88

Zweig & Spiro, supra note 25, at 86.
See Farrell et al., supra note 81, at 64.

80
81
64, 66
ferred
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There is a symbiosis between the economy and the IPO market.
A strong economy, coupled with a bullish stock market, fosters IPOs.89

Similarly, a successful IPO that transforms an undercapitalized startup
into a thriving public company may, in turn, "have a catalytic effect on
the economy."90 The last decade provides evidence that "[i]n the
world of IPO capitalism, success feeds on success, and the pool of sophisticated investment money" continues to grow.9 1 This "entrepreneurial multiplier effect" has given rise to many startups in the
past several years, and has propagated a record number of IPOs across
many different industries. 92 Professor Clifford Smith summed up the
impact of initial issuances by declaring that "'IPOs are a big part of
what makes the whole capital market process possible[; they] allow[]
the economy to tap into entrepreneurial zeal-and we're all wealthier
'
for it."1'

B.

Prelude to the SBIs
1. iPOs and Small Businesses

For the aforementioned reasons, many small, private businesses
have wanted to go public in the 1990s via a registered IPO. Small
businesses often lack other opportunities to raise capital. They experience difficulty because lenders are often reluctant to provide assistance to small businesses that lack a sufficient record of
performance.9 4 Private investors are similarly uneasy about providing
capital. 95 Many small businesses prefer to avoid private financings
which dilute equity to a greater extent than public offerings. 96 Hence,
even though public offerings are generally more expensive than pri97
vate financings, small businesses often seek to initiate IPOs.

However, a number of impediments hinder small businesses' access to the registered IPO market. Huge financial and time commitments pose the most towering obstacles, and continue to be
89 See id. at 65.
90 1& at 67.
91 Id. Even an unsuccessful IPO may benefit the economy because many entrepreneurs who lose in the IPO market will subsequently return to the arena and win. See id. at
72. Furthermore, in the wake of these inauspicious efforts to go public, a second wave of
entrepreneurs will learn from their predecessors' filures and prepare differently before
entering the IPO market. See id.
92 Id. at 68.
93 Id. at 66 (quoting Clifford Smith, Professor of Finance, University of Rochester).
94 See The Impact of the 1992 Small Business Initiatives,47 ADMIN. L. REv. 511, 512 (1995)
[hereinafter Impact of SBIs].
95 See id. at 512-13.
96 See Ronald M. Loeb & Alison Whalen, IPOs in the 1990's: Company Counsel's Role, in
ADVANCED SECURrTES LAw WORSHOP 1995, at 309, 312 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice Course
Handbook Series No. B-902, 1995).
97 However, there is of course no guarantee that a small business will be able to find
an underwriter willing to undertake an IPO.

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:464

particularly burdensome, for they do not subside after the IPO.98
Therefore, small businesses often are wary of going public because of
the increased operating costs and time requirements incurred in running a public company.
A small business considering a registered IPO must be prepared
to pay dearly before it receives any capital from the financing. The
miscellaneous costs of an IPO vary depending on the size, difficulty,
and timing of the offering. A private business that seeks to launch a
small $5 million registered IPO can easily incur expenses of $500,000
to $750,000, or ten to fifteen percent of the offering price. 9 9 Compliance costs, the legal, accounting, printing, and other expenses associated with compliance with federal and state securities laws, comprise
the major share of these costs. These costs are especially onerous for
small businesses because they are disproportional to the amount of
proceeds the offering generates. 10 0 Moreover, the company must pay
these expenses before the actual offering begins. 01'
There are additional intangible costs. For example, a small business may not be able to afford the substantial diversion of management's time and attention from the operation of the company to the
preparation for a registered IPO.102 The following figures estimate
the average amount of time that management devotes to taking a
company public: seventy-five percent of a chief financial officer's time,
forty percent of a chief executive officer's time, and between twenty03
five and thirty percent of other managers' time.
Following a registered IPO, a small public company continues to
incur substantial costs.

04

Compliance with the Exchange Act's rigid

reporting requirements is a costly undertaking: in total, after going
public, a company incurs new expenses of approximately $50,000 to
98 See infra text accompanying notes 104-05.
99 For estimates of the costs of going public, see LipmAN, supra note 78, at 51-52;
SCHNEIDER Er AL., supra note 78, at 38-43; Loeb & Whalen, supra note 96, at 312-13; Olson
& Arp, supra note 78, at 29-30.
100
See Impact of SBIs, supranote 94, at 512; Olson & Arp, supra note 78, at 23.
101
See Proposing SBIs Release, supra note 3, at 82,483-84.
102
See The EntrepreneurialInvestment Act of 1996: Hearings on H.R 2981 Before the Subcomm. on CapitalMkts., Sees., and Gov't Sponsored Enters. of the House of Representatives Comm.
on Banking and Fin. Sews., 104th Cong. 45, 48 (1996) (statement of Karl May, of Buckingham, Doolitle & Burroughs, on behalf of National Small Business United) [hereinafter
Hearingson H.. 2981] (explaining that as a result of the "enormous time spent on raising
funds rather than concentrating on [running] the business[, o]ften the business suffers or
deteriorates during the period that the owner is out seeking funds"). The cost to the
business of the diversion of senior executives' time "cannot be easily translated to dollars,
but is in many cases enormous." Id.
103
See Loeb & Whalen, supra note 96, at 312. Charles R- Stuckey, Chief Executive
Officer of Security Dynamics Technologies Inc., a company with 150 employees that went
public in late 1994, reported to Business Week that he spent 40% of his time preparing for
the IPO. See Farrell et al., supra note 81, at 69.
104

See SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 78, at 4.
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$200,000 per year. 05 Management will in turn devote much of its
time and energy to handling the day-to-day responsibilities of operat06
ing a public company
IPOs are not only highly expensive, but also extremely risky ventures. Many IPOs are unsuccessful and the stock often plunges after
the offering. 10 7 Therefore, a larger private company with greater resources is usually more willing and better prepared to weather the
storm. Moreover, a larger firm with more shareholders is more likely
to know its market, which is essential for gauging investor interest. A
smaller company may have trouble assessing whether the market is
interested in its IPO. 10 8 Furthermore, many small businesses cannot

afford the regulatory costs necessary to determine if there is market
interest. 10 9 Testing the waters is intended to address these latter two
problems.
2.

Regulation A Before the SBIs

In recognition of the formidable obstacles that preclude most
small businesses from undertaking registered IPOs, the SEC has historically turned to Regulation A to help small issuers conduct public
offerings." 0 By exempting small businesses from the registration requirements of section 5 of the Securities Act, Regulation A helps small
businesses to offer securities to the public."' When introduced in
1936, Regulation A exempted public offerings of only $100,000 or
less." 2 Over time, the SEC has increased this amount to adjust for
inflation, and to make the exemption available to a greater number of
small issuers." 3 Prior to the SBIs in 1992, the ceiling for Regulation A
114
exemptions was $1.5 million.
See id.
Mr. Stuckey, see supra note 103, reports that he currently spends 10% of his time
"dealing with the demands of being a public company." Farrell et al., supra note 81, at 69.
107 See supra note 25. In particular, small businesses have encountered considerable
economic difficulties after going public. See infra text accompanying note 146.
108 See Hearingson H. 2981, supra note 102, at 47; Proposing SBIs Release, supra note
3, at 82,483.
109 SeeFinancing America's Growth, supra note 1, at 82,467 (reporting that "a company
may have to spend $200,000 or more just to prepare the mandated disclosure forms and
financial statements without knowing whether there would be any investor interest in the
company").
110 See Proposing SBIs Release, supra note 3, at 82,485; An Analysis of the Use of Regulation A for Small Public Offerings, SEC, Directorate of Economic & Policy Analysis, [1982
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CGH) 1 83,207, at 85,052 (Apr. 1982). For the text of
Regulation A before the SBIs, see 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-.264 (1992). For the current provisions of Regulation A reflecting the SBIs revisions, see 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-.263 (1997).
111 17 C.F.R § 230.251 (1997).
112
See 3 Louis Loss &JOEL SEUGMAN, SECURmES REGULATION 1322 (3d ed. 1989).
113 See id. at 1322-27.
114 See Proposing SBIs Release, supra note 3, at 82,484 & n.52 (discussing the 1992
version of Rule 254(a), codified at 17 G.F.R. § 230.254(a) (1992)); Increase in Amount of
105

106
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Regulation A's status as an exemption is somewhat misleading because an issuer seeking to commence a Regulation A offering must
still prepare and file an offering statement with the SEC and deliver
an offering circular to each purchaser.1 1 5 Commonly known as a
"short form registration," 1 6 Regulation A simplifies the requirements
of "registration" and reduces the concomitant costs small issuers incur."

7

Prior to the SBIs, Rule 255(a), a Regulation A analogue to

section 5 (c), proscribed publicity before the filing of an offering statement with the SEC.""
Although Regulation A requires that an issuer prepare and file an
offering statement, it helps small issuers by decreasing the amount of
mandatory disclosure that must accompany the offering statement." 9
Regulation A also minimizes expenses incurred after a public offering
because it does not necessarily trigger subsequent annual and quarterly reporting requirements under the Exchange Act.' 20 Finally, the
offering materials, unlike those prepared for a fully registered offer121
ing, do not expose issuers to section 11 strict liability.
Despite these benefits, few small issuers availed themselves of
Regulation A in the decade before the adoption of the SBIs. 122 This
was because Regulation A limited issuers to an offering of $1.5 million, an amount too low for many small issuers, especially in light of
the compliance costs incurred in preparing and filing the offering
statement with both federal and state regulatory agencies. 12 3 Potential issuers were also uncertain whether there would even be market
Small Offering Exemption, Securities Act Release No. 5977, [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,710, at 80,877, 80,878-79 (Sept. 11, 1978).
115 See SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 78, at 45. The SEC added an exception for offerings of $100,000 or less for which offering circulars were not required. See Proposing SBIs
Release, supra note 3, at 82,484 n.54 (discussing the 1992 version of Rule 257, codified at
17 C.F.R. § 230.257 (1992)).
116
3 Loss & SEUGMAN, supra note 112, at 1319; SCHNEIDER ET AL, supra note 78, at 45.
117
See 3 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 112, at 1335-36; SCHNEIDER ET As., supra note 78,
at 46.
118 17 C.F.R. § 230.255(a) (1992).
119 See SCHNEIDER Er AL.., supra note 78, at 46. In addition, a small issuer generally may
attach unaudited financials covering a one-year period in a short form registration,
whereas expensive, audited financials are required in a registered offering. See Proposing
SBIs Release, supra note 3, at 82,484; SCHNEIDER ET Ar., supra note 78, at 46.
120
See Proposing SBIs Release, supra note 3, at 82,484 & n.55 (referring to 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o(d) (1988)).
121
See id. at 82,485.
122
See 3A BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 11, § 5.05, at 5-49. The SEC reported that there
were only 44 Regulation A filings during the 1991 fiscal year. In fiscal 1981, there were
439. See Proposing SBIs Release, supra note 3, at 82,483. Professors Loss and Seligman
refer to the "near-total eclipse" of Regulation A before the SBIs. 3 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra
note 112, at 1319.
123
See 3A BLoomENTHAL, supra note 11, § 5.05, at 5-49; KeithJ. Mendelson & Cindy R.
Shepard, The SEC's ProposedSmall Business Initiative: Bold Reform or Opportunity Forgone?, INsiGHrs, July 1992, at 12, 17.
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interest in their Regulation A offerings. 124 Further, underwriters,
seeking higher profits, were unwilling to handle most short form re12 5
gistrations, and insisted instead upon full registration.
3.

Regulation D Before the SBIs

As Regulation A offerings waned in the early 1990s, small businesses that were interested in public offerings, but lacked the resources for a registered IPO, were able to raise capital under
Regulation D. 12 6 Rules 504, 505, and 506 of Regulation D have enabled many small issuers to conduct private placements. 12 7 For example, Rule 505 of Regulation D enables an issuer to sell $5 million in
securities within a period of twelve months without registering
them. 2 8 In addition, after the initial sale of securities, an issuer need
29
only file a "notice of sales" of securities pursuant to Regulation D.1
Like Regulation A, however, Rule 505 contains certain drawbacks
that reduce its utility to small issuers.' 30 For instance, the issuer cannot be an investment company.' 3 ' Second, although an issuer may
sell securities under Rule 505 to any "accredited investor," ?s defined
in Rule 501(a), it cannot sell to more than thirty-five unaccredited
investors, or "purchasers" as narrowly defined by Rule 501 (e). 3 2 Further, an issuer using Rule 505 or 506 cannot offer or sell the securities
by means of "general solicitation or general advertising."1 3 3 If an issuer offers securities to nonaccredited investors, it is required to pay
for the preparation of audited financials. 3 4 Finally, small issuers may
have difficulty finding investors for Rule 505 and 506 offerings because Rule 502 requires purchasers to wait until the Rule 144 holding
See supra text accompanying note 108.
See 3 Loss & SEUGMAN, supranote 112, at 1320 & n.282 (reporting that underwriters handled only 10 of 104 Regulation A offerings in 1986); SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note
78, at 46.
126 See Mendelson & Shepard, supra note 123, at 17. For the text of Regulation D
before the SBIs, see 17 C.FR. §§ 230.501-.508 (1992). For the current provisions of Regulation D reflecting the SBIs changes, see 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-.508 (1997).
127 See Impact of SBIs, supra note 94, at 521.
128
See 17 C.F.R. § 230.505 (1992).
129 Id. § 230.503(a).
130 For further discussion of the limited practical availability of Regulation D to small
issuers before the SBIs, see Rutheford B Campbell,Jr., The Plight of Small Issuers (and Others)
UnderRegulationD: Those NaggingProblemsThat Need Attention, 74 Ky.L.J. 127 (1985); Patrick
Dougherty, Rethinking the Ban on General Solicitation, 38 EMORY LJ. 67 (1989).
131 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.505 (a).
132 Id. §§ 230.505(b), 230.501(e). Compare § 230.505 (permitting sales of securities up
to $5 million to no more than thirty-five "purchasers"), with § 230.506 (permitting sales of
securities in any amount to no.more than thirty-five "purchasers," each of whom must have
.such knowledge and experience in financial and business matters that he is capable of
evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective investment").
133 Id. § 230.502(c).
134 See id. § 230.502(b).
124
125
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periods have expired before reselling the securities without register35
ing them.
Rule 504, which exempts public offerings up to $1 million, has
36
provided small businesses with another alternative to Regulation A.'
Unlike Rules 505 and 506, Rule 504 does not limit small issuers' options by restricting the number or nature of purchasers eligible to buy
the securities. 3 7 However, before the SBIs of 1992, Rule 504 imposed
the same restrictions on general solicitation and advertising and resales by purchasers.' 3 8 An issuer that is either a reporting company,
pursuant to sections 13 or 15(d) of the Exchange Act, or an investment company cannot rely on Rule 504.139 The most limiting aspect
of Rule 504 was, and continues to be, that the exemption applies to
only very small offerings, those for which the aggregate offering over a
twelve-month period is priced at or below $1 million. 40 As with Regulation A, small businesses that seek to raise capital via Rule 504 also
incur considerable expenses which discourage potential issuers, espe14
cially when they do not even know that investors will be interested. '
4. IntrastateExemption
Section 3(a) (11) of the Securities Act, which the SBIs did not
amend, has provided another limited avenue for an exempt offering. 142 An issuer may make an offering of any size to any number of
purchasers, all of whom must reside in a single state or territory as
long as the issuer (i) is incorporated in that particular state and (ii)
conducts most of its operations in that state as well. 143 This intrastate
exemption is thus of limited utility because it allows an issuer to offer
securities only within its own state. In addition, issuers conducting an
intrastate exemption offering must comply with the Rule 147 safe harbor for such offerings, and with Rule 147(e)'s restriction on resales by
purchasers, which further detracts from the appeal of the
exemption. 4 4
'35

Id. § 230.502(d).

See Mendelson & Shepard, supra note 123, at 12.
See Proposing SBIs Release, supra note 3, at 82,484; supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.
138
See Proposing SBIs Release, supra note 3, at 82,484; 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b) (1992).
139 See Proposing SBIs Release, supra note 3, at 82,484; 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(a) (1)-(2)
(1992).
140 See Proposing SBIs Release, supra note 3, at 82,484; 17 G.F.R. § 230.504(b) (2) (i)
(1992).
141
See supra text accompanying note 108.
142
15 U.S.C. § 77c(11) (1994).
143
See id. Rule 147 outlines the specific requirements for both issuers and purchasers.
17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (1992).
144 17 C.F.R. § 230.147(e).
136
137
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Economic and PoliticalBackdrop

In light of the inadequacies of Regulation A, Regulation D, and
the intrastate exemption, the prohibitive costs and demanding time
commitments of going and remaining public via a registered IPO, the
inherent risks of undertaking an IPO, and the uncertainty regarding
the market's reception to an IPO, many small businesses in need of
capital have not ventured into the IPO market. 45 Additionally, success has eluded most small businesses with annual sales below $5 mil46
lion that have attempted to go public.
These problems were particularly apparent in 1992. The U.S.
economy was emerging from a recession, and small businesses were
bearing the brunt of the economic downturn. The aforementioned
obstacles denied small businesses access to the public markets. Further, small companies that were not prepared to go public had considerable difficulty obtaining private financing.14 7
Nineteen ninety-two was also an election year. Members of both
parties, including the two major presidential candidates, championed
the cause of small business, and explained that the troubled state of
small businesses was largely responsible for the recent sluggish economy.' 48 The resuscitation of small business was seen as the key to creating new job opportunities and restoring the economy. 49 In
addition, the Bush Administration repeatedly addressed the need to
streamline the federal securities laws.' 50 The SEC ultimately adopted
the SBIsjust before the Republican National Convention. Critics have
145 See Proposing SBIs Release, supra note 3, at 82,483 (highlighting the decline in the
number of small business IPOs between 1986 and 1991).
146 See Olson & Arp, supra note 78, at 23; Taggart et al., supra note 78, at 51.
147 See Proposing SBIs Release, supra note 3, at 82,483 (noting, in particular, the decline in both venture capital and bank financing).
148
See, e.g., The Small Business IncentiveAct of 1993: Hearingson S. 479 Before the Subcomm.
on Telecomm. and Fin. of the House of Representatives Comm. on Energy and Com., 103d Cong.
(1994); Carl W. Schneider, Small Business CapitalRaising-The Need for FurtherSEC Initiatives, INSIGHTs, Feb. 1993, at 2, 2.
149
See Proposing SBIs Release, supra note 3, at 82,482 (explaining that " tI] he approximately 20 million small businesses in the United States employ more than half of the domestic labor force, produce nearly half of the gross domestic product[,] and created the
vast preponderance of new jobs during the period from 1988 through 1990") (footnotes
omitted) (citing U.S. SMALL BusINEss ADMINISTRATION, THE ANNUAL REPORT ON SMALL
BusNmss AND COMPETTON (1990)); sources cited supra note 148.
150
See LeslieJ. Levinson & Anthony De Toro, A Guide to the SEC's Small Business Initiative, 17 SETON HALL LEGIS.J. 75, 75 (1993); Guy P. Lander, SEC Adopts Guidelineson Raising
Capital N.Y. LJ., Dec. 7, 1992, at 9. President Bush called upon the SEC to "eliminate or
revise those [securities laws) that clearly impose costs that exceed their benefits, and [to]
ensure that other regulations are implemented in a cost-effective manner." Council of
Economic Advisers, The Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers, in ECONOMIc REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 7, 191 (1992); see also Financing America's Growth, supra note 1, at
82,469 (commenting on a speech by President Bush in which he proposed measures to
reduce regulatory costs).
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commented that the political climate forced the SEC to hastily adopt
the SBIs when additional time would have enabled the SEC to im151
prove upon the proposed SBIs.
Against this backdrop, the SEC proposed the SBIs in a release on
March 11, 1992.152 In its Proposing SBIs Release, the SEC identified

small businesses as "the cornerstone of the U.S. economy," and reiterated that "the Commission has historically recognized the distinct financing concerns of start-up and development stage businesses and
companies newly entering the public markets." 15 3 The SEC then set
forth the following objectives of the SBIs: "[F]acilitating access to the
public market for start-up and developing companies, and... lowering the costs for small businesses that undertake to have their securities traded in the public market."154 The prevailing economic and
political pressures led to a foreseeable straining of the balance between encouraging capital formation and protecting investors. The
testing the waters rule introduced in the SBIs strained this balance
more than any of the other initiatives.
III
TESTiNG THE WATERS UNDER REGULATION

A

The period for public comment on the Proposing SBIs Release

ended on June 18, 1992.155 The SEC received substantial comments
from interested parties, many of whom expressed concerns regarding
the SBIs.156 The testing-the-waters initiative stimulated more concern
151
See, e.g., Amy L. Goodman, A Farewellto ChairmanBreeden, INSIGHTS, May 1993, at 2,
2 (reflecting that the Chairman of the SEC "rushed through the [SBIs] before the Novem-

ber 1992 election, ignoring ongoing negotiations among the state securities regulators, the
bar and the SEC to create an acceptable 'test the waters' approach"); Jonathan R. Laing,
Errorsof Commission: On Several Counts, the SEC Is Puttingthe Investor at Risk, BARRON'S, Sept.
7, 1992, at 8, 9 (describing the SBIs as a "political masterstroke," that is, "more a product of
political grandstanding than genuine conviction and ameliorative intent"); Rosalyn
Retkwa, States Slap Roadblock on SEC's Small Business Initiatives, CoRP.CASHFLOW, Apr. 1993,
at 37, 37 (quoting an observer who commented that the SBIs were intended "'to put a
small business feather in Bush's cap in preparation for the campaign'"); Kevin G. Salwen,
State Regulators Criticize SEC Proposals,WALL ST. J., July 28, 1992, at B2 (quoting Congressman Edward Markey who expressed concern regarding "'election-year deregulatory proposals'" that may undermine investor protection); see also infra notes 282, 285, 288 and
accompanying text (discussing the views of NASAA and the SEC).
152
Proposing SBIs Release, supra note 3. The SEC also drafted and sent to Congress in
April a bill, the Small Business Incentive Act of 1992, which similarly aimed to help small
businesses through amendments to the Securities Act and the Investment Company Act of
1940. S.2518, 102d Cong. (1992); H.R. 4938, 102d Cong. (1992).
153
Proposing SBIs Release, supra note 3, at 82,482.
154
Id. at 82,483.
155 See id. at 82,481.
156 For assessments of the SBIs, see infra note 206 and accompanying text. There were
sixty-six comment letters filed with the SEC. See SEC Adopts Small BusinessPackage, Some Say
It May Fall Short of Goals, 24 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1139, 1139 (July 31, 1992) [hereinafter SBIs May Fall Short].
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from commentators than any of the other proposals contained in the
SBIs Release. 157 Nevertheless, only four months after the Proposing
SBIs Release, the SEC adopted the SBIs with relatively few changes in
response to public comments. 158 The SBIs became effective on August 13, 1992.159
A.

The SBIs

Before discussing the testing-the-waters initiative in detail, it is important to summarize briefly the other principal initiatives for four
reasons. First, they show the SEC's commitment to assisting small
businesses. 160 Second, one must not view the testing-the-waters initiative in a vacuum, for it would achieve little without the further support
of these provisions. Third, they demonstrate, by contrast, the originality of the testing-the-waters initiative. Fourth, these other initiatives do
not address the problem confronting small businesses that testing the
waters was designed to address-uncertainty as to market interest.
1. Amendments to Regulation A
In addition to the testing-the-waters initiative, the Commission
overhauled much of Regulation A to make it more useful for small
issuers. 16' Addressing the primary problem with short form registration under Regulation A, the SEC increased the ceiling for offerings
162
in a twelve-month period from $1.5 million to $5 million.
New Rule 251, as revised, now prescribes the eligibility requirements for issuers. 163 Regulation A remains unavailable to issuers that
are investment companies. 6 4 In addition, issuers that are reporting
companies, "blank check" entities, or issuers of fractional undivided
interests in oil or gas rights may not rely on Regulation A.1 65 The SEC
extended eligibility to Canadian issuers that meet the other eligibility
157
158

See infra Part III.B.1.
SBIs Release, supranote 5, at 36,442.

159

See id.

160 The SEC clarified in the SBIs Release what constitutes a small business. In ascribing a revenue-based definition to "small business issuer[s]," the SEC designed the SBIs to
assist companies with revenues below $25 million. Id. at 36,446; see also infra note 182
(defining "small business issuer" in greater detail).
161 See SBIs Release, supra note 5, at 36,442; see also Loss & SELGMAN, supra note 112,
Supp. 1996, at 355 (responding that the SBIs represented another effort by the SEC "to
breathe life into Regulation A7).
162 See SBIs Release, supra note 5, at 36,443. The ceiling includes resales by purchasers
of up to $1.5 million. See i& The SEC also clarified that if small businesses availed themselves of other "'small issues' exemptions" such as under Rules 504 and 505 of Regulation
D, it would not affect the ceiling. Id
163 Id. at 36,468 (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.251 (1997)).
164 See id. (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(a) (4) (1997)).
165 See id. at 36,443, 36,468 (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.251 (a) (4)-(5) (1997)).
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criteria stated in Rule 251.166 Under revised Rule 251, otherwise eligible issuers that have violated Rule 262's "bad boy" provisions are dis1 67
qualified from the Regulation A exemption.
The SEC also modified the disclosure requirements of short form
registration.168 Although issuers must still file an offering statement,
they now have the opportunity to prepare the document in a "question-and-answer format."1 69 This is significant because the abbreviated format is both cheaper and easier for many issuers. Regulation A
issuers also now benefit from a safe harbor for forward-looking statements. The SBIs insulate Regulation A issuers from liability for fraud
when they in good faith include forward-looking statements in offer70
ing statements.
At the same time, the SBIs retain important safeguards for investors. For example, an issuer may make a written offer only by means
of an offering circular.' 7 ' The purchaser must receive the offering
circular at least forty-eight hours before a broker or dealer is required
to send the confirmation of a sale to the buyer.'7 2 Sales of securities
must await the "qualification" of the offering statement, which occurs
twenty calendar days after the filing.' 73 The SEC also eliminated Rule
257 of Regulation A, which authorized an issuer to make an offering
up to $100,000 without delivering an offering circular. 174
Lastly, the Commission introduced a "substantial and good faith
compliance" standard to address circumstances when issuers fail to
comply with the foregoing requirements. 175 Under the standard established in Rule 260, the SEC will not automatically prevent an issuer
who failed to meet a requirement under Regulation A from relying on
the exemption, so long as the issuer shows that (i) the particular rule
was not in existence for the protection of such investor, (ii) the violation did not materially affect the offering at large, and (iii) it made a
76
good faith effort to meet the requirements of the Regulation.
See id. (codified at 17 G.F.R. § 230.251(a) (1) (1997)).
See id. at 36,443 & n.51, 36,468 (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(a)(6) (1997)).
See id. at 36,443-44.
Id.
Id. at 36,444.
See id.
See id.
173
Id.
174
See id. at 36,445; supra note 115. According to the Commission, this change was
unlikely to affect adversely small issuers because (i) the modifications to Rule 504 rendered
"Rule 257 unnecessary" and (ii) few issuers in the preceding three years took advantage of
the Rule. SBIs Release, supra note 5, at 36,445 & n.63.
175 Id. at 36,444, 36,471 (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.260 (1997)).
176
See id. at 36,471 (codified at 17 C.F.RL § 230.260(a) (1997)). It is important to add
that the "substantial and good faith compliance standard" does not protect an issuer who
has failed to (i) qualify, (ii) file the requisite offering statement, or (iii) comply with the
dollar ceilings. Id. at 36,443-44.
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
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2.

Rule 504 of Regulation D

The Commission also sought to eliminate the disadvantages of
Rule 504 that rendered the exemption unappealing to small issuers. 17 7 The new Rule 504178 removes the proscription of general advertising and solicitation that constrained small issuers.' 79 Equally
appealing to issuers, the SEC now permits purchasers, who are not
affiliates of the issuer, to resell the securities immediately after the
purchase.' 8 0 In fact, an issuer who conducts an offering that does not
exceed $1 million within a one-year period is exempt from registering
the securities with the Commission and from all federal securities laws
except for antifraud and other civil liability requirements.'18
3.

IntegratedDisclosure System for Registration and Reporting

The SBIs streamlined disclosure requirements for small issuers as
well. The SEC implemented Regulation S-B, an "integrated disclosure
system" which eligible small issuers can use to (i) register securities
under the Securities Act, (ii) meet reporting requirements under the
Exchange Act, and (iii) comply with qualification procedures for trust
indentures under the Trust Indenture Act of 1939.182
4.

Testing the Waters-Rule 254

The revisions discussed in the preceding three subsections were
intended to help small businesses tap the public market to raise capital by simplifying regulatory procedures and reducing compliance
costs.' 8 3 To the extent the SBIs discussed above succeed in achieving

these results, small issuers should have increased confidence in their
ability to access the public market. However, these measures do not
provide a small issuer with sufficient information to conduct a proper
cost-benefit analysis regarding whether to pursue a public offering. If
an issuer's offering does not attract sufficient market interest, more
lenient disclosure and procedural requirements and lower compliance costs are immaterial. 8 4 As mentioned earlier, a small issuer
177
178

See supra Part II.B.3.
17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (1997).

SBIs Release, supra note 5, at 36,473 (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b) (1997)).
Id. (codified at 17 C.FR. § 230.504(b) (1997)).
181 See id. at 36,445.
182 Id. (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 228 (1997)). An eligible small issuer is defined in the
SBIs as a domestic or Canadian company with revenues under $25 million with a "public
float," i.e., the total market value of voting stock that is held by nonaffiliates of the issuer,
below $25 million. See id. at 36,449-50 (codified at § 228.10(a)(1) (1997)); see also 17
C.F.R § 230.405 (1997) (defining, among other terms, "small business issuer").
183 See SBIs Release, supranote 5, at 36,44243.
184 The converse is also true-a small issuer's knowledge that there are investors
keenly interested in its IPO is irrelevant if compliance with the federal securities laws is too
overwhelming for a small business to undertake or if the costs are prohibitive.
179
180
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often does not know, or cannot afford to assess, whether its offering
will generate market interest. 185 In response to this problem, the SEC
introduced the testing-the-waters initiative to assist a small issuer in
assessing market interest and determining whether to go public.
The SEC explained the value of testing the waters in the Proposing SBIs Release. The Commission reported that the testing-the-waters proposals would
for the first time, [permit] an issuer relying upon the Regulation A
exemption .. . to solicit indications of interest prior to filing the
mandated offering statement. Under this "test the waters" provision, a Regulation A-eligible issuer could use a written statement to
gauge investor receptiveness to a possible offering. The issuer
should then be better able to determine whether to incur the expense of proceeding with a public offering of its securities under
86
Regulation A or to follow some other capital-raising plan.'
The Commission was thus concentrating on its responsibility to promote capital formation. However, after setting forth the proposals,
the SEC addressed the second of its twin aims by "request[ing] comment on whether the 'test the waters' . . . propos[al] .

.

.provides

87
adequate protection to prospective investors."'
After reviewing the public comments, the SEC concluded that the
proposal "is consistent with investor protection interests.' q 8 The
Commission reconfirmed that testing the waters would facilitate capital-raising by eliminating the risk that a small issuer would incur
"[t]he full costs of compliance ...without knowing whether there will
1 89
be any investor interest in the company."
Under Rule 254, an issuer that meets the Regulation A eligibility
criteria may publish or deliver to potential investors a solicitation doc-

ument to ascertain market interest, in its offering. 190 In addition, an

issuer may prepare scripted advertisements on radio or television for
the same purpose.' 91 An issuer must submit a copy of the written document or script of the advertisement to the appropriate regional or
the main office of the Commission no later than the first day it uses
the materials to solicit indications of interest. 19 2 The copy must identify a person to whom queries about the document or script can be

186

See supra text accompanying notes 108-09.
Proposing SBIs Release, supra note 3, at 82,487.

187

Id.

185

188

SBIs Release, supra note 5, at 36,445.
Id. at 36,444.
190 See id. at 36,470 (codified at 17 G.F.R. § 230.254(a) (1997)).
191 See id. (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.254(a) (1997)).
192 See id. (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.254(b) (1) (1996)). The Commission has subsequently amended this provision to require small issuers to submit the testing materials to
the main office of the SEC in Washington, DC. See infra note 444.
189
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directed.' 93 The materials may include any factually accurate information, but must state (i) that the issuer is not soliciting money or any
other form of consideration; (ii) that a delivery of a detailed offering
circular must precede any sale of securities or any purchase commitment; (iii) that a potential investor has no commitment whatsoever
when he or she communicates interest; and (iv) the name of the issuer's chief executive officer as well as a brief description of the issuer's business practice and products. 19 4 However, a potential issuer
is required to submit only materials that are substantively different
from materials previously submitted.' 95 The solicitation document or
other materials submitted to the SEC become public documents.' 96
Finally, after sending the solicitation materials to the SEC, an issuer
may speak with potential investors and air other advertisements.97
The antifraud regulations under the federal securities laws apply to all
testing-the-waters communications. 98
An issuer may not make any solicitations of interest under Rule
254 after it has filed an offering statement. 99 Only after (i) the qualification of the offering statement and (ii) twenty calendar days after
the latest publication, document delivery, or aired advertisement may
20 0
an issuer begin selling the securities.
Compliance with the foregoing requirements of Rule 254(b) is
"not a condition to [the] exemption." 20 1 Nevertheless, although the
rules appear to be somewhat liberal, the Commission in the SBIs Release encouraged issuers to comply by explaining that violations of
Rule 254(b) are "grounds for Commission suspension of the
202
exemption."
The solicitation document can contain a coupon, which an interested, potential purchaser may return to the issuer with his or her
name, address, and phone number for the purpose of expressing interest in a possible offering.2 0 3 But an issuer may neither solicit nor
20 4
accept "money or other consideration" from a potential purchaser.
193

(1997)).
194

195
196
197

See SBIs Release, supra note 5, at 36,470 (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.254(b) (1)
See id. (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.254(b) (2) (1997)).
See id. at 36,44445 n.59 (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.254(b) (1) note (1997)).
See id. at 36,444 n.59.

See id. at 36,470 (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.254(a) (1997)).
198 See id. (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.254(a) (1997)). References herein to the antifraud provisions under the federal securities laws refer to section 17(a) of the Securities
Act and section 10(b) of the Exchange Act. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77q(a), 78j(b) (1994).
199 See SBIs Release, supra note 5, at 36,470 (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.254(b) (3)
(1997)).
200
See id. (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.254(a), (b) (4) (1997)).
201 Id. (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.254(b) (1997)).
202 Id. at 36,445; see 17 C.F.R. § 230.258 (1997).
203 SeeSBIs Release, supranote 5, at 36,470 (codified at 17 C.F.R.§ 230.254(c) (1997)).
204 Id. (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.254(a) (1997)).
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Finally, Rule 254(d) addresses the situation where an issuer, after testing the waters, decides in good faith to pursue a registered offering
instead of a Regulation A offering. Under these circumstances, an
issuer must wait thirty calendar days after its last solicitation before it
files an offering statement in order to avoid the integration of the
20 5
testing-the-waters activity with the registered offering.
A small issuer has no commitment to prospective investors after
testing the waters. If an issuer decides that there is a lack of interest in
its offering or that it no longer wishes to launch an offering for any
other reason, the issuer is not required to (i) proceed with the offering, (ii) file further documentation with the SEC, or (iii) further correspond with interested investors.
B. Assessing the Testing-the-Waters Rule
1. Analysis of Rule 254
The testing-the-waters rule received mixed reviews from the pub-

lic. 20 6 Reactions to Rule 254 varied because of the disparate interests

and concerns of scholars, practitioners, small businesses, the states,
NASAA, bar associations, and other interested parties. However, most
agreed that in contrast to the other SBIs, testing the waters was both
an "innovative" 20 7 and "controversial" 20 8 means of helping small issuers to raise capital.
205
See id. (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.254(d) (1997)). Rule 251(c) governs integration
of Regulation A offerings with other securities offerings or sales. 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(c)
(1997). An issuer that tests that waters under Rule 254 must wait six months to avoid
integration with a Regulation D offering. See 17 G.FR. § 230.502(a) (1997). Therefore,
integration will probably force an issuer that wants to commence a Rule 505 or 506 private
placement after relying on Rule 254 to wait six months, because the issuer will have presumably violated the general solicitation prohibition in Rules 505 and 506. 17 C.F.R.
§§ 230.502(c), 230.505(b), 230.506(b) (1997); see infra note 431 and accompanying text.
206 A discussion of reactions to, and an assessment of, the SBIs as a whole is beyond the
scope of this Note. For a critical assessment of the SBIs, see Impact of SBIs, supra note 94;
Ralph S. Janvey, The SEC's Small Business Initiatives: Regulatory Reform or Shabby Conduct?, 21
SEC. REG. L.j. 4 (1993); Levinson & De Toro, supra note 150; Marc I. Steinberg, The Emergence of State Securities Laws: Partly Sunny Skies for Investors, 62 U. GIN. L. Rxv. 395 (1993);
Priscilla S. Johnson, Note, The SEC's Small BusinessInitiatives and RegulationA: New Lifefor an
Old Exemption?, 13 J.L. & Com. 157, 162 (1993); John M. Allen, Jr. et al.,
New Regulation
Helps Small Business, NAT'L LJ., Sept. 21, 1992, at 17; Stanley Keller, SEC Small Business
Initiatives: New Opportunities Created, INsiGrrs, June 1993, at 15; Laing, supra note 151;
Lander, supra note 150; Herrick K. Lidstone, Jr., SEC's Small Business Initiatives, 21 CoLo.
LAW. 2553 (1992); Mendelson & Shepard, supranote 123; Retkwa, supra note 151; Mark A.
Sargent, No More Tinkering!, Bus. L. ToDAYJuly-Aug. 1992, at 5; Schneider, supra note 148.
207
See, e.g., 3A BLooMEwrNTH., supra note 11, § 5.05, at 5-65; Impact of SBIs, supra note
94, at 517, 520;Johnson, supra note 206, at 167; Keller, supranote 206, at 16; Mendelson &
Shepard, supra note 123, at 17; Schneider, supra note 148, at 2.
208 See, e.g., Impact of SBIs, supra note 94, at 517; Levinson & De Toro, supra note 150, at
79; Retkwa, supra note 151, at 37.
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The SEC itself recognized in the Proposing SBIs Release that the
testing-the-waters initiative was innovative. 20 9 The Commission explained that the proposed changes to Regulation A would allow small
issuers "for the first time" to test the waters before filing an offering
statement to assess interest in its public offering. 210 Prior to the SBIs,
old Rule 255(a), the Regulation A equivalent to section 5(c) of the
Securities Act, proscribed prefiling publicity.2 1' With the introduction of Rule 254, the SEC needed to introduce new Rfle 251(d) (1) (i)
to exclude testing materials from the requirements regarding prefiling offers.2 12 Thus, Rule 254 afforded small issuers an opportunity
formerly unavailable to issuers of any size.
In essence, Rule 254 permits gunjumping. Testing-the-waters
measures constitute an offer to sell under section 2(3) of the Securities Act.2 13 Rule 254 enables issuers to make an offer to sell prior to
the filing of an offering statement with the Commission. Such conduct is quintessential gunjumping. 214 The SEC historically has not
tolerated direct solicitations of investors before the filing of a registration statement.2 15 Testing the waters under Rule 254 epitomizes the
Commission's traditional concern that "although not couched in
terms of an express offer, [prefiling publicity] may in fact contribute
to conditioning the public mind or arousing public interest in the
[issue] in a manner which raises a serious question whether the pub216
licity is not in fact part of the selling effort."
However, in reality, issuers that test the waters under Rule 254 do
not commit gunjumping because (i) Regulation A issuers are exempt
from the Securities Act registration requirements including section
5(c), and (ii) after the SBIs, Rule 251(d) (1) (i) specifically allows issuers to test the waters before filing an offering statement without violating Rule 251 (d) 217 Nevertheless, the testing materials still trigger the
same concerns regarding investor protection. As discussed below,
Rule 254 is controversial because critics are worried that it seriously
2 18
exposes investors to misrepresentation and fraud.
209

Proposing SBIs Release, supra note 3, at 82,487.

210

See id.

See supra text accompanying note 118.
See 17 C.F.R1 § 230.251(d) (1) (i) (1997).
213 See Testing Release, supra note 8, at 86,892; Additional Small Business Initiatives,
Securities Act Release No. 6996, [1992-1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH)
185,134, at 84,118, 84,123 (Apr. 29, 1993) [hereinafter Additional SBIs Release]; Janvey,
supra note 206, at 45. For the language of section 2(3), see supra note 32 and accompanying text.
211
212

214

See Part I.A.

215 See supra note 60 and accompanying text; infra Part V.A.2.
216 Publication of Information Release, supra note 34, at 3149; see supra note 36 and
accompanying text.
217 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(d) (1) (i) (1997); supra text accompanying notes 111, 212.
218
See infra notes 229-57 and accompanying text.
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Others have not found that Rule 254 controversially helps issuers
at the expense of investors. Although there was a consensus that testing the waters represented an innovative approach that should help
small businesses to cost-effectively determine whether to undertake a
public offering, some critics maintain that Rule 254 does not assist
potential issuers enough. These critics acknowledge that Rule 254
reduces the onerous cost and burden of disclosure; however, they conclude that small issuers must still incur considerable expenses to test
the waters. 21 9 For example, an entrepreneur would still need to discuss with an attorney how to test the waters and how to comply with
the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws that apply to the
solicitation materials. 220 Furthermore, the costs of preparing and distributing the testing materials may prevent or deter small issuers from
relying on Rule 254. Identifying these and other costs, members of
the Federal Regulation of Securities Committee of the American Bar
Association ("ABA") argued that small issuers should be able to speak
with prospective investors before preparing the solicitation
2 21
document.
Another shortcoming of Rule 254 is its limited scope. Commentators have suggested that the Commission should extend testing the
waters beyond Regulation A so that small issuers contemplating private placements, other exempt offerings, or registered public offerings can test the waters. 22 2 After the SBIs, an issuer may rely on
Regulation A for offerings up to $5 million. This is considered a small
offering, one that investment banks are often reluctant to underwrite. 223 Although the SEC defined a "small business issuer" as a company with revenues under $25 million,22 4 Rule 254 currently provides
no assistance to a small business interested in undertaking a public
offering in excess of $5 million. A small business considering a public
offering of more than $5 million will then need to choose between (i)
conducting a smaller offering that will raise less funds than it requires
to take advantage of Rule 254, and (ii) forgoing the testing-the-waters
219 See Separate Statement of [Former] Commissioner Fleischman on Small Business
Initiatives, Securities Act Release No. 6925, [1991-1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 84,932, at 82,575 (Mar. 11, 1992) [hereinafter Fleischman Statement] (making
seventeen recommendations to reduce compliance costs for small issuers); Mendelson &
Shepard, supra note 123, at 17-18.
220

See Fleischman Statement, supra note 219, at 82,577; SEC Proposes Rules, Legislation

Aimed at Helping Small Business, 24 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 331, 332 (Mar. 13, 1992);
Mendelson & Shepard, supra note 123, at 18.
See Letter from John F. Olson, Chairman, Committee on Federal Regulation of
221
Securities, to Richard C. Breeden, Chairman, SEC (Feb. 28, 1992), quoted in Mendelson &
Shepard, supra note 123, at 18.
See Mendelson & Shepard, supra note 123, at 18; Schneider, supra note 148, at 4.
222
223
See SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 78, at 11.
See supra note 182.
224
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opportunity to pursue a larger offering. Similarly, a small business
interested in immediately commencing a Regulation D or other exempt offering that wishes to test the waters is forced to instead conduct a Regulation A offering. 225 In addition, a larger private
company, uncertain of its market appeal, may wish to test the waters
before conducting a public offering. However, unless the company is
content with a Regulation A offering below $5 million, it may not rely
on Rule 254.226
In fact, the limited utility of Rule 254 might lead small businesses
to abuse the testing-the-waters privilege. As discussed above, Rule
225
Rule 502(a)'s integration requirements and the general solicitation prohibition
that applies to Rule 505 and 506 offerings make it very difficult for an issuer to offer securities under Regulation D after testing the waters. See supra note 205.
226 A possible solution to these problems is to raise the current Regulation A ceiling.
Similar to the sentiment before adoption of the SBIs, see supra text accompanying notes
123, 162, there has been an outcry since 1992 to raise the current $5 million Regulation A
ceiling. See, e.g., Capital Markets Deregulation and Liberalization Act of 1995, H.R. 2131,
104th Cong. 26 [hereinafter Fields Bill] (introducing legislation in section 7(a) to amend
section 3 of the Securities Act in order to raise the ceiling prescribed therein to $15 million). In order to raise the Regulation A ceiling, Congress must first amend section 3(b)
because the SEC's authority to promulgate Regulation A derives from this section. See 15
U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1994) (authorizing the SEC to pass rules and regulations that exempt
from registration "any class of securities" for which compliance with section 5 is "not necessary in the public interest and for the protection of investors by reason of the small amount
involved or the limited character of the public offering"); Securities Act Release No. 627,
1936 WL 3434 (S.E.C.), at *1 (Jan. 21, 1936). The Fields Bill gave rise to the NSMIA, which
added new section 28 to the Securities Act and corresponding new section 36 to the Exchange Act. NSMIA, supra note 22, at 3424. Section 28 grants the Commission general
exemptive authority.
The Commission, by rule, regulation, or order, may conditionally or unconditionally exempt any person, security, or transaction, or any class or classes
of persons, securities, or transactions, from any provision or provisions of
this title or of any rule or regulation thereunder, to the extent that such
exemption is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, and is consistent with the protection of investors.
Id. at 3424 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77z-3 (Supp. II 1996)).
After the passage of the NSMIA, some observers concluded that section 3(b) is no
longer significant. See, e.g., Mary E.T. Beach, Unregistered Offerings of Corporate Securities, in
PRrVATE PLAcEmENTs 1997, at 45, 49 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice Course Handbook Series No.
B-983, 1997). The SEC can now adopt the section 3(b) exemptions under new section 28,
and therefore either eliminate or alter section 3(b)'s current $5 million ceiling which has
circumscribed its ability to raise the cap under Regulation A. See id. Section 7(a) of the
Fields Bill suggests that an increase of the Regulation A ceiling (as well as those for other
exempt offerings) to as much as $15 million may be forthcoming. See Fields Bill, supra, at
26; Martha L. Cochran & David F. Freeman, SecuritiesRegulatory Reform Legislation, in 28TH
ANNUAL INSTrUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION, at 299, 335 (PLI Corp. L & Practice Course
Handbook Series No. B-962, 1996); Richard H. Rowe, The CapitalFormationProvisions of the
1996 Ac INSIGHTS, May 1997, at 8, 8 n.4.
If the Commission raises the Regulation A ceiling, it would entitle many more small
issuers to test the waters pursuant to Rule 254. For an analysis of why this development
should not dissuade the SEC from adopting proposed Rule 135d, see infra Part V.E.3. See
infra text accompanying notes 541-44 for a discussion of how the NSMIA affects the Commission's efforts to adopt proposed Rule 135d.
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254(d) addresses the situation where an issuer tests the waters and
then decides in good faith to pursue a registered offering instead of a
Regulation A offering. 227 This allows an issuer to benefit from testing
the waters when it would have lacked such an opportunity, if it had
conducted a registered offering from the outset. It is uncertain
whether the good faith standard and the threat of integration are
strong enough to prevent issuers, who originally intend to conduct a
registered offering, from profiting from Regulation A's testing-the-waters exemption. In addition, Rule 254(d) only contemplates issuers
that subsequently pursue registered offerings. However, issuers may
test the waters, purportedly in preparation for a Regulation A offering, and then sell securities, for example, via the intrastate exemption
to purchasers found as a result of testing the waters. Such purchasers
may be particularly susceptible to fraud and misrepresentation because under federal securities law, issuers are not required to provide
disclosure for this type of offering, unlike in a Regulation A or other
public offering. The limited utility of Rule 254 is the initiative's largest drawback for issuers, and as discussed below in Part IV, this con228
cern gave rise to the Testing Release.
Although there is support for the proposition that Rule 254 did
not do enough to help small businesses, the greater concern is that
the Rule does not provide investors with adequate protection. 229 Rule
254 is often characterized as "controversial" because many believe that
it tilts the balance, previously maintained by old Rule 255 (a), in favor
of raising capital and away from protecting investors. 230 The states,
which have a compelling interest in guarding the interests of their
resident investors, and NASAA, which represents the states, were the
loudest proponents of this view.
Both state securities administrators and NASAA legitimately opposed Rule 254 because it left investors vulnerable. For example, they
were concerned that Rule 254 did not provide any guidance regarding
how businesses can test the waters. 23 1 Moreover, because no rule requires the distribution of materials, entrepreneurs or their agents
could file the testing materials with the SEC and then immediately
begin cold calling.232 State regulators also warned of a greater dan-

ger: that issuers may actually sell their securities while they are testing
the waters. 23 3 In short, the states expressed concern that rather than
test the waters, "unscrupulous operators will 'boil' the waters" by excit227
228
229
230
231
232
233

See
See
See
See
See
See
See

supra note 205 and accompanying text.
infra notes 380-81 and accompanying text.
SBIs May Fall Shor, supra note 156, at 1139.
supra text accompanying note 118; supra note 208 and accompanying text.
Retkwa, supra note 151, at 37-39.
id, at 37.
SBIs May Fall Shor4 supra note 156, at 1139.
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ing prospective investors who will then ignore the disclosure in the
23 4
offering circular.
Such practices give rise to two significant concerns. First, investors may become more susceptible to fraud and misrepresentation,
which are more common in smaller issues. 2 35 Investors lost a primary
defense against these harms, the threat of section 12 (a) (2) liability for
issuers who made misrepresentations in prospectuses, 23 6 when the
SEC in April 1993 amended Rule 254 to effectively exempt written
testing materials from section 12(a) (2).237 The SEC added Rule
254(e), which establishes that written testing materials distributed to
the SEC in compliance with Rule 254 "shall not be deemed to be a
prospectus as defined in section 2(10) of the Securities Act."23 8

Therefore, because section 12(a) (2) only applies to prospectuses, it
does not apply to testing-the-waters materials, given that Rule 254(e)
provides that these materials fall outside the definition of a "prospectus." Second, Rule 254 may cause systemic problems such as a "misallocation of capital." 23 9 The SBIs encourage eager small businesses,
which have not yet developed careful business plans, to approach investors hastily.2 40 As a result, investors who suffer losses may be reluc234 Retkwa, supra note 151, at 37-39 (discussing the danger that "unethical operators
will 'drop the hook' with an oral pitch, and investors won't pay attention to the written
disclosure documents that arrive later"). A state securities regulator described the obvious
.outcome when a roomful of unsophisticated investors are hit with the dogand-pony show of an adept salesman. The sale will be made long before the
investors ever get their hands on the SEC offering circular, which carefully
delineates the company's business and its risks. Most investors won't even
bother reading the prospectus."
Laing, supra note 151, at 21 (quoting the then president-elect of NASAA and director of
the Massachusetts Securities Division).
235
See 'Testing the Waters' Rules Still Troubling State Regulators, 24 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA) 1642, 1642 (Oct. 23, 1992) [hereinafter Testing Rules Still Trouble States]; supra text
accompanying note 75.
236
See 15 U.S.C. § 771(a) (2) (1994).
237
See infra note 238 and accompanying text. However, an oral solicitation made pursuant to Rule 254 can still trigger section 12(a) (2) liability. See Additional SBIs Release,
supra note 213, at 84,123 n.46.
238
17 C.F.R § 230.254(e) (1997); see also Additional SBIs Release, supra note 213, at
84,122-23 (stating that written testing-the-waters material is not a prospectus); 3A BLOOMENrHAL, supra note 11, § 5.05, at 5-70 (same); SEC Adopts Rules FurtherRelaxing Small Business Disclosure Requirements, 25 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 619, 620 (Apr. 30, 1993)
[hereinafter SECAdopts FurtherRules] (same). The language of Rule 254(e) excludes from
the section 2(10) definition of a prospectus, and the Supreme Court's interpretation of
this definition, written testing materials that (i) comply with Rule 254 and (ii) have been
submitted to the SEC. The Supreme Court held in 1995 that a "prospectus," for the purposes of the federal securities laws, "refer[s] to a document that describes a public offering
of securities by an issuer or controlling shareholder." Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S.
561, 584 (1995).
239
Testing Rules Still Trouble States, supra note 235, at 1642.
240 See id.
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tant or unwilling to invest in small businesses in the future.2 4 1 This
would defeat the purpose of the SBIs because it would ultimately
242
make it more difficult for small businesses to obtain capital.
NASAA reiterated the concerns of state securities regulators. In a
caustic comment letter, NASAA remarked that the Commission's "attempt to assist small business issuers by removing investor protection
is short sighted." 24 3 NASAA was particularly concerned about small
investors, noting that "the Commission has become too eager to favor
244
small business concerns over those of the small public investor."
Although NASAA indicated its support for the Commission's intended
goal for testing the waters, it found "virtually no safeguards" in Rule
254.245 The small investor, often lacking financial sophistication, is

especially vulnerable because Rule 254 allows issuers to orally solicit
potential investors after merely filing testing materials that lack the
more comprehensive disclosure provided in the forthcoming offering
circular. 246 NASAA's comment letter explained that the SEC was "embarking on an attempt to facilitate the sale of the riskiest securities in
247
the market to the least sophisticated of buyers."
There are few safeguards built into Rule 254. For example,
although the issuer must file a solicitation document, the Rule does
not impose any content restrictions other than requiring the accuracy
of all statements. 248 In contrast, the SEC has explained that "Rule
254(b) (2) (iv) sets forth the minimum amount of information that
must be provided." 24 9 As a result, prospective issuers may make exceedingly optimistic projections that would mislead small investors.
Further, the requirement of "publication or delivery" of the solicitation document is ineffective because an issuer is not required to deliver the document to investors. 250 Thus, issuers may contact investors
who have not read the solicitation document prepared in compliance
241
See id. (identifying "a diversion of capital from better run enterprises" as a consequence of the SBIs that will harm small businesses).
242
See id.
243
NASAA Comment Letter Regarding SBIs, supra note 18, at 9374.
244 Id.
245
Id. at 9379.

See id. at 9376-78. In fact, after publication or delivery of the solicitation document,
246
an issuer is free to communicate with an investor who has not read the document. See id. at
9378.
247 Id. at 9374. NASAA's reaction was largely influenced by the rampant penny stock
fraud in the years before the adoption of the SBIs that harmed many individual investors
who lost up to $2 billion per year. See 3A BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 11, § 5.05, at 5-68;
Steinberg, supra note 206, at 410 & nn.71-72; Testing Rules Still Trouble States, supranote 235,
at 1642.
248 See NASAA Comment Letter Regarding SBIs, supra note 18, at 9379.
249
Michael I. Keller Enterprises, Ltd., SEC No-Action Letter, [1994-1995 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 76,952, at 78,752 (Dec. 1, 1994) [hereinafter Keller
Enterprises No-Action Letter].
250
NASAA Comment Letter Regarding SBIs, supra note 18, at 9379.
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501.

with Rule 254.251 Rule 254(b) (4)'s so-called "cooling-off' period simi252
larly fails to shield investors sufficiently from oral representations.
Rule 254(b) (4) requires the postponement of sales "until [twenty] calendar days after the last publication or delivery of the document or
radio or television broadcast." 25 However, there is no cooling-off pe25 4
riod between the final oral solicitation and the sale of the securities.
In fact, Rule 254(b), which explains that noncompliance with the provisions thereof does not preclude an issuer from relying on the exemption, undermines the effectiveness of the few safeguards that are
in place. 255 Finally, Rule 254(a) prescribes the antifraud provisions as
the liability standard, while Rule 254(e), in effect, precludes the application of section 12(a) (2) as the liability standard for testing materials. 256 The prescription of the antifraud provisions of the securities
laws as the basis of liability inadequately protects investors because recent case law and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
have made it exceedingly difficult for plaintiffs to bring and prevail in
2 57
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 private actions.
NASAA suggested that issuers may also suffer under Rule 254.
Testing the waters may "raise[ I false hopes for many persons eager to

251
252
253
254
255
256

See id.
See id.

17 C.F.R. § 230.254(b) (4) (1997).
See NASAA Comment Letter Regarding SBIs, supra note 18, at 9379.

See supra text accompanying notes 201-02.
See supra notes 198, 236-38 and accompanying text. NASAA and some scholars
have argued that the antifraud standard inadequately protects investors. See, e.g., NASAA
Comment Letter Regarding SBIs, supranote 18, at 9379; Steinberg, supra note 206, at 409.
257
See Douglas M. Branson, Running the Gauntlet:A Descriptionof the Arduous, and Now
Often Fata Journy for Plaintiffs in FederalSecurities Law Actions, 65 U. CIN. L.Rxv. 3 (1996)
("describ[ing] the entire gauntlet a plaintiff now must run [to bring a private cause of
action under Rule 10b-5] based on recent developments in substantive securities law, in
judicial measures to stem and manage any flood of litigation, and in the [Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995]"). In particular, only actual purchasers and sellers can
recover in a private Rule lOb-5 claim. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S.
723, 754-55 (1975). The statute of limitations for a Rule lOb-5 claim is very short: one year
following discovery with a three year limitation after the violation. See Lampfv. Gilbertson,
501 U.S. 350, 364 (1991). There is also a scienter requirement for a Rule lOb-5 claim. See
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214-15 (1976). The heightened pleading requirements under section 21D (b) (2) of the Exchange Act that section 101 of the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (the "PSLRA7) codified, see PSLRA, Pub. L. No.
104-67, 109 Stat. 737, 747 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (2) (Supp. I 1995)), have also
made it very difficult for plaintiffs to prove section 10(b) liability in a private action. Furthermore, under section 21D (b) (3) (A), a failure to meet the heightened pleading requirements may be grounds for a defendant's motion to dismiss. Id (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u-4(b) (3) (A) (Supp. I 1995)). Section 21D(b) (3) (B), which prescribes a stay of discovery "during the pendency of any motion to dismiss," also undermines plaintiffs' efforts
to litigate a Rule 101>5 claim. Id. (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (3) (B) (Supp. I 1995)).
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start businesses... who are not really suited to raise capital from the
258
public."
2.

The "Coordination"Problem

The rift between the SEC, on the one hand, and the states and
NASAA, on the other, was serious because the federal securities laws,
including Regulation A, did not trump state securities laws, known as
blue sky laws. 259 Both the Securities and Exchange Acts recognized
until the adoption of the NSMIA in 1996 that the federal securities
laws did not preempt state laws. 260 Blue sky laws in most states differ

from federal securities laws in that they paternalistically provide investors with greater protection. 26 1 Although the federal securities laws
and the SEC primarily emphasize disclosure obligations, 26 2 some
states additionally impose "merit regulation" which securities administrators apply to determine whether an offering is "'fair, just[,] and
258 NASAA Comment Letter Regarding SBIs, supra note 18, at 9378. In response to
these myriad problems with Rule 254, NASAA proposed further safeguards intended to
protect investors without adding substantially to issuers' costs. Id. at 9380-81. See infra Part
III.C.1 for a discussion of the NASAA model, which incorporates many of these proposed
safeguards.
259 For a discussion of the relationship between federal and state securities laws before
the NSMIA, see Rutheford B Campbell,Jr., An OpenAttack on the Nonsense ofBlue Sky Regulation, 10J. CORP. L. 553 (1985); FrancisJ. Facciolo & Richard L. Stone, Avoiding the Inevitable: The ContinuingViability of State Law Claims in the Face ofPrimaryJurisdictionand Preemption
Challenges Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 1995 COLUM. Bus. L. Rxv. 525; Marianne
M. Jennings et al., Federalism to an Advantage: The Demise of State Blue Sky Laws Under the
Uniform Securities Act, 19 AKRON L. REv. 395 (1986); Roberta S. Karmel, Blue Sky Merit Regulation: Benefit to Investors or Burden on Commerce?, 53 BRooIK. L. REv. 105 (1987);Jonathan R.
Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Origin of the Blue Sky Laws, 70 TEx. L. REv. 347 (1991); Mark A.
Sargent, A FutureforBlue Sky Law, 62 U. CIN. L. RIv. 471 (1993); Steinberg, supra note 206;
Manning Gilbert Warren III, Reflections on DualRegulation of Securities: A CaseAgainst Preemption, 25 B.C. L. REv. 495 (1984); BrianJ. Fahrney, Comment, State Blue Sky Laws: A Stronger
Casefor FederalPre-emptionDue to IncreasingInternationalizationof Securities Markets, 86 Nw. U.
L. Ray. 753 (1992). Several of these articles suggest that blue sky law is obsolete and unnecessary. Since the adoption of the SBIs, Congress in 1996 passed the NSMIA which
preempts state securities laws for many types of securities and securities transactions. See
infra Parts III.C.3, V.D.
See section 18 of the Securities Act ("Nothing in this subchapter shall affect the
260
jurisdiction of the securities commission (or any agency or office performing like functions) of any State or Territory of the United States, or the District of Columbia, over any
security or any person.") (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77r (1994)); section 19(c) (3) (C) of the
Securities Act ("Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as authorizing preemption of
State law.") (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77s(c) (3) (C) (1994)); section 28 of the Exchange Act
("Nothing in this chapter shall affect the jurisdiction of the securities commission (or any
agency or officer performing like functions) of any State over any security or any person
insofar as it does not conflict with the provisions of this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder.") (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1994)). In October 1996, Congress
essentially repealed this language in section 18 of the Securities Act and section 28 of the
Exchange Act by passing the NSMIA. For a discussion of how the NSMIA has affected
issuers' capacity to test the waters under Rule 254, see infra Part III.C.3.
261
See Sargent, supra note 259, at 486.
262 See supra text accompanying note 2.
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equitable."' 263 If an offering does not meet these "substantive standards," an issuer cannot compensate by providing more detailed disclosure. 264 Rather, merit regulation prohibits the issuer from
265
conducting the offering in the state.
Prior to 1996, many issuers were bound by the blue sky laws of
most states which required issuers seeking to offer or sell securities in
their state to register the securities with the state's securities division
unless the state's laws provided an exemption. 266 The most common
means of state securities registration are qualification, notification,
2 67
Small Corporate Offering Registration (SCOR), and coordination.
Coordination is the simplest and least expensive for most issuers, because it allows an issuer to coordinate the filing of both state and SEC
registration statements. 268 However, virtually no states permit Regulation A issuers to register through coordination because such an issuer
is registering securities with the Commission via an offering statement-not by means of a registration statement. 269 Similarly, the
most widely available exemptions under the various blue sky laws do
270
not aid a Regulation A issuer.
Therefore, an issuer interested in offering securities pursuant to
Regulation A in states that do not allow coordination must register the
securities, via either qualification or notification, in every state in
which it intends to offer or sell securities. In addition, a Regulation A
issuer may have to meet the aforementioned merit criteria in multiple
states. 2 71 Compliance with federal and state requirements is very expensive and often confusing for issuers because federal securities laws
263 Sargent, supranote 259, at 473.
264 Rutheford B Campbell,Jr., Blue Sky Laws and the Recent CongressionalPreemptionFailure, 22J. CoRn'. L. 175, 177 (1997); see also Sargent, supranote 259, at 487 (noting that in
merit regulation, "the individual's disadvantages cannot be offset by eliminating informational asymmetries through government-mandated disclosure"). Although many states followed the merit standards prescribed in section 306(a) (2) (A) of the Uniform Securities
Act, a significant problem with merit regulation lay in that many states had standards that
differed from those adopted by other states. See Campbell, supra, at 186.
265 See Campbell, supra note 264, at 177; Sargent, supra note 259, at 486.
266 See Campbell, supra note 264, at 185.
267 See id. at 185-86.
268
See id. at 186. Notification is actually cheaper than coordination; however, few issuers qualify because of strict earnings criteria.
269
See SCHNEIDER F" AL., supra note 78, at 46; Campbell, supra note 264, at 186, 193;
Keller, supra note 206, at 18.
270
See Campbell, supra note 264, at 193. For an explanation of why the small offering
exemption, the Uniform Limited Offering Exemption (ULOE), the national securities exchange exemption, and the Uniform Securities Act exemptions are inapplicable to Regulation A offerings, see id. at 187-90.
271
In the case of private and limited offerings exempt from registration under the
federal securities laws, such as Regulation D offerings, many states have exempted these
offerings from their strict merit regulation. See Sargent, supra note 259, at 476-77. Similarly, states could exempt Regulation A offerings from merit scrutiny.
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often differ from blue sky laws.27 2 As a result, testing the waters under

Rule 254 may not be cost-effective for many small issuers because they
still must pay the costs of compliance with both federal and state securities laws.
Given that there are only a small number of states that require
the coordination of state law with federal securities law, 273 the remain-

ing states may enact laws that diverge from federal securities laws.
The result is that "[t]he state regulators' sovereign ability to superimpose upon offerings in their jurisdictions additional, inconsistent or
even prohibitory criteria means that they indeed have the last word,
and that they can reduce the best-intentioned federal reforms to practical insignificance." 274 In the case of Rule 254, issuers will not be able
to test the waters effectively in states that do not either adopt Rule 254
275
or engage in corresponding rulemaking.
Congress recognized the importance of coordinating federal and
state securities laws and decreed section 19(c) of the Securities Act,
which authorizes the SEC to work with associations of state securities
regulators, to "assist in effectuating greater uniformity in Federal-State
securities matters."2 76 The Commission's efforts to adopt Rule 254
constituted a "violat[ion of] the spirit of Section 19(c)." 277 According
272 See Campbell, supra note 264, at 193-94.
273 See Testing Rules Still Trouble States, supra note 235, at 1642. In a few states, state
securities regulators must take measures such as holding hearings in order to deviate from
federal law. See id.; Colo. InitiatesRulemaking Aimed at SEC Small Business Rules, 24 Sec. Reg.
& L. Rep. (BNA) 1529, 1529 (Sept. 25, 1992) [hereinafter Colorado InitiatesRulemaking].
274 Sargent, supra note 206, at 8.
275
See Mendelson & Shepard, supra note 123, at 18. Lack of coordination threatens
not only the effectiveness of Rule 254, but also of a number of the other SBIs.
276
15 U.S.C. § 77s(c) (1) (1994). The statute endorses "greater Federal and State co-

operation in securities matters" in order to promote the (i) highest regulatory effectiveness, (ii) greatest regulatory uniformity in federal and state laws, (iii) minimum regulatory
intrusion upon efforts to raise capital, (iv) raising of capital by issuers, especially small
businesses, through a significant decrease in the requisite paperwork and compliance
costs, and (v) minimization of the costs of government administration. Id. § 77s(c) (2). In
addition, Congress intended to foster cooperation between the Commission and state and
other securities regulators in the (i) exchanging of information concerning issuers' application for registration or exemption of issues within the states, and (ii) establishment of
uniform forms, procedures, and an exemption for small issues. See id. § 77s(c) (3).
277 NASAA Comment Letter to SEC Secretary, Jonathan Katz, Regarding SEC Release
Nos. 33-6950, 34-30969, 39-2288, [1986-1993 Transfer Binder] NASAA Rep. (CCH) 9349,
at 9390, 9390 (Oct. 5, 1992) [hereinafter NASAA Comment Letter Regarding Additional
SBIs] (referring to additional SBIs); see also Richard H. Rowe, FinancingSmall Business in the
SecuritiesMarkets: An Overview, in FINANCING A SMALL BUSINESS IN THE SECURITIES MARETS 9,
66 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice Course Handbook Series No. B-816, 1993) (rhetorically questioning whether the Commission's adopted version of Rule 254 represents a "break down
of [section] 19(c) [p~olicy?"). But seeJohnson, supranote 206, at 175 (explaining that the
SEC's consultation with securities regulators of the states and NASAA and its provision of a
three-month comment period demonstrate that it complied with section 19(c)). The
SEC's conduct prior to the SBIs is important to discuss because it differs significantly from
that leading up to the promulgation of the Testing Release. See infra Part IVA, D.
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to NASAA, representatives of the Association, staff members of the
SEC, and members of the American Bar Association worked together
for two years to develop uniformity under Regulation A. 2 78 Appar-

ently nearing "a concrete proposal," NASAA complained that the SEC
staff "unilaterally and without explanation terminated the [ ] deliberations in the fall of 1991."279 NASAA ultimately learned that the SEC
280
planned to publish the SBIs from an article in the Wall StreetJournaL
The Commission's conduct made coordination improbable. In
reaction to the SEC's unwillingness to work with the states, NASAA
insisted that despite section 19(c), the Commission was not interested
in working with the states to develop a coordinated.approach to small
businesses' issuances.2 81 NASAA concluded that the Commission's
political concerns were greater than its concern for small businesses. 28 2 In response, Richard Breeden, then Chairman of the SEC,
contended that "'[t] he states have set themselves up with a stranglehold on capital formation with the very types of companies that have
traditionally provided the backbone for growth of the American
283
economy."'
Although the states, NASAA, and certain commentators have
complained that the Commission's "unilateral" and "political" action
destroyed an opportunity for coordination, certain scholars have
noted that because the SEC sought to implement "bold reforms,"
there was not in reality a strong likelihood that the Commission and
the states would find common ground.2 8 4 According to this view, if
the SEC had waited for full coordination with the states, it may not
have adopted the SBIs at all 2 85 An additional problem confronting
the SEC during the discussions was that the securities administrators
of the states did "not 'always speak with one voice."' 2 86 Furthermore,
cooperation was further complicated because the SBIs "mak[e] transactions harder to track," which in turn "make the state regulators'jobs
'more difficult,"' and thus partially explains their opposition.2 8 7 However, these explanations are insufficient. Richard Roberts, former
278

NASAA Comment Letter Regarding SBIs, supra note 18, at 9373.

279
280
281

Id.
See id.

Id.
Id.; see Goodman, supra note 151, at 2.
283 Salwen, supranote 151, at B2. Breeden added that the SEC did not exist " ' to simply take suggestions from a trade association of state bureaucrats.'" Id.
284 Impact of SBIs, supra note 94, at 524-26 & n.105.
285 See id. at 525. Forced to choose between "a 'carrot or stick' approach toward coordinating regulation with state officials," the Commission pursued its agenda with the expectation that the states would follow its lead. SBIs May Fall Short, supra note 156, at 1139.
286 SBIs May Fall Short, supra note 156, at 1139.
287 Bradford McKee, Simpler Offeringsfor Smaller Firms,NATION'S Bus., July 1993, at 33,
282

506
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Commissioner of the SEC, offered a further explanation, conceding
several months later that the political climate had forced the agency
to depart from the coordinated rulemaking necessary for Rule 254 to
28 8
succeed.
After adoption of the SBIs, most observers and interested parties
identified the absence of coordination as the greatest threat to the
success of testing the waters under Rule 254. For example, scholars
and practitioners certainly understood that cooperation between the
Commission and the states as well as coordination of federal and state
securities laws were prerequisites to the success of the SEC's testing
the waters rule. 2 89 This is particularly significant because coordinating Regulation A offerings with blue sky laws has historically been
problematic. 290 The ABA echoed the views of commentators that
without cooperation with the states and coordination of federal and
state securities laws, "'[a] ny simplification of the federal requirements
will be both illusory and frustrating to the intended purposes of encouraging small business investment."' 291 Likewise, the SEC subsequently admitted that state adoption of testing the waters is
essential. 292 Not surprisingly, the states and NASAA also identified
the absence of state and federal coordination as particularly
29 3
worrisome.
C.

Aftermath of the SBIs
1.

The States and NASAA

The contentious relations between the Commission, on the one
hand, and the states and NASAA, on the other, continued after adoption of the SBIs. 294 Some states immediately announced that they

would not make corresponding amendments to their securities laws to
conform them to the revised Regulation A rules because the SBIs provided investors with inadequate protection. 295 For example, Colorado, one of the states whose securities laws are required to mirror
those of the federal government, immediately expressed its dissatisfac288

Roberts Says More Effort Needed To Reduce OverlappingRegulations, 25 Sec. Reg. & L.

Rep. (BNA) 520, 520-21 (Apr. 9, 1993) [hereinafter More Effort Needed].
289
See, e.g., 3A BLOOMENTHAL, supranote 11, at 5-68.1 to 5-69;Janvey, supranote 206, at
45; Keller, supra note 206, at 18; Lander, supra note 150, at 9; Mendelson & Shepard, supra
note 123, at 18; Sargent, supra note 206, at 8; SBIs May Fall Short, supra note 156, at 1139.
290
See supra text accompanying note 269.
291
SBIs May Fall Short, supra note 156, at 1139 (alteration in original).
292
See More Effort Needed, supra note 288, at 520.
293 See SBIs May Fall Short, supra note 156, at 1139.
294 See, e.g., NASAA Comment Letter Regarding Additional SBIs, supra note 277, at
9390.
295
See Rowe, supra note 277, at 66; Testing Rules Still Trouble States, supra note 235, at
1642.
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don with the testing-the-waters

507

rule.2 96

Colorado securities regulators
held a hearing and adopted a testing-the-waters rule that differed
somewhat from Rule 254.297
In September 1992, NASAA announced that it was attempting to
develop a model for a testing-the-waters rule that would satisfy the
states' concerns regarding investor protection and harmonize with
Rule 254.298 On April 25, 1993, the members of NASAA passed a resolution to launch a two-year pilot project inviting states to test its
model. 299 NASAA sought to determine whether it could achieve "the
policy objectives underlying the testing-the-waters exemption" and
"adequately ensure that investors are protected."300 The NASAA testing-the-waters model, however, lacked legal effect until the states
passed legislation adopting the model.3 0 ' NASAA published its "Statement of Policy on Solicitation of Interest (Test the Waters)" to facilitate uniform state implementation of the program, and to assess the
feasibility of a testing-the-waters rule that does not sacrifice investor
3 02
protection.
The NASAA testing-the-waters model retained many of the provisions of Rule 254, but incorporated several new safeguards to protect
investors. For example, the model gave a state the opportunity to reject a potential issuer's bid to test the waters. 30 3 The model achieved
this by requiring, in section (1) (c), that a potential issuer file a "Solicitation of Interest Form" 30 4 or any other soliciting materials with a securities administrator ten business days prior to the first solicitation of

296
297

See Colorado InitiatesRulemaking, supra note 273, at 1529.
See id. The Colorado rule requires that the solicitation document contain a state-

ment that the sales of securities will not begin until after (i) the registration of the offering
with the Colorado Securities Commissioner and (ii) the delivery of a qualified offering
circular. See id. The Rule also requires issuers to file its solicitation document with the
state securities commission before delivery to prospective investors. See id.
298
New NASAA Chief Callsfor Split in Regulation of Smaller Offerings, 24 Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) 1528, 1528 (Sept. 25, 1992).
299
See Testing Release, supra note 8, app. at 86,894-98 (setting forth the Resolution of
the North American Securities Administrators Association, Inc., Regarding the Testing-theWaters Exemption).
300
d1.at 86,894.
301
See Keller, supra note 206, at 18.
302 Proposed Statement of Policy on Solicitation of Interest (Test the Waters), [Current Transfer Binder] NASAA Rep. (CCH) 1 4141, at 2541 (Apr. 25, 1993) [hereinafter
NASAA Proposed Statement of Policy]. The SEC attached this Proposed Statement of Policy to the Testing Release as an appendix. Testing Release, supra note 8, app. at 86,895.
303
See State Regulation of Securities Committee, Review of Developments in State Securities
Regulation, 50 Bus. LAw. 343, 385 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 Review of Developments].
304 For the format of the Solicitation of Interest Form, see Solicitation of Interest
Form, [Current Transfer Binder] NASAA Rep. (CCH) 1 4142, at 2545, 2545-46 (Apr. 25,
1993) [hereinafter Solicitation of Interest Form].
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interest.8 0 5 In contrast, Rule 254 requires only that an issuer file the
solicitation document or broadcast script as of the day it solicits interest.30 6 In addition, section (1) (d) of the NASAA program stipulates
that issuers must submit any new or revised materials to the administrator five days before it uses them to test the waters-as opposed to
Rule 254's requirement that issuers need only file substantively different materials. 30 7 The NASAA model also provides in section (1) (f)
that a prospective issuer must deliver to a potential investor whom it
intends to contact a current Solicitation of Interest Form no later than
five days after the issuer establishes contact. 30 8 This provides prospective investors with more information about the company.
The Solicitation of Interest Form under the NASAA model calls
for more disclosure than the Rule 254 solicitation document by providing more comprehensive disclosure regarding the company, the
business, use of proceeds, and key personnel. 0 9 Although the
NASAA plan prescribes only minimum disclosure requirements, 3 10
sections (1) (c) and (1) (d), which enable administrators to review all
materials before solicitation, and the threat of liability under the antifraud provisions of the federal and state securities laws 311 are intended to help protect investors from fraud and misrepresentation.
The NASAA model also protects investors by introducing in section
312
1 (i) a bad boy disqualification provision.
Section (1) (h), which provides that an issuer may not sell securities until seven days after delivering a prospectus to the investor, is
another significant requirement that does not exist under Regulation
A. 3 13 This cooling-off period, lacking under Rule 254, is designed to
give investors more time to review the prospectus before selling efforts
begin. Section (3) (b) further insulates a prospective investor by
prohibiting an issuer from selling securities until twenty calendar days
305
See NASAA Proposed Statement of Policy, supra note 302, at 2541. Section 1(e)
prohibits an issuer from using a Solicitation of Interest Form or other material that a securities administrator has informed the issuer is unacceptable. Id.
306 17 C.F.RL § 230.254(b)(1) (1997).
307 NASAA Proposed Statement of Policy, supra note 302, at 2541; ef. 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.254(b) (1) note (1997). Section (1) (d) of the NASAA proposal exempts materials
sent to a potential purchaser by request. NASAA Proposed Statement of Policy, supranote
302, at 2541.
308 NASAA Proposed Statement of Policy, supra note 302, at 2541.

309 Solicitation of Interest Form, supranote 304, at 2545-46.
310 Id. at 2545.
311
Despite its earlier concern regarding the prescription in Rule 254, as amended, of
the antifraud provisions as the liability standard, see supra note 256 and accompanying text,
under the NASAA model, "[m] aterials filed... will be judged under anti-fraud principles."
NASAA Proposed Statement of Policy, supra note 302, at 2544 cmt. 2.
312 NASAA Proposed Statement of Policy, supra note 302, at 2542-43. For a comparison with the Regulation A bad boy disqualification provision, see infra text accompanying
notes 713-18.
313 Id. at 2541.
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after its last contact with the investor rather than twenty calendar days
after the final publication or delivery of the testing materials.8 14 This,
together with section (3) (b)'s prohibition of testing-the-waters communications with potential investors after the filing of an offering
statement with the state3 15 and section (1) (h)'s "seven day cooling-off"
period, 3 16 should mitigate the danger of investor reliance on issuers'
oral representations.
The NASAA model also differs from Rule 254 in its treatment of
an issuer's failure to comply with its requirements. As discussed
above, compliance with Rule 254(b) is "not a condition to [an] exemption."3 17 Rather, an issuer's failure to meet any of the requirements of Rule 254(b) entitles the Commission to suspend the
exemption.3 18 Although this approach protects issuers, it leaves investors vulnerable because it does not preclude an issuer from further
testing the waters, and does not automatically bar an issuer from proceeding with the offering. In contrast, the NASAA model accords different treatment depending on which provision an issuer has
violated. 3 19 In addition, section (4) of the NASAA model provides
some flexibility by permitting state securities administrators to waive
any of the requirements of the exemption at the request of an offeror
3 20
who has demonstrated cause.
Further, the NASAA model addresses the problem that occurs
when issuers test the waters and then decide to conduct a private
placement under section 4(2) of the Securities Act. Under section (6)
f the model, an issuer that has tested the waters must wait six months
ter its final contact with a potential investor before it may offer or
321
sell securities pursuant to a private placement.
Although the NASAA model introduces many much needed safeguards, it also has its flaws. Because the plan focuses disproportionately on investor protection, its adoption by the states may exacerbate
the problems facing small issuers discussed above with respect to Rule
254.322 The NASAA plan is more complex and imposes more demanding disclosure requirements than Rule 254. If the states enact
the NASAA model,3 23 a potential issuer that tests the waters must comply both with the state procedure, which would follow the NASAA
314
315
316
317
318

319
320
321
322
323

Id. at 2543-44; cf. 17 G.F.R § 230.254(b) (4) (1997).
NASAA Proposed Statement of Policy, supra note 302, at 2543-44.
Id. at 2541.

See supra text accompanying note 201.
See supra text accompanying note 202.
NASAA Proposed Statement of Policy, supra note 302, at 2543.
aL at 2544.
Id.

See supra text accompanying notes 219-21.
The more likely outcome is that only some states will enact laws that mirror the
NASAA model. Other states may design their own rules. In that case, a small issuer that
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model, and with Rule 254. The inconsistencies between Rule 254 and
the NASAA model render compliance confusing and burdensome for
small issuers. Such issuers would incur considerable expenses and
would still need a lawyer to ensure compliance with both sets of laws.
These burdens and high costs of compliance may discourage small
businesses from testing the waters. Further, the model has limited
utility. The model's scope is broader than that of Rule 254-section
1 (b) provides that it also applies to Rule 504 offerings-however, the
model is available only to potential issuers contemplating Regulation
A and Rule 504 offerings.8 24 The model also does not alleviate
NASAA's concern that small businesses, armed with the opportunity
to test the waters, will develop unreasonable expectations regarding
the offering. 325 It also threatens to give rise to the same systemic
problems that state securities regulators warned of with respect to
Rule 254-a poor allocation of capital and skepticism toward invest32 6
ing in small companies.
As of September 11, 1995, eight states participated in NASAA's
pilot program. 327 Of these states, Massachusetts, Vermont, Virginia,
and Washington adopted laws that mirror the NASAA plan. 328 Kansas, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Wyoming enacted statutes that enable
small issuers to test the waters; however, their laws differ slightly from
the NASAA model. 329 Colorado and Oklahoma implemented their

own testing-the-waters procedures. 3 30 As of November 1995, Arizona
seeks to test the waters in multiple states is confronted with the daunting task of compliance with several different sets of procedures.
324 NASAA Proposed Statement of Policy, supra note 302, at 2541.
325 See supra text accompanying note 258.
326 See supra text accompanying notes 239-42.

327 See NASAA Comment Letter to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC, Regarding the
Rule on Solicitation of Interest Prior to an Initial Public Offering, [Current Transfer
Binder] NASAA Rep. (CCH)
13,029, at 13,052, 13,052 (Sept. 11, 1995) [hereinafter
NASAA Comment Letter Regarding Testing Release].
328 See State Regulation of Securities Committee, Review of Developments in State Securities
Regulation, 51 Bus. LAw. 223, 291 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 Review of Developments].
329 See id. For a discussion of how the testing-the-waters rules adopted by these states
differ from the NASAA program, see id.
330 See Michael E. Flowers, Small Business and Small Offerings: Developments in SEC and
State Regulation, 28 A.L.I.-A.B.
CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. 201, 259-60 (Feb. 16, 1996);
supra notes 296-97 and accompanying text.
In 1994, California introduced a new exemption that permits eligible issuers to make
solicitations that resemble testing the waters. See CAL. CoRP. CODE § 25102 (n) (West Supp.
1997). Under section 25102(n), offerings by California issuers, among others, who market
securities to certain qualified purchasers, are exempt from state registration requirements.
Id. § 25102(n)(1)-(2). The rule also allows eligible issuers to publish and distribute general solicitations regarding a potential offering. Id. § 25102(n) (5). According to the SEC,
"[t]his general announcement process is modeled on the 'test the waters' concept being
used by several of the states and by the Commission in [the form of Rule 254]." Small
Business Registration Exemption, Securities Act Release No. 7285, [1996-97 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,803, at 88,006, 88,008 (May 1, 1996) [hereinafter
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authorized the codification of a testing-the-waters rule based on the
NASAA example.3 3 ' In August 1996, Indiana adopted a testing-thewaters rule.3 3 2 North Dakota also passed testing-the-waters legislation

in April 1997.333
The NASAA pilot project yielded unimpressive results. Participating states reported the following numbers of testing-the-waters filings:
Kansas (none), Massachusetts (none), Oregon (three to five), Pennsylvania (one); Vermont (one, but disqualified), Virginia (one or
two), and Washington (eight to ten).3 3 4 In Colorado, between twenty

and thirty issuers relied on the testing-the-waters rule, while in
Oklahoma, only one issuer tested the waters.3 3 5 These statistics are
insufficient to provide a basis for a definitive conclusion regarding the
project. 336 NASAA conceded that it had "captured very little data
[from the pilot project] due to the small number of filings. '33 7 Nevertheless, after the two years, NASAA did conclude that under its mode
testing the waters did not appear to "compromise... investor protec33
A larger number of filings may have cast doubt on this
tion."1
conclusion.
2.

The Commission

Confronted with the prospect of an ineffective Rule 254, the
33 9
Commission set out in 1993 to secure its acceptance by the states.
California Exemption Release] (footnote omitted). Much like the SEC's hopes for Rule
254, California intended for section 25102(n) to help small businesses raise capital. See id.
at 88,007.
In May 1996, the Commission, relying on its authority under section 3 (b) of the Securities Act, adopted new Rule 1001. See id. at 88,009. Rule 1001 exempts from section 5
offers and sales of securities not exceeding $5 million that section 25102 (n) of the California Corporations Code exempts from registration. 17 C.F.R. § 230.1001 (a) (1997); California Exemption Release, supra, at 88,009. Therefore, Rule 1001 provides a federal
exemption for offerings that qualify for the exemption in California. See California Exemption Release, supra, at 88,009. Rule 1001, which endorses the general announcement provision of section 25102(n), should encourage more eligible issuers to rely on California's
rule.
331
See 1995 Review of Develpments, supra note 328, at 291.
See Regulatory Briefs: Indiana, 28 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1014, 1015 (Aug. 16,
332
1996).
333
See Legislative Briefs: North Dakota. 29 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 581, 581 (Apr. 25,
1997).
334
See Flowers, supra note 330, at 259-60.
335
336
337

See id.

See infra Part III.C.4.
NASAA Comment Letter Regarding Testing Release, supra note 327, at 13,052.
The numbers of filings in states that have adopted testing-the-waters rules, see supra text
accompanying notes 334-35, were reported in February 1996, five months after NASAA
wrote its comment letter. Therefore, these low figures are probably even higher than those
that NASAA was aware of when it acknowledged that it had "captured very little data."
338 NASAA Comment Letter Regarding Testing Release, supranote 327, at 13,052 (emphasis added).
339 See More Effort Neede, supra note 288, at 520-21.
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Foreshadowing increased cooperation, the Director of the Division of
Corporation Finance praised NASAA for its model and recognized
that the "states' response has been 'constructive' in the rulemaking
process.

'3 40

Nevertheless, the SEC did not wait until the end of the

NASAA two-year pilot project to assess the impact of testing the waters.
At an ABA State Regulation of Securities Committee meeting in September 1993, Richard Wulff, Chief of the Corporation Finance Division's Office of Small Business Policy, announced that the
Commission considered the SBIs "a 'very successful revision."' 3 4 1 He
reported that as of September 27, 1993, thirty small issuers, representing many different industries, had tested the waters. 3 42 Five of these
issuers, the so-called "success stories," subsequently began Regulation
A offerings.3 43 The SEC concluded that Rule 254 was a success.
3.

The National Securities Markets Improvement Act

The NSMIA does not increase the likelihood that Rule 254 will be
a success. 344 In order to reduce issuers' costs and the burden of complying with expensive, excessive, and at times inconsistent, blue sky
laws, 345 Congress amended section 18 of the Securities Act and sec-

tion 28 of the Exchange Act to authorize federal preemption of certain state securities laws regarding "covered securities" or securities
that will be "covered securities" after a transaction.3 46 The NSMIA signals the end of blue sky registration of and qualification requirements
for, as well as merit regulation of, offerings of covered securities.3 47
Congress defined four levels of covered securities in section 18. The
first level consists of "nationally traded securities," which are those
listed or approved for listing on the New York or American Stock Exchanges, the NASDAQ National Market System, or an exchange that
3 48
the Commission deems to have equivalent listing requirements.
Second, covered securities include securities issued by investment
SEC Adopts FurtherRules, supranote 238, at 620.
SEC Pleased with SBI, Agency Official Declares, 25 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1341,
1341 (Oct. 8, 1993) [hereinafter SEC Pleased with SBI].
342
See id. at 1342.
343 Id.
344 However, if the Commission relies on new section 28 of the Securities Act to raise
the Regulation A ceiling, then more small issuers should test the waters. See supranote 226.
345
See supra text accompanying notes 271-75.
346 NSMIA, supra note 22, at 3417-19 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77r (Supp. II 1996)),
3422 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (Supp. II 1996)). To review the text of section 18 of
the Securities Act and section 28 of the Exchange Act prior to the NSMIA, see supra note
260.
347
See Rowe, supra note 226, at 8. However, the states will retain their authority to
investigate and enforce violations of state antifraud laws and illegal broker-dealer conduct,
permit notice filings, and collect existing fees. See NSMIA, supra note 22, at 3419-20 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77r(c) (Supp. II 1996)).
348
Id. at 3418 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b) (1) (Supp. II 1996)).
340
341
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companies registered, or with registration statements filed, under the
Investment Company Act.3 49 Third, securities offered to so-called
"qualified purchasers" are covered.3 5 0 Finally, securities offered or
sold pursuant to the following Securities Act exemptions are covered:
(i) sections 4(1) and 4(3), if by an issuer that has reporting obligations under the Exchange Act; (ii) section 4(4); (iii) section 3(a) ex51
cluding subparagraphs (4) and (11);3 and (iv) section

4(2).352

The passage of the NSMIA should make it easier and less expensive for many issuers to offer and sell securities.3 53 However, the
NSMIA does not provide any assistance to issuers seeking to rely on
Regulation A. New section 18(b) of the Securities Act does not include securities offered or sold pursuant to Regulation A in its definition of covered securities.3 5 4 Consequently, the states retain
jurisdiction over Regulation A offerings. 35 5 As a result, small businesses interested in testing the waters under Rule 254 must still comply with the duplicative, expensive, and often inconsistent blue sky
laws of all states in which it seeks to offer or sell securities under Regulation A. 3 56 As discussed earlier, most issuers are effectively unable to
test the waters in many states.3 5 7 The NSMIA thus leaves the coordination problem largely unresolved and has'not increased accessibility to
Rule 254.
There is hope that Congress, or the Commission, will preempt
state securities laws regarding Regulation A offerings, or at least testing the waters before such offerings. Section 102(b) of the NSMIA
includes a note to new section 18, requiring the SEC to assess the
extent to which the states have taken steps to achieve "uniformity of
State regulatory requirements for securities or securities transactions
...

for securities that are not covered securities" and to report to

Congress on the results of this review no later than October 11,
1997.358 In addition, the NSMIA authorizes the Commission to subse349
350

351

See id (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b) (2) (Supp. II 1996)).
See id. (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b) (3) (Supp. II 1996)).
Municipal securities, exempt under section 3(2), which are offered or sold in the

state where the issuer is located, are not covered. See id. at 3418-19 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 77r(b) (4) (C) (Supp. 111996)).
352

353
354

See id. (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b) (4) (Supp. II 1996)).
See Rowe, supra note 226, at 8.
See NSMIA, supra note 22, at 3418-19 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b) (4) (Supp. II

1996)). Securities offered or sold pursuant to Rules 504 and 505 are also excluded from
section 18(b). See id. (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b) (4) (Supp. II 1996)).
355
See OFFIcE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, SEC, THE SEC SPEAKS IN 1997, at 9, 451 (PLI
Corp. L. & Practice Course Handbook Series No. B-980, 1997); Campbell, supra note 264,

at 205.
356
357
358

See supra text accompanying notes 261-75.
See supra text accompanying notes 269-75.
NSMIA, supranote 22, at 3420 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77r note (Supp. II 1996)).
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quently amend the definition of "qualified purchasers."3 59 This authority may enable the Commission to expand the definition of
covered securities to include Regulation A, thereby preempting state
securities laws concerning the offering or sale of securities pursuant to
this exemption.A60 If the Commission does exercise this authority,
new section 18(b) (3) of the Securities Act requires the Agency to ensure that this expansion is "consistent with the public interest and the
protection of investors."3 61
4.

Synthesis

The SEC's declaration of the success of the testing-the-waters rule
only thirteen months after its adoption 362 was a hasty conclusion to
draw. As with the NASAA pilot program, only a small number of potential issuers tested the waters. Yet in contrast to NASAA's appropriate circumspection, the Commission was quick to trumpet the success
of Rule 254. Instead of waiting until the end of NASAA's pilot program, meeting with members of the Association to discuss the results
under both testing-the-waters procedures, and issuing a joint statement, the SEC once again chose to proceed on its own.
There are several possible reasons why the SEC was anxious to
proclaim Rule 254 a success. The Commission ultimately recognized
that it had erred in abandoning the states and NASAA in order to
force through the SBIs. 3 63 The SEC thus had a very strong interest in
the success of Rule 254, because of criticism it would receive if the
Rule failed. Success could help to justify the agency's overt discontinuation of its negotiations with the states and NASAA. Further, successful testing-the-waters filings might encourage more states to adopt
testing-the-waters legislation. After NASAA launched its pilot project,
the SEC had an even greater interest in the success of its testing-thewaters rule. States that adopted rules based on Rule 254, rather than
the NASAA model or entirely different legislation, would reduce both
compliance costs for small issuers and the confusion of inconsistent
securities laws. The SEC may have also felt pressure because of the
continued politicization of the small business cause.
As ofJune 27, 1995, the Commission reported that sixty-one small
businesses had filed solicitation documents and twenty-six of these issuers had taken steps to offer securities.3 64 The SEC reiterated that
Rule 254 was a success.3 65 But, like the representation in September
359
360

361
362
363
364

365

Id. at 3418 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b) (3) (Supp. II 1996)).
See Campbell, supra note 264, at 207.
NSMIA, supra note 22, at 3418 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b) (3) (Supp. 111996)).
See SEC Pleased with SBI, supra note 341, at 1341.
See More Effort Needed, supra note 288, at 520-21.
See Testing Release, supra note 8, at 86,886.
See id.
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1993 that Rule 254 was a success8 66 this report was premature, for
3 7
Rule 254 helped only a fraction of small businesses. 6
There are a number of plausible explanations for the low number
of testing-the-waters filings. Rule 254 had been on the books for only
three years. Further, it has been available only to nonreporting companies seeking to raise up to $5 million in capital, many of which may
have been ignorant of the opportunity. In addition, most states' blue
sky laws have not exempted Regulation A offerings by small issuers
from registration with state regulators.8 68 The costs of compliance
with blue sky laws, especially those incurred in pursuit of registration,
have been prohibitively expensive for many small issuers.3 69 Moreover, most states have not adopted testing-the-waters rules, thereby
precluding small issuers from soliciting indications of interest in those
states. Section 18, as currently amended by the NSMIA, will not encourage more small issuers to test the waters under Rule 254 because
3 70
it does not apply to Regulation A.
Another problem is that the Commission addressed only the
number of Rule 254 solicitations and Regulation A filings. 37 1 To determine whether Rule 254 has succeeded, one must take other factors
into account. For example, the Commission must consider the success of the ultimate offering. If the ultimate Regulation A offering
fails to raise sufficient capital for the issuer, then Rule 254 should not
necessarily be considered a success. In such a case, testing the waters
may have failed to introduce enough actual investors to the issuer. A
tremendous response to an issuer's solicitation of interest is insignificant if investors do not purchase the securities.
Similarly, the SEC has not focused on the small businesses that
test the waters, and decide not to undertake a Regulation A offering
because of a lack of interest. For such companies, however, Rule 254
was a success, for it saved them considerable expense. At the meeting
of the ABA's State Regulation Committee, Richard Wulff mentioned
the significance of the twenty-five small businesses who tested the waters, yet did not conduct Regulation A offerings, only after a lawyer in
attendance noted that these were the "real success stories." 372 In fact,
See supra text accompanying notes 341-43.
See Impact of SBIs, supranote 94, at 520 n.81; supra text accompanying note 364.
See supra note 270 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying note 272.
See supra text accompanying notes 354-57.
371 The SEC has reported that between 1991 and 1994, the value of Regulation A filings rose from $40 million to $290 million. See Regulatory Flexibility Act Provisionsof H.R. 99,
The job Creationand Wage Enhancement Act of 1995: HearingsBefore the House Comm. on Small
Bus., 104th Cong. (1995).
372 SEC Pleased with SBI, supra note 341, at 1342. The SEC has subsequently emphasized how Rule 254 can help small issuers ;when it dissuades them from an offering. See,
e.g., Arthur Levitt, Remarks at the California Capital Access Forum (May 2, 1996), available
366
367
368
369
370
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one must take the analysis a step further. The SEC should have contacted the twenty-five small businesses to learn why they did not pursue public offerings. If they chose not to proceed because testing the
waters revealed that there was not enough interest to raise sufficient
capital under Regulation A, then Rule 254 helped these companies.
Alternatively, if they decided not to proceed with the offering for
other reasons, 373 testing the waters under Rule 254 may not have influenced their decision.
The success of Rule 254 also requires that testing the waters not
have an adverse effect on investors. Neither the SEC nor NASAA have
said much beyond their naked declarations that testing the waters
under their respective models did not appear to harm investors. In
fact, the Commission has conceded that it "had seen more 'puffing'
than had been expected." 374 These reports suggest that Rule 254 may
need stricter requirements regarding the content of solicitation
materials in order to protect inexperienced investors from puffing by
issuers.
The SEC and NASAA should contact investors who received solicitations of interest and purchased securities in a Regulation A offering
to ask them about their experiences with either Rule 254, the NASAA
model, or other testing-the-waters rules that any of the states have
adopted. Without such an effort, the Commission or NASAA would
presumably learn that testing the waters has harmed investors only
from investors' complaints or lawsuits. However, the absence of reported complaints or lawsuits does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that Rule 254 does not harm investors. It is conceivable that Rule
254 has harmed investors who have not resorted to either of these
courses of action. Furthermore, investors may not recognize that they
suffered as a result of testing the waters. For example, they may have
reviewed the offering circular, but relied primarily on excessively optimistic projections conveyed orally by the issuer in a Rule 254 solicitation of interest. The effect of testing the waters is thus very difficult to
measure. Rule 254 had not been in existence long enough for the
SEC to make a fair determination of its impact on investors. Admitin 1996 WL 222411 (S.E.C.), *5-*6 [hereinafter Remarks by Arthur Levitt] (recalling how a
particular small business tested the waters, discovered that its customers, whom it solicited,
would not be able to help the company raise a sufficient amount of capital under Regulation A, and then conducted a very successful registered IPO with the assistance of an
underwriter).
373
For example, a company might not begin a public offering if it received a loan

from a bank or decided to remain private because it was uncomfortable with the disclosure
requirements that arise in preparation of and following an offering.
374 LeonardJ. McGill, Innovative New California TransactionalExemptionfor Sales to Qualified Purchasers,INsiH-s, May 1995, at 23, 24. In California, the Department of Corporations conducted an independent analysis of testing the waters and agreed with this finding.
See id.
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tedly, SEC discussion of issuers who declined to offer securities or of
investor protection does not constitute publicity that rivals stories of
small businesses that have tested the waters and then undertaken Regulation A offerings.3 75 Nevertheless, an analysis that takes these two
factors into account is critical to accurately determine if testing the
waters has been a success. A careful evaluation will help the Commission make any necessary revisions to the Rule and will shed light on
the wisdom of expanding the availability of testing the waters.
A proper conclusion that Rule 254 does not harm investors could
376
give rise to three outcomes, all of which would help small issuers.
First, the SEC could exercise its authority under new section 28 to
increase the Regulation A ceiling.3 77 Second, the Commission may
have the authority to add the Regulation A exemption to new section
18's definition of covered securities, and thereby preempt state securities laws regarding securities offered or sold pursuant to the Regulation A exemption.3 78 Third, more states, encouraged by NASAA,
might exempt Regulation A offerings or adopt testing-the-waters rules
based on, or coordinated with, Rule 254.
Small businesses that lack a market for their stock need a testingthe-waters rule to enable them to make a rational business decision
whether to conduct a Regulation A offering. In theory, testing the
waters either under Rule 254 or the NASAA model should help small
businesses. However, the NASAA model appears to strike a better balance than Rule 254 between facilitating capital formation and protecting investors. Nevertheless, like the three-year period that followed
the adoption of the SBIs, the two-year trial period was inadequate to
properly determine the impact of testing the waters on investors.
IV
TESTING THE WATERS BEFORE REGISTERED IPOs UNDER
PROPOSED

A.

RULE 135D

Background to the Testing Release

The foregoing criticism of the SEC's hasty conclusion is significant because the SEC proposed an extension of testing the waters to
See supra text accompanying note 343.
Section 106(b) of the NSMIA requires that when the SEC is making rules, pursuant
to the NSMIA, that require consideration of the effect on the "public interest," it must take
into account "the protection of investors" as well as "whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation." NSMIA, supra note 22, at 3424 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 77b(b) (Supp. II 1996)). However, SEC Chairman Levitt has subsequently explained that investor protection is the most important of these considerations. See Market
Issues Weighed in Rulemaking Investor Protection Is First, Levitt States, 29 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA) 297, 297 (Mar. 7, 1997) [hereinafter Investor Protection Is First].
377 See supra note 226.
378 See supra text accompanying notes 359-61.
375

376
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registered IPOs based on its determination that Rule 254 helped small
businesses.3 79 Thus, if the SEC drew an improper conclusion, the
foundation of the Testing Release is weak.
As discussed earlier, certain critics of the SBIs argued that Rule
254, available only to businesses considering Regulation A offerings,
has very limited utility.38 0 For instance, small issuers seeking to raise
more than $5 million could not test the waters, for such an offering
would exceed the Regulation A ceiling. These critics proposed the
extension of the testing-the-waters rule to other types of offerings that
3 81
would benefit small businesses.
In 1995, politics dictated neither the scope of the Testing Release
nor the pace of its adoption to the same extent as before the SBIs
Release. 38 2 Rather, the remarkable success of the IPO market during
the 1990s, which enabled issuers in the first four and one-half years of
this decade to raise $114.8 billion, prompted the Commission to propose extending testing the waters to registered IPOs. 38 3 The Commis-

sion thus recognized the advantages registered IPOs offer companies
in need of capital; however, it also understood that the prohibitive
costs of going public and operating a public company preclude many
businesses from pursuing this means of raising capital.
In contrast to its approach in the SBIs Release, the Commission
incorporated some of the views of NASAA into the Testing Release.
For example, the Testing Release discussed the NASAA pilot project
and contrasted it with Rule 254.384 In addition, the SEC attached
NASAA's resolution regarding testing the waters and its Proposed
Statement of Policy on Solicitation of Interest as an appendix to the
See Testing Release, supra note 8, at 86,886. The SEC reported that:
Experience under Regulation A suggests that the "test the waters" initiative
provides issuers of small offerings a useful and cost effective means of assessing whether there is sufficient potential interest in the company as an
investment to proceed with a Regulation A offering. To date [June 27,
1995], these solicitations do not appear to have raised significant investor
protection concerns. Accordingly, the Commission today is soliciting comment on the appropriateness of providing a similar "test the waters" option
for registered IPOs.
Id.; see also SEC ProposesFourInitiativesAimed at Helping Small Businesses, 27 Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) 980, 980-81 (June 30, 1995) (discussing the Testing Release).
380 See supra notes 222-28 and accompanying text.
381
Two such proposals that particularly influenced the SEC were a July 8, 1993 comment letter from members of various committees of the ABA on the SBIs and a March 31,
1995 report by the Subcouncil on Capital Allocation of the Competitiveness Policy Council. See Testing Release, supra note 8, at 86,886 & nn.13-14.
382
See supra notes 148-51 and accompanying text; text accompanying notes 282, 288.
383
See Testing Release, supra note 8, at 86,887 (explaining that "[t]he IPO market is
one of the great strengths of the U.S. capital markets, and its breadth and depth is [sic]
unique").
384
Id. at 86,886.
379
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Testing Release.38 5 The SEC took these measures because it knew that
for this proposal to succeed, it would need the support of the state
securities regulators. In sum, the SEC had learned from its experience in 1992.
B.

The Testing Release

The SEC issued the Testing Release on June 27, 1995, and the
period for public comment was to end on September 8, 1995.386 The
Commission's primary inquiry for commenters was whether its proposed new Rule 135d, entitled "Solicitation of Interest Document for
Use Prior to an Initial Public Offering,"3 8 7 would help businesses reasonably ascertain the market's interest in their IPOs without leading
investors to disregard the disclosure they would subsequently receive
38 8
pursuant to the federal securities laws.

1.

ProposedRule 135d

Under proposed Rule 135d, written, published, broadcasted, or
oral solicitations of interest that comply with the Rule do not represent an offer of securities for the purposes of section 5 of the Securities Act.38 9 The Rule is not available to an issuer who is (i) a reporting
company under the Exchange Act, (ii) a development stage or blank
check company, (iii) a penny stock issuer, (iv) an investment company
under the Investment Company Act of 1940,390 (v) an issuer of assetbacked securities, or (vi) a partnership, limited liability company, or
other "direct participation investment program" following the IPO.39 1
The proposal prescribes five requirements for the solicitation document or script of the radio or television broadcast. 392 First, the issuer
must state that the solicitation of interest does not constitute an offer
to sell securities, which will be made only via a future detailed prospectus available from the issuer.39 3 Second, the issuer must explain
that it is not soliciting any consideration, which, if paid, will be reSee id. at 86,894-98.
Id. at 86,885. The SEC did not treat this as a firm deadline. See, e.g., infra note 533
and accompanying text.
387 Testing Release, supra note 8, at 86,893.
388 Id. at 86,886-87.
389
See id. at 86,893 (proposed 17 C.F.R1 § 230.135d(a)).
390
15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 et seq. (1994).
391
See Testing Release, supra note 8, at 86,893 (proposed 17 C.F.R. § 230.135d(a) (1)).
In the Testing Release, the Commission proposed new Rule 100(a) (8) which would define
a direct participation program as: "any program (other than an investment company...)
that provides for flow-through tax consequences regardless of the structure of the legal
entity or vehicle for distribution, including, but not limited to, partnerships, limited partnerships, real estate investment trusts .... and limited liability companies." Id. (proposed
385
386

17 C.F.R. § 230.100(a)(8)).
392
393

See id. (proposed 17 C.F.1. § 230.135d(a) (2)).
See id. (proposed 17 C.F.R. § 230.135d(a) (2) (i)).
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turned.3 94 Third, the issuer must state that it will neither sell securities nor accept an offer to purchase until the Commission declares a
filed registration statement effective, or after the issuer properly relies
on an exemption from registration.3 95 Fourth, the issuer must assert
that if a potential investor expresses interest, he or she does not incur
any obligation.3 96 Fifth, the document or script must name the issuer's chief executive officer and broadly discuss its business and
product line.3 9 7 These represent only the minimum requirements; is-

suers may provide any other information such as pricing information,
unaudited financial statements, and forward-looking statements.3 98
All representations in the solicitation materials must be accurate, for
the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws apply to them.3 99
In addition, an issuer may send a coupon along with the solicitation document through which a prospective investor can convey interest in a registered IPO by returning the coupon to the issuer.400 The
coupon must reiterate that its completion does not commit a prospective investor to purchasing the securities and that the prospective investor should not send money. 40 1 Further, the coupon may ask for
the prospective investor's name, address, and telephone number, but
40 2
may not inquire as to his or her financial status.
The issuer must submit a copy of its testing materials to the Commission before it can rely on proposed Rule 135d.40 3 An issuer may

submit the copy either in paper format or electronically, via EDGAR. 40 4 The main office of the SEC must receive the copy no later

than the first day on which the issuer uses the materials to solicit indications of interest.40 5 The submitted copy is then available for public
inspection. 40 6 The submitted copy must include the name and telephone number of an individual who can respond to inquiries regarding the testing materials. 40 7 Finally, the issuer is required to submit
only material that is substantively different from materials that an is408
suer has previously submitted to the Commission.
394
395
396
397
398

399
400
401
402
403
404
405
406
407
408

See id. (proposed 17 C.F.R § 230.135d(a) (2) (ii)).
See id. (proposed 17 C.F.R § 230.135d(a) (2) (iii)).
See id. (proposed 17 C.FR. § 230.135d(a) (2) (iv)).
See id. (proposed 17 C.F.R § 230.135d(a) (2) (v)).
See id. at 86,888.
See id. at 86,894 (proposed 17 C.F.R § 230.135d(a) (4) note).
See id. (proposed 17 C.F.R. § 230.135d(b)).
See id. (proposed 17 C.F.R. § 230.135d(b)).
See id. (proposed 17 C.F.R. § 230-135d(b)).
See id. at 86,888, 86,893 (proposed 17 C.FR. § 230.135d(a) (4)).
See id. at 86,889 n.38.
See id. at 86,893 (proposed 17 C.F.R § 230.135d(a) (3)).
See id. at 86,889 n.38.
See id. at 86,893-94 (proposed 17 C.F.RL § 230.135d(a) (3)).
See id. at 86,894 (proposed 17 C.F.R § 230.135d(a) (3) note).
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An issuer may speak directly with prospective investors after submitting its solicitation materials to the SEC. 40 9 Proposed Rule 135d
imposes many of the same restrictions on oral communications that it
does on written materials. An issuer may neither solicit nor accept any
form of consideration from an investor. 4 10 Moreover, during the
course of oral communications, an issuer cannot accept a commitment from a potential investor to purchase. 41 ' Finally, barring an exemption from registration, an issuer may not orally sell securities until
the SEC declares its registration statement effective. 4 12 As with written
materials and scripted broadcasts, the antifraud provisions of the fed4 13
eral securities laws apply.
The Testing Release explains that the proposal in no way restricts
4 14
the "means of dissemination of the 'test the waters' solicitation."
Communication via any print, broadcast, telephone, facsimile, or electronic medium, including the Internet, is permitted. 4 15 An issuer
must meet all of the requirements of proposed Rule 135d for each
communication, publication, or broadcast. 4 16 In fact, the Testing Release explains that an issuer must meet all of the requirements of proposed Rule 135d to rely on the Rule. 417 After an issuer has tested the

waters, it has no obligation to interested investors should it decide not
to proceed with an offering.
Following the filing of a registration statement with the Commission, an issuer may no longer test the waters.4 18 In addition, sales pursuant to a registration statement may not be made until twenty
calendar days after the final publication or delivery of the written doc41 9
ument or radio or television broadcast.
Proposed subparagraph 135d(c), modelled after Rule 254(e),
provides that written materials, submitted to the Commission and
meeting the other requirements of Rule 135d, would not fall within
the meaning of a prospectus under section 2(10) of the Securities
Act. 420 This protects issuers from potential section 12(a)(2)
liability. 42 1
See id. (proposed 17 C.F.R. § 230.135d(a) (4)).
See id. (proposed 17 C.F.R § 230.135d(a) (4).
See id. (proposed 17 G.F.R. § 230.135d(a) (4)).
See id. (proposed 17 G.F.R. § 230.135d(a) (4)).
413 See id. (proposed 17 G.F.R § 230.135d(a) (4) note).
414 Id. at 86,888.
415 See id.
416 See id.
417 Id, at 86,890.
418 See i& at 86,894 (proposed 17 G.F.R. § 230.135d(a) (5)). An issuer's receipt of a
coupon from a prospective investor, in accordance with proposed Rule 135d(b), after it
has filed a registration statement does not violate this provision. See id.
419 See id. (proposed 17 C.F.R. § 230.135d(a) (6)).
420 I& (proposed 17 C.F.R. § 230.135d(c)).
421 See id at 86,889.
409
410
411
412
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Proposed Amendments to Rule 254

The Commission also proposed revisions to Rule 254 in the Testing Release that would enable an issuer to conduct a Regulation A
offering after it has tested the waters under proposed Rule 135d in
contemplation of a registered IPO. 4 2 2 A proposed revision to Rule
254(b) (4) would preclude issuers from selling securities via an offering circular or a registration statement until twenty calendar days after
the final publication or delivery of the written document or broadcast
on radio or television "pursuant to this rule or pursuant to [proposed
Rule 135d]."423 In addition, the Commission proposed removing
from Rule 254(d) the restriction on an issuer's ability to undertake a
registered IPO until thirty days after testing the waters in good faith
under Regulation A's Rule 254.424
3.

Application of Proposal to Other Exempt Offerings

As discussed above, proposed Ruled 135d does not limit the
means by which an issuer may disseminate testing materials before a
registered IPO.425 However, the Commission warned in the Testing
Release that "[i] f an issuer wants to maintain full flexibility to proceed
with an offering under Regulation D and Section 4(2) of the Securities Act, the means of dissemination of the 'test the waters' solicitation
would have to be consistent with the limitations under the regulation
and statute. '426 Of particular importance is the Rule 502(c) prohibition of general solicitations and advertising. 4 27 The Commission published a release concurrently with the Testing Release which proposes,
among other things, the elimination of the Regulation D prohibition
of general solicitations. 428 Unless the SEC adopts this proposal, an
issuer may not subsequently offer securities under Rules 505 or 506 if
"its testing the waters activity was done in a way that involved general
422 Id. at 86,890.
423 Id. at 86,894 (proposed 17 C.F.R § 230.254(b) (4)).
424 Id. (proposed 17 C.F.R. § 230.254(d)). When an issuer in good faith changes its
intention and registers an offering after testing the waters, current Rule 254(d) provides
that Regulation A's "exemption... will not be subject to integration with the registered
offering, if at least 30 calendar days have elapsed between the last solicitation of interest
and the filing of the registration statement with the Commission, and all solicitation of
interest documents have been submitted to the Commission." 17 C.F.R. § 230.254(d)
(1997). The Testing Release proposes to remove the thirty-day waiting requirement. Testing Release, supra note 8, at 86,894 (proposed 17 C.F.R. § 230.254(d)).
425 See supra text accompanying notes 414-15.
426 Testing Release, supra note 8, at 86,888 n.35.
427 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c) (1997); supra text accompanying note 133. For discussion
of the ban on general solicitation, see Stuart R. Cohn, Securities Marketsfor Small Issuers: The
Barrierof FederalSolicitation and Advertising Prohibitions,38 U. FLA. L. REv. 1 (1986); Dougherty, supra note 130.
428 Exemption for Certain California Limited Issues, Securities Act Release No. 7185,
[1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 85,636, at 86,871 (June 27, 1995).
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429
advertising or other activities constituting general solicitation."
The Commission would have to make this determination on a case-by430
case basis.
The SEC explained in the Testing Release that an issuer seeking
to offer securities under Rules 505 or 506 cannot allow an integration
of the exempt offering with solicitation activity.4 31 The Commission
expressed concern that such an integration might reduce the utility of
proposed Rule 135d.43 2 In the Testing Release, the Commission
asked commenters about the viability of another approach: the creation of "a special integration safe harbor for private placements following a Rule 135d 'test the waters' solicitation. '43 3 The Commission
elaborated, proposing that an issuer would be required to wait twenty
days after its final delivery or broadcast of a solicitation, and then
43 4
could proceed with a private placement.

4.

Comparison of ProposedRule 135d with Rule 254 and the
NASAA Model

The language of proposed Rule 135d is, unsurprisingly, very similar to that of Rule 254. Nevertheless, the rules differ in important
respects. Proposed Rule 135d did not borrow much from the NASAA
model. As a result, the differences between proposed Rule 135d and
the NASAA model reflect essentially the same differences that exist
43 5
between Rule 254 and the model.

Proposed Rule 135d goes beyond Rule 254 by permitting more
issuers to test the waters. 43 6 By making testing the waters available to
429 See Testing Release, supra note 8, at 86,890. However, if the issuer avoids making
general solicitations and otherwise complied with Rules 505 or 506, it can immediately
proceed with an offering under these Rules instead of a registered IPO. Moreover, an
issuer that has made general solicitations during the course of its testing-the-waters activity
could immediately conduct an offering under Rule 504, assuming it otherwise complies
with Rule 504, because, after the SBIs, the general solicitation prohibition no longer applies to Rule 504. See id. at 86,889 n.50.
430 See id. at 86,890 n.58.
431
Id. at 86,890-91. An issuer can avoid integration by either (i) relying on Rule
502(a), thereby waiting six months after it has tested the waters before it conducts its exempt offering, or (ii) taking measures that will enable the issuer to demonstrate that the
two transactions were sufficiently different that the "five-factors" test would not compel
integration. See id. at 86,891. For enumeration of the five-factors test, see Non-Public Offering Exemption, Securities Act Release No. 4552, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 2770,
2781, at 2918, 2921 (Nov. 6, 1962).
432 Testing Release, supra note 8, at 86,891.
433
434
435

Id.
Id.

See supra Part m.C.1.
However, the proposal precludes issuers of asset-backed securities as well as partnerships, limited liability companies, and similar direct participation investment programs.
See supra note 391 and accompanying text. The Commission explained the exclusion of
these issuers on the ground that they "appear unsuited to a 'test the waters' concept, given
the complex and contractual nature of the issuer." Testing Release, supra note 8, at 86,887.
436
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issuers contemplating registered IPOs, proposed Rule 135d enables
larger issuers and small issuers that seek to raise more than $5 million
to test the waters. Although Regulation A is reserved for American
and Canadian issuers, proposed Rule 135d does not deny foreign issuers access to testing the waters in the United States. 437 In addition,
unlike Rule 251(a) (6) and section 1(i) of the NASAA model, proposed Rule 135d does not contain a bad boy disqualification provision.4 38 In the Testing Release, the SEC solicited comments regarding
the appropriateness of the exclusions proposed Rule 135d(a)
prescribes. 43 9 The Commission considered removing some of these
exclusions and extending them to other types of issuers. 440 In fact,
the SEC even requested comment on whether it should add to Rule
135d(a) those issuers that NASAA excluded under its model. 441 In a
troubling step backwards, the Commission also asked commenters if it
44 2
should limit availability of the Rule to small business issuers.
Proposed Rule 135d also requires that an issuer submit a copy of
its solicitation materials to the Commission's main office. 443 In con-

trast, Rule 254 originally gave an issuer the option of submitting a
copy to the regional SEC office in the area in which the issuer conducts or plans to conduct its principal business operations. 44 4 Proposed Rule 135d also contains language that necessarily differs from
that of Rule 254 to reflect the differences between short form registration pursuant to Regulation A and full registration. For example, proposed Rule 135d(a) (2) (i) requires that the written document or
scripted broadcast state that an issuer will make any public offering via
a prospectus. 445 Rule 254(b) (2) (ii) has different language because a

Regulation A issuer must deliver an offering circular rather than a
prospectus.
Another important difference is that under proposed Rule 135d,
full compliance with the provisions of the Rule is a precondition to
reliance on the Rule. 44 6 In contrast, compliance with the require437 See Regulation Update: Testing the Waters, IN EsrOR REL., Sept. 1, 1995, available in
1995 WL 10825895.
438 See supra text accompanying notes 167, 312. For a recommendation that the Commission adopt such a provision, see infra Part V.F.3.
439 Testing Release, supra note 8, at 86,887-88.
440 Id.
441

442

Id.

Id. at 86,888; see also infra Part V.E.3 (discussing why this would be a misstep).
See supra text accompanying note 405.
444 See supra text accompanying note 192. Effective as ofJanuary 21, 1997, the Commission requires that small issuers submnit Rule 254 testing materials to the main office of
the SEC in Washington, DC. See Revisions to Forms SB-1, SB-2, and Regulation A, Securities Act Release No. 7373, [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 85,867,
at 88,768-69, 88,771 (Dec. 16, 1996) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.254(b) (1) (1997)).
445 Testing Release, supra note 8, at 86,893 (proposed Rule 135d(a)(2)(i)).
446
See supra text accompanying note 417.
443
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ments of Rule 254(b) is "not a condition to [the] ...exemption." 4 7
For example, submission of the solicitation document or scripted
broadcast to the Commission does not constitute a condition to testing the waters under Rule 254.448 Pursuant to the guidance offered in
the SBIs Release and Rule 258(a), 44 9 failure to meet the requirements
of Rule 254(b) is grounds for "[tihe Commission . . . [to] enter an
order temporarily suspending a Regulation A exemption." 450 Conversely, in order to exempt a solicitation from section 5, an issuer
seeking to solicit indications of interest under proposed Rule 135d
must submit the materials to the Commission and meet all other requirements the Rule prescribes. 45 1 This also differs from the more
complicated provisions of the NASAA model regarding
452
compliance.
Although the Commission followed Rule 254 rather than
NASAA's model rule in drafting proposed Rule 135d, it did give
NASAA's model serious consideration. Throughout the Testing Release, the SEC asked commenters to consider various revisions to proposed Rule 135d, many of which were part of NASAA's testing-thewaters program. 453 In most of these instances, the SEC failed to mention that these proposals were included in the NASAA rule and in
effect in some states. 45 4 Nevertheless, the Commission was clearly trying to appease NASAA and coordinate federal and state securities
laws.
C.

Reactions to the Testing Release
1. Djd Vu

Given that the SEC modelled Rule 135d on Rule 254, the proposal, unlike its antecedent, was not regarded as innovative. Familiarity
with the concept of testing the waters and anticipation that the Com447
448

SBIs Release, supranote 5, at 36,470 (codified at 17 G.F.R § 230.254(b) (1997)).

See Testing Release, supra note 8, at 86,889.
17 C.F.R. § 230.258(a) (1997).
450 Id.
451 See Testing Release, supra note 8, at 86,890.
452 See supra text accompanying note 319.
458
See, e.g., Testing Release, supra note 8, at 86,887-88 (soliciting comment as to
whether "any of the exclusions [regarding types of issuers] in the NASAA draft policy statement [should] be specifically incorporated into the proposal"); id, at 86,888 (asking commenters "whether additional information should be required in the soliciting material,
such as that required by the NASAA draft policy").
454
See, e.g., id. at 86,890 (soliciting comment on whether the Commission should grant
investors more time to review the prospectus when an issuer has tested the waters-this
idea originated in section (1) (h)of NASAA's model, see supra text accompanying note
313); id. at 86,889 (seeking comment on whether the Rule should require issuers to deliver
a copy of the solicitation document to each person from whom they solicit indications of
interest-this suggestion derives from section 1 (f) of the NASAA model, see supra note 308
and accompanying text).
449
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mission would extend the concept beyond Regulation A may explain
why few commenters submitted letters in response to the Testing Release, and why there has been a dearth of scholarly work written about
the proposal since its introduction in June 1995. 4 55 Nevertheless, the

comments submitted to the SEC are important because they, in part,
have contributed to the SEC's extended review of its proposal. Before
the Testing Release, the Commission noted that its proposal to extend
45 6
testing the waters to registered IPOs had received mixed reviews.
As with Rule 254,4 5 7 responses to the proposal after the Release's pub-

lication were mixed.
2.

Controversial?

Although not innovative, proposed Rule 135d, as with Rule 254
when the Commission introduced it, is extremely controversial. The
Testing Release suggests that the SEC knew its proposal was controversial and expected the public comments to question its authority to
adopt a rule that would introduce such sweeping change to the Securities Act. The Commission recapitulated the relevant language of sections 5(c) and 2(3) of the Securities Act, explaining how proposed
Rule 135d constituted an exception to the gunjumping prohibition. 4 58 The SEC acknowledged that it was "cognizant that rulemak-

ing in [the testing-the-waters] area is circumscribed by the statute's
prohibition of conduct constituting an 'offer' prior to the filing of a
registration statement."4 59 In addition, the SEC explained that under
Rule 254, testing-the-waters measures constitute offers under section
2(3).460 The Commission also reiterated language from a 1957 release in which it had explained that prefiling publicity that is not
"couched in terms of an express offer," but "contribute[s] to conditioning the public market or arousing public interest in an issuer or its
455

Commenters submitted thirteen responses, including two actiongrams, which

briefly indicate a commenter's support of, or opposition to, the proposal. See Comment
Letter File for S7-18-95 (on file with the SEC). By contrast, there were sixty-six comment
letters submitted in response to the SBIs Release. See supra note 156. The more comprehensive nature of the SBIs may explain why that Release prompted more responses.
456
See SEC Advisory Committee Moves Agenda Toward Model for Company Registration, 27
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 708, 709 (May 12, 1995) [hereinafter Toward Model for Company
Registration].
457 See supra note 206 and accompanying text. It is important to recognize that the
commenters have various personal and professional interests that help explain their positions regarding the Testing Release. Furthermore, the comments do not necessarily reflect
the views of an individual commenter's entire organization, association, or firm. Unless
the letter suggests otherwise, one should attribute the views to the individual who wrote the
letter, or the committee to which the individual belongs.
458 Testing Release, supra note 8, at 86,891-92.
459
Id. at 86,891.
460
Id. at 86,892; see supra text accompanying note 213.
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securities" may violate section 5(c). 461 In support of its authority to

adopt proposed Rule 135d, the Commission cited its past experience
in adopting rules such as Rules 135 and 135a-c, and in taking "interpretive positions" in releases regarding "application of the statute to
other types of public communications made prior to the filing of a
registration statement. '462 The SEC concluded by stating its intention
to review the relevant statutory language as well as its past interpretations "in considering the historical scope of permissible 'test the waters' activities and the appropriateness of the provisions of proposed
Rule 135d."

46

3

Despite the undoubtedly controversial nature of the proposal,
few public commenters, including NASAA, either questioned the
Commission's authority or addressed the inherent difficulty of reconciling proposed Rule 135d with sections 5(c) and 2(3) of the Securities Act. Only one comment letter discussed this problem. Marc
Steinberg, Professor of Law at Southern Methodist University and a
former SEC attorney, responded that "proposed Rule 135d... is in
contravention of [s] ection 5 (c) of the Securities Act" and "'amounts
to an effective administrative repeal of [section] 5(c) in the case of
IPOs.'"464 According to Professor Steinberg, testing the waters under
proposed Rule 135d represents an illegal offer to sell. 465 Professor

Steinberg added that the Rule allows an issuer to "'condition the mar'466
ket,' adversely affect[ing] unsophisticated investors.
3.

Necessary?

A few commenters expressed doubts as to whether proposed Rule
135d was necessary. According to this view, testing the waters before a
registered IPO is unnecessary because professional underwriters work
with the issuer to assess the viability of an IPO.467 Because an issuer
usually needs an underwriter to conduct a registered IPO, this view
suggests that rather than testing the waters, an issuer should let the
461
Testing Release, supra note 8, at 86,891-92; see supra note 36 and accompanying
text. The Commission posited the idea of testing the waters via a "simplified registration
procedure" as a means of navigating around the gun-jumping problem. Testing Release,
supra note 8, at 86,892.
462 Testing Release, supra note 8, at 86,891 & n.66."
463
Id. at 86,892.
464 Comment Letter from Marc I. Steinberg, Rupert and Lillian Radford Professor of
Law, Southern Methodist University School of Law, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC 1
(Aug. 30, 1995) [hereinafter Steinberg Comment Letter] (on file with the SEC) (quoting
John C. Coffee,Jr., Is the SecuritiesAct of 1933 Obsolete? The SEC IncreasinglyAppears To Believe
So But Has Not Yet Adopted a Consistent Policy To Replace I NAT'L LJ., Sept. 4, 1995, at B4).
465
Id.
466
Id
467
See Comment Letter from Gary P. Kreider, Partner, Keating, Muething & Kiekamp,
to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC 1 (July 24, 1995) [hereinafter Keating Comment Letter] (on file with the SEC).

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:464

underwriters assess the viability of an IPO. 4 6 8 As a result, proponents
of this position have commented:
It is difficult to imagine an issuer of the type involved in a normal
IPO gaining anything from the "test the waters" concept. Regardless of the degree of advertising involved in this manner, an underwriter would make its own judgment as to the success of a real
offering. The procedure would... be of benefit only to the most
marginal of offerings, ones that could not normally make it in [the]
4 69
regular IPO scenario.
In the same vein, a school of thought argues that "the opportunity to
test the waters for an IPO by floating promotional materials isn't necessary for mainstream companies whose products have already found
a market; those firms... can get ample advice on the marketability of
their stocks from investment bankers." 470 Proposed Rule 135d would
therefore be detrimental because it "would mainly benefit 'marginal
companies' that pose riskier prospects for investors."4 71
Similarly, there were commenters who questioned the need for
proposed Rule 135d on the ground that the Commission was mistaken
in thinking that small businesses incur considerable costs conducting
IPOs that fail. 472 In support of this position, the Capital Markets Com-

mittee of the Securities Industry Association ("SIA'), a trade association representing over 700 securities firms in North America,
maintains that only a few issuers have withdrawn their registrations
after filing registration statements in preparation for an IPO. 4 73 According to SIA, underwriters serve as "'filters'" that prevent an issuer
from incurring substantial expenses if the IPO appears unlikely to succeed. 4 74 Unlike attorneys and accountants, underwriters' compensation is contingent on consummation of the offering. 475 Therefore, as
a result of this "'no consummation, no compensation'" custom, underwriters are unlikely to underwrite an IPO that is unpromising.47 6
Furthermore, a failed IPO is also detrimental to an underwriter's reputation. 4 77 These disincentives of zero compensation and negative
468 An issuer could attempt to self-underwrite a registered IPO, but this would be extremely difficult. See infra text accompanying notes 594-95.
469 Keating Comment Letter, supra note 467, at 1.
470 Jeffrey Taylor, SEC To Approve Plan PermittingIPOPromotions: Firms Could Test Markets Before Formal Process; CriticsFearRisky Plays, WALL ST. J., June 27, 1995, at A4.
471
Id.
472 See Comment Letter from Perry L. Taylor, Jr., Chairman, Capital Markets Committee of the Securities Industry Association, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC 2 (Sept. 19,
1995) [hereinafter SIA Comment Letter] (on file with the SEC).
473 Id. at 1 n.1, 2.
474 Id. at 2.
475
See id. at 3.
476 Id.

477

See id."
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529

publicity render an underwriter a "'gate keeper,'" who carefully assesses "which private companies are ready for [public] markets and
...prevent[s] companies from incurring the expenses that are part of
a public offering when the likelihood of success is inadequate." 478 An
IPO specialist commented that the intended benefits of proposed
Rule 135d do not justify the reduction of "'investor protection"' because IPOs "'are easy to do."' 479 In contrast to underwriters and IPO
firms, management or business owners usually lack the experience
4 0
necessary to determine if the market will be interested in an IPO.
SIA questioned an issuer's ability to properly assess the extent of investor interest in an IPO. 48 1 In short, these critics disagree with the Com-

mission, arguing that the compliance costs are prohibitive only for
"shaky investment schemes" that should not consider IPOs in the first
place-not for "substantial business enterprise [s]."482
In fact, testing the waters under proposed Rule 135d may still be
expensive for an issuer. In order to ensure full compliance with the
proposed Rule and state laws, understand the ramifications of testingthe-waters activity, and avoid liability under the federal and state antifraud provisions, an issuer should still consult a lawyer. Legal fees
and the expenses incurred in preparing, submitting, and distributing
or broadcasting the solicitation materials may prohibit or discourage
some potential issuers from testing the waters under the proposal.
Commenters, questioning the need for proposed Rule 135d, also
feared that the proposal may hurt the public markets. 48 3 To the extent investors are misled by prefiling solicitations or suffer as a result
of an ill-conceived offering, "a dilution of confidence in [the United
48 4
States] capital markets" may result.
Despite these comments, Part V below argues that a testing-thewaters rule is necessary. In particular, the foregoing commenters
failed to discuss how the Rule might help businesses that are not
"mainstream" and "whose products have [not] found a market" who
may, primarily as a result of a successful testing-the-waters experience,
485
be able to retain an underwriter.

478

Id

Peggie Elgin, SEC's Test-the-WaterProgram Could Cut LPO Expenses, CoRP. GASHFLOW,
Nov. 1995, at 14, 17 (quoting Kathleen Smith, Analyst, Renaissance Capital).
480
See SIA Comment Letter, supra note 472, at 2-3.
481
Id.
482 Keating Comment Letter, supranote 467, at 2.
483 See, e.g., id.
484 SIA Comment Letter, supra note 472, at 4.
485 Taylor, supra note 470, at A4.
479
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4. Benefits for Issuers
Most commenters responded that the proposal would help small
businesses. Commenters appreciated the proposal's easing of the regulatory burdens on issuers and the flexibility it affords small businesses that are frequently forced to conduct Rule 505 or 506 offerings
instead of IPOs due to the uncertainty of investor response to a public
offering. 48 6 According to the New York State Bar Association
("NYSBA"), the proposal will provide easier access to the capital markets for private businesses who are reluctant to go public due to the
"high initial costs" and the risky nature of an IPO.487 The ABA also
appreciated the value of giving issuers a chance to solicit indications
of interest in an IPO of greater value than that permitted by the Regulation A ceiling.488 The ABA acknowledged that issuers who can secure the services of an experienced underwriter for a "firm
commitment" underwriting 48 9 are unlikely to use proposed Rule
135d.490 However, the ABA supported proposed Rule 135d because,
among other reasons, it (i) gives issuers the opportunity to assess market interest before meeting with underwriters, and (ii) may permit
underwriters to test the waters on behalf of issuers, both of which
would enable more issuers to secure firm commitment underwritings. 491 Further, in the case of a "best efforts" underwriting49 2 or a
self-underwritten offering, the proposal will authorize issuers both to
486
See, e.g., Comment Letter from D. Craig Nordlund, Chairman, Securities Law Committee of the American Society of Corporate Secretaries, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary,
SEC 1-2 (Sept. 7, 1995) [hereinafter American Society of Corporate Secretaries Comment
Letter] (on file with the SEC); Comment Letter from John V. Helmick, Attorney,
Hershner, Hunter, Moulton, Andrews & Neill, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC 1 (Sept.
8, 1995) [hereinafter Hershner Comment Letter] (on file with the SEC).
487
Comment Letter from Michael lovenko, Chair, Committee on Securities Regulation of the Business Law Section of the New York State Bar Association, to Jonathan G.
Katz, Secretary, SEC 1 (Sept. 7, 1995) [hereinafter NYSBA Comment Letter] (on file with
the SEC); see also Comment Letter from Sullivan & Cromwell, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC 1-2 (Sept. 22, 1995) [hereinafter Sullivan & Cromwell Comment Letter] (on file
with the SEC) (discussing financial constraints of the registration process).
488
Comment Letter from John M. Liftin et al., Chairpersons, Committees on Federal
Regulation of Securities, State Regulation of Securities, and Small Business Committee of
the ABA, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC 21 (Oct. 25, 1995) [hereinafter ABA Comment Letter] (on file with the SEC).
489 In a firm commitment underwriting, the underwriter agrees to buy the securities
offered and then resells the shares to the public. See LIPMAN, supra note 78, at 50; SCHNEIDER ET AL.., supra note 78, at 31. For a discussion of the difference between "firm commit-

ment" and "best efforts" underwritings, see LIPMAN, supra note 78, at 50-51; 1 Loss &
SELGMAN, supra note 112, at 324-42.

ABA Comment Letter, supra note 488, at 21.
Id.
492 In a best efforts underwriting, the underwriter agrees to make its best efforts to sell
the securities, but is not obligated to sell the securities unless it finds enough investors to
buy all of the shares or an amount established in the undenvriting agreement. See ScNErDER ET AL., supra note 78, at 31-32.
490
491
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ascertain whether an IPO would sell and to tailor the offering to the
wishes of the market before it must shoulder considerable expenses.

49 3

In short, the proposal makes a registered IPO a more feasi-

ble avenue for raising capital.
In fact, several commenters advocated a further extension of the
availability of testing the waters to help still more issuers. For example, the ABA recommended that proposed Rule 135d contain language expressly permitting underwriters and other agents to solicit
indications of interest on an issuer's behalf.494 Sullivan & Cromwell, a

large corporate law firm, opined that in light of the difficulties foreign
companies face in determining market interest in the United States,
the proposal should expressly permit foreign and sovereign issuers to
test the waters. 495 Some commenters suggested that the Commission
remove certain types of issuers from proposed Rule 135d(a) (1)'s exclusionary provision to enable more issuers to test the waters. 49 6 Finally, many commenters encouraged the Commission to extend the
availability of testing the waters beyond the Regulation A and registered IPO markets. A common suggestion was to repeal or amend
Rule 502(c)'s prohibition on general solicitation, facilitating issuers'
ability to test the waters and subsequently conduct Rule 505 and 506
offerings. 497 One commenter even advocated the expansion of test-

See ABA Comment Letter, supra note 488, at 21.
Id. at 22.
495 Sullivan & Cromwell Comment Letter, supra note 487, at 2.
496 See, e.g., ABA Comment Letter, supra note 488, at 20 (commenting that "the exclusion of 'direct participation investment programs' is unnecessary and, as proposed to be
defined, is excessively broad and would unnecessarily deprive many legitimate operating
companies of the benefits of the rule merely because they chose to organize in other than
corporate form"); Comment Letter from Tony M. Edwards, Vice President and General
Counsel, National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC 2-3 (June 6, 1996) [hereinafter NAREIT Comment Letter] (on file with the SEC)
(maintaining that real estate investment trusts should not be excluded from the proposal);
Sullivan & Cromwell Comment Letter, supra note 487, at 2 (responding that proposed
Rule 135d should be available to all classes of issuers with the exception of blank check and
penny stock issuers). But see Comment Letter from Michael S. Caccese, Senior Vice President, General Counsel & Secretary, Association for Investment Management and Research,
to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC 4 (Sept. 8, 1995) [hereinafter AIMR Comment Letter]
(on file with the SEC) (finding that the Commission's "exclusions are appropriate for the
reasons set forth in the [Testing] Release"); NASAA Comment Letter Regarding Testing
Release, supranote 327, at 13,052-53 (recommending (i) exclusion of "businesses that engage in extractive industries," and (ii) inclusion of catch-all and bad boy disqualification
provisions).
497 See, e.g., ABA Comment Letter, supra note 488, at 23-24; AIMR Comment Letter,
supra note 496, at 3, 6-7; Hershner Comment Letter, supra note 486, at 1; NYSBA Comment
Letter, supranote 487, at3-4. NASAA has already indicated its willingness to permit issuers
to test the waters before Rule 504 offerings. See supra text accompanying note 324.
493

494
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ing-the-waters privileges to issuers considering an exempt offering
abroad under Regulation S.498
5.

Investor Protection

Some commenters were satisfied that proposed Rule 135d contained enough safeguards to protect investors. 499 For example, the
ABA concluded that the threat of liability under the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws, the twenty-day waiting period, and
cautionary language requirements for the solicitation materials provided prospective investors with sufficient protection.5 0 0 Furthermore, some commenters pointed out that investors would still enjoy
protection not only under the regular registration process that would
precede a public sale of securities, but also from the documentation
50 1
distributed before any exempt offering.
Commenters generally approved of the Commission's decision to
require issuers to make only limited disclosures in the solicitation
materials while allowing issuers to disseminate any factually accurate
information. 50 2 In light of the deterrent power of the general antifraud provisions, these commenters were not concerned that this
would harm investors. 50 3 Similarly, commenters supported the Commission's emphasis on permitting dissemination via a wide range of
media.50 4 In fact, the responses of certain commenters suggest that
the proposal may go too far in protecting investors. The NYSBA, for
instance, proposed limiting application of the filing requirement to
situations where an issuer commences an IPO after testing the waters. 50 5 Both the Association for Investment Management and Re498 See, e.g., Sullivan & Cromwell Comment Letter, supra note 487, at 6-7. The SEC
could accomplish such an extension by exempting solicitation materials from Regulation
S's proscription of "'directed selling efforts.'" Id.
499 See, e.g., ABA Comment Letter, supra note 488, at 21-22; AIMR Comment Letter,
supra note 496, at 3-6; Hershner Comment Letter, supra note 486, at 1; NYSBA Comment
Letter, supra note 487, at 1-2; Sullivan & Cromwell Comment Letter, supra note 487, at 3-6.

ABA Comment Letter, supra note 488, at 21-22.
See, e.g., AIMR Comment Letter, supra note 496, at 3; Sullivan & Cromwell Comment Letter, supra note 487, at 3.
502
See, e.g., ABA Comment Letter, supra note 488, at 22; Sullivan & Cromwell Comment Letter, supra note 487, at 4. But see AIMR Comment Letter, supra note 496, at 4-5
(advocating additional disclosure, but opposing inclusion of highly specific pricing information regarding the offering, unaudited financials, and forward-looking statements).
503
See ABA Comment Letter, supra note 488, at 22; Sullivan & Cromwell Comment
Letter, supra note 487, at 4; see also NYSBA Comment Letter, supra note 487, at 2 (supporting the SEC's decision to rely on the antifraud provisions to protect investors).
504
See, e.g., AIMR Comment Letter, supra note 496, at 5; Sullivan & Cromwell Comment Letter, supra note 487, at 5-6.
505 NYSBA Comment Letter, supra note 487, at 3 (contending that "[t]he mere existence of the filing requirement may well negatively impact the desire of private companies,
not subject to the jurisdiction of the SEC to so subject themselves prior to a determination
to have an IPO").
500

501
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search ("AIMR"), an international nonprofit organization comprised
of more than 50,000 members and candidates employed in investment management, and Sullivan & Cromwell even went so far as to
oppose proposed Rule 135d(a) (3) 's requirement that issuers submit a
copy of the testing materials to the Commission before they use them
to solicit indications of interest. 50 6 AIMR also objected to the proposal's restrictions on the content of the coupon an issuer may include
50 7
with its soliciting materials.
However, as expected, other commenters' concerns regarding
the proposal's insufficient protection of investors prompted them to
oppose the entire proposal. Reflective of this position was the comment that "the cost to public investors of this proposal far outweighs
any benefit to legitimate issuers." 508 Many of these concerns echoed
those made in response to Rule 254.509 For example, one commenter
charged that proposed Rule 135d left investors too vulnerable to fraud
and misrepresentation. 5 10 There was also concern that in "permitting
IPO issuers to 'condition the market,"' proposed Rule 135d "adversely
affects unsophisticated investors." 5 1' The principals of potential issuers, unlike underwriters, generally lack experience in soliciting investors. 51 2 Unfamiliar with federal and state securities laws and eager to

promote their offerings, principals may "lack either the experience or
self-restraint to ignore the sudden rush of interest in their companies
and the opportunity for free advertising."5 15 Therefore, during the
solicitation process, such issuers may illegally sell securities or engage
in overreaching and puffing; in short, critics of the proposal believe
that issuers who test the waters under proposed Rule 135d may actu'
ally be "'poisoning the waters.' "514

In contrast, NASAA, a vociferous critic of Rule 254's inadequate
investor protection, did not reject proposed Rule 135d due to its insufficient investor protection. NASAA submitted a brief comment letter in response to the Testing Release. 515 The Association reiterated
its support for "the policy of facilitating capital formation by allowing
506 AIMR Comment Letter, supra note 496, at 1 n.1, 4-6; Sullivan & Cromwell Comment Letter, supra note 487, at 5.
507 AIMR Comment Letter, supra note 496, at 5.
508 Keating Comment Letter, supra note 467, at 1; see also id, at 2 (concluding that the
"proposal should be abandoned as being contrary to the interest of investors and the integrity of the public markets. It is a proposal not worthy of the Commission.").
509 See supranotes 229-58 and accompanying text.
510 See Keating Comment Letter, supra note 467, at 2.
511 Steinberg Comment Letter, supra note 464, at 1.
512 See SIA Comment Letter, supra note 472, at 3-4.
513 Id. at 3.
514 Id.
515 For discussion of NASAA's longer, more acrimonious comment letter submitted in
response to the SBIs Release, see supra text accompanying notes 243-47, 278-82.
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a company to make an early assessment of the public interest in the
purchase of its securities." 51 6 However, NASAA added that it "believ[ed] that, at least on the state level, there is a need for a regulatory
structure that assures that those who utilize this process are not problematic and those investors that are solicited are not preconditioned
to such an extent that the final document is meaningless." 5 17 The way
to achieve these two elements of investor protection, according to
NASAA, was to pattern proposed Rule 135d on the NASAA model
rule, which contains safeguards protecting both investors and issuers.518 After summarizing the key provisions of its model, NASAA concluded that "within the structure of our Model Rule, we believe that
expanding the opportunity to 'test the waters' beyond Regulation A to
registered offering[s] will be beneficial to capital formation and will
not compromise investor protection."5 1 9
NASAA was thus satisfied with the provisions of proposed Rule
135d that resembled sections of its model rule or comported with its
findings after the pilot project. For example, NASAA agreed with the
Commission's decision not to limit what an issuer may disclose in the
solicitation materials. 520 Similarly, NASAA reached the same conclusion as the ABA and NYSBA that the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws provide investors with adequate protection from
fraudulent or misleading solicitations. 5 21 On the other hand, NASAA
suggested ways in which the SEC could further protect investors. For
example, the Association advocated that the Commission further restrict who may test the waters in reliance on the Rule. 52 2 In addition,
NASAA recommended that proposed Rule 135d impose restrictions
on cold calling, a means of dissemination that, as states in the pilot
program discovered, was prone to abuse. 523 NASAA also suggested
that the SEC could further protect investors by incorporating a cooling-off period that resembles the seven-day period section (1) (h) of its
516
517

NASAA Comment Letter Regarding Testing Release, supra note 327, at 13,052.
Id.

518 Id.; see supraPart llI.C.1.
519 NASAA Comment Letter Regarding Testing Release, supranote 327, at 13,053 (emphasis added).
520
Id.
521
Id.; ABA Comment Letter, supra note 488, at 21-22; NYSBA Comment Letter, supra
note 487, at 2. Therefore, NASAA, the ABA, and the NYSBA opposed the establishment of
section 11 or section 12(a) (2) of the Securities Act as the "standard of liability." Imposition of the higher standard of liability under sections 11 or 12(a) (2) would dramatically
increase the cost of testing the waters because an issuer would then certainly want to consult a lawyer before delivering, broadcasting, publishing, or transmitting its solicitation
materials. See NYSBA Comment Letter, supra note 487, at 2; infra Part V.F.5.
522
NASAA Comment Letter Regarding Testing Release, supra note 327, at 13,052-53.
523
Id. at 13,053; see alsoKeating Comment Letter, supra note 467, at 2 (recommending
a ban on telephone solicitation because of "policing" problems).
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model rule prescribes. 524 With respect to extending the testing-thewaters proposal to other exempt offerings, NASAA expressed its willingness to work with the Commission to reach an agreeable solution. 525

On the ground that twenty days was too short a waiting

period, NASAA opposed the Commission's proposal that twenty days
after an issuer has ceased testing the waters, it could conduct a private
placement. 526 NASAA thus had concerns regarding investor protection, but appeared confident that if the Commission followed
NASAA's model rule, it could cure the proposal's deficiencies.
6.

Coordination

Before the NSMIA, coordination of proposed Rule 135d with
blue sky laws was considered essential for the proposal to be effective.5 2 7 NASAA addressed the importance of coordination when it

wrote, 'We support any move toward making our two rules as uniform
as possible ....

,

28

Nevertheless, a careful reading of NASAA's com-

ment letter suggests that the state securities regulators may not support the proposal unless it incorporates more of the safeguards found
5 29
in the NASAA model rule.

Following publication of the Testing Release, the SEC began taking measures to align federal and state law with respect to testing the
waters. For example, at the annual 1996 Conference on Uniformity of
Securities Law attended by representatives of the Commission and
NASAA, the testing-the-waters proposal was on the agenda.5 30 The
conferees were scheduled to discuss how Rule 254 has affected issuers
and investors through a "review [of] their experience with amended
53
Regulation A and the use of 'test the waters' documents." '
524 NASAA Comment Letter Regarding Testing Release, supra note 327, at 13,053. Investors currently have only forty-eight hours to review the prospectus before a broker or
dealer is required to mail the confirmation of a sale. See Testing Release, supra note 8, at
86,890 (citing Rule 15c2-8, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-8 (1997)). AIMR also commented that
forty-eight hours was insufficient. AIMR Comment Letter, supra note 496, at 6.
525 NASAA Comment Letter Regarding Testing Release, supra note 327, at 13,053.
526 Id.; see also Keating Comment Letter, supra note 467, at 2 (recommending "[a]
longer safe harbor, such as three to six months"). For discussion of the SEC's proposal, see
supra text accompanying notes 433-34.
527 See, e.g., 3A BLooMENHrrA, supra note 11, § 6.09, at 6-28. These concerns predated
the NSMIA. For a discussion of how the NSMIA obviates most of these concerns, see infra
Part V.D.
528 NASAA Comment Letter Regarding Testing Release, supra note 327, at 13,052.
The Association also stated its amenability to working with the SEC on a possible change to
the current prohibitions on general solicitation and advertising under Rules 505 and 506.
a at 13,053.
529
See supra text accompanying note 519.
530 See Securities Uniformity; Annual Conference on Uniformity of Securities Law, Securities Act Release No. 7277, 61 Fed. Reg. 15,847, 15,849 (Apr. 9, 1996).

531

Id.
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The Commission's Response
1. A Lengthy Review
In stark contrast to its race to adopt the SBIs, 53 2 the SEC has

taken its time considering the pros and cons of proposed Rule 135d.
Although the comment period ended on September 8, 1995, the SEC
continued to accept comment letters submitted much later.535 Perhaps the mixed reactions to the proposal have made the SEC hesitant.
However, there was an even greater disparity of opinion regarding the
5 4
SBIs which did not delay the Commission's adoption of Rule 254. 3

There are a number of other possible reasons for the Commission'sjudicious delay in making a determination on testing the waters.
While the IPO market has remained strong, its appeal cannot compare to the political pressure which drove the SEC to adopt the SBIs
before the 1992 election. 535 Unlike in 1992, the SEC, through a review of solicitations of interest in reliance on Rule 254, now has the
opportunity to assess how testing the waters functions in practice.
This has given the Commission a chance to tailor its proposal accordingly, work with NASAA to try to coordinate state securities regulations with the federal rule, and avoid criticism for hastily adopting a
controversial proposal.
The controversial nature of the proposal has also contributed to
the Commission's protracted review. Proposed Rule 135d is a more
controversial proposal than Rule 254, for it directly clashes with secion 5(c) of the Securities Act.53 6 Furthermore, the Commission acknowledged in the Testing Release that section 5(c) ties the agency's
hands when it comes to rulemaking in connection with prefiling solicitations. 53 7 The Commission's defense of its authority to make rules
regarding prefiling publicity and its promise to consider other alternatives prompted a scholar to remark that "[i]n proposing Rule 135d
with such unusual tentativeness, the Commission seems to be testing
55
the waters itself."

8

While this initial tentativeness has endured, the Commission's eagerness to extend testing the waters beyond Regulation A has not relented. The Commission has repeatedly stated that an expansion of
testing the waters remains a priority. For example, at a speech in late
January 1997, one-and-a-half years after the SEC published the Testing
Release, the Chairman of the SEC reiterated: "[W]e should permit
532

53
534

535
536

537
538

See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., NAREIT Comment Letter, supra note 496 (dated June 6, 1996).
See Comment Letter File for S7-4-92 (on file with the SEC).
See supra notes 148-51 and accompanying text; text accompanying note 288.
See infra Part V.3.
See supra text accompanying note 459.
3A BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 11, § 6.09, at 6-30.
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some form of 'testing the waters' in more offerings.... I don't want
to make... this sound too easy; as always, the devil is in the details.
But I believe that we can and should make progress in [this] ...
area[ ] soon." 539 In addition to wrestling with these details and coordinating them with the states, the Commission has struggled with the
issue of its authority. In the past, the SEC has asserted that it would
welcome a grant of general "exemptive authority which would make it
easier for the Commission to implement ... the pending 'test-thewaters' proposal."5 4° Pursuit of general exemptive authority was undoubtedly a higher priority for the SEC in 1996 than the adoption of
the Testing Release.
Enacted in October 1996, the NSMIA has accorded the Commission this general exemptive authority.54 1 The SEC can rely on this
authority to exempt issuers that test the waters from the section 5 requirements. 5 42 However, as discussed above, the Commission may exercise this authority only "to the extent that such exemption is
necessary or appropriate in the public interest, and is consistent with
the protection of investors." 54 3 The SEC must therefore first establish
both of these points, which will require an extensive inquiry. 544 The
Commission has not yet invoked its section 28 authority to adopt proposed Rule 135d.
2.

The PotentialDisarmament of Section 5(c)

The availability of this general exemptive authority may forebode
the end of the section 5 (c) gun-jumping prohibition. 5 45 Critics of the
gunjumping prohibition and other scholars have discussed its "obsolescence, '5 46 "'metaphysical"' and "'hyper-technical"' nature,5 47 and
its potential to lead to inconsistent results.5 48 Linda Quinn, former
Director of the SEC's Division of Corporation Finance, has observed
that in the modem age of technology, it may "no longer [be] possible
...to expect that information flows to investors can be limited effec539 Arthur Levitt, Corporate Finance in the Information Age, Remarks at the Securities
Regulation Institute (Jan. 23, 1997), available in 1997 WL 24362 (S.E.C.), at *6.
540 S. REP. No. 104-293, at 15 (1996).
541 See supra note 226.
542 See Rowe, supra note 226, at 8.
543 NSMIA, supra note 22, at 3424 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77z-3 (Supp. II 1996)); see

also supra note 226 (discussing the Commission's general exemptive authority).
544

See infra Part V.B-C.

545 See Rowe, supra note 226, at 8.
546 See Coffee, supra note 60, at 1150; Michael McDonough, Comment, Death in One
Act: The Casefor Company Registration, 24 PEPP. L. REV. 563, 598 (1997); Coffee, supra note
464, at B4; see also Chiappinelli, supra note 30 (arguing for the elimination of the gunjumping prohibition).
547 McDonough, supra note 546, at 596, 598-602; Gerald S. Backman & Stephen E.
Kim, A Curefor SecuritiesAct Metaphysics: IntegratedRegistration, INsiGsHS, May 1995, at 18, 18.
548 See McDonough, supra note 546, at 600-02; Backman & Kim, supranote 547, at 18.
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tively."'5 49 The adoption of Rule 254 has ushered in a more liberal
SEC attitude towards gun-jumping. 550 As a distinguished scholar in
the securities field concluded in September 1995, proposed Rule 135d
represents such a radical departure from the Commission's historical
prohibition on gun-jumping that it "can be understood only as reflecting an implicitjudgment that Sec[tion] 5 (c) has become obsolete and
55 1
imposes regulatory costs in excess of its benefits."
The Commission thus has recently re-evaluated the utility of the
gunjumping prohibition. 55 2 AJuly 1996 report by the Advisory Committee on Capital Formation and Regulatory Processes (the "Advisory
Committee") further hints that the SEC may be approaching this conclusion.55 3 The Advisory Committee Report even suggests that the
gunjumping prohibition may actually harm investors. 554 According
to the Advisory Committee,
[A] Ithough the gunjumping doctrine may serve to protect purchasers in the offering by hindering circumvention of the registration
requirements, it also may chill or delay the disclosure of some company-related information that is beneficial to the marketplace. The
Committee questioned whether the chilling effect of the gun-jumping doctrine serves investor protection when the issuer is required
to supply the markets with extensive public disclosures on an ongo555
ing basis through its Exchange Act filings.
This argument closely resembles the Commission's traditional
policy interpretation that the gun-jumping ban necessitates a balancing of the competing interests of encouraging disclosure and protecting investors. 55 6 The difference is that the tone has changed. The
Commission's historical deference to the gunjumping prohibition appears to have given way to skepticism regarding its value. 557 The test-

ing-the-waters issue has precipitated debate challenging a part of the
549 Linda C. Quinn, Reforming the Securities Act of 1933: A Conceptual Framework, INSIGHTS, Jan. 1996, at 25, 28.
550 See Hoyns, supra note 30, at 9.
551
See Coffee, supra note 464, at B4; see also McDonough, supra note 546, at 598-601
(agreeing with Professor Coffee's assessment).
552 Coffee, supra note 464, at B6 (commenting that the "SEC is coming to view
Sec[tion] 5 as antiquated and possibly an obstacle to efficient capital formation").
553 Report of the Advisory Committee on the Capital Formation and Regulatory
Processes, [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 85,834, at 88,403 (July
24, 1996) [hereinafter Advisory Committee Report].
554 Id. at 88,444.
55
Id.
556 See supra note 69.
557 See Coffee, supra note 60, at 1149-53 (explaining that even ten years ago, the gunjumping prohibition was a "[s]tatutory norm[ ] ...treated as inviolate," but recently it "has
been disrupted by major SEC staff initiatives"); see also McDonough, supra note 546, at 600
(describing section 5 (c) as one of the "basic concepts once considered indispensable to

the Securities Act").
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bedrock of the Securities Act. This debate may ultimately revolutionize the registration process, going far beyond helping small businesses
launch registered IPOs. 558 The SEC has perhaps shelved consideration of proposed Rule 135d until it can adopt the proposal as part of a
broader reform of the Securities Act.5 59 The seriousness of this undertaking further explains the SEC's delay in proceeding with pro5 60
posed Rule 135d.

V
RESTORING THE BALANcE-AN ASSESSMENT OF THE

TESTING-THE-WATERS PROPOSAL

A.

Proposed Rule 135d and Section 5(c)
1.

The Authority Issue

Although some observers have questioned the Commission's authority to adopt proposed Rule 135d, 561 the language of section
19(a) 562 of the Securities Act, in effect as of the publication of the

Testing Release, suggests that the agency does in fact have such authority.5 63 Section 19(a) grants the Commission the "authority from

time to time to make, amend, and rescind such rules and regulations
as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this subchapter [the
Securities Act], including . . . defining accounting, technical, and

trade terms used in this subchapter. '56 The statute further provides
that "[t] he rules and regulations of the Commission shall be effective
upon publication in the manner which the Commission shall prescribe."5 65 Perhaps one could argue that the proposed rule is not
"necessary to carry out the provisions" of the statute. However, as the
ABA commented, the SEC has relied in the past on this grant of authority to make rules in which it has defined the terms "offer" and
"5
"prospectus.
558
559

560

Id
561
562
563

1

66

Proposed Rule 135d would refine the definition of

See infra Part V.B.4.
See infra notes 652-54 and accompanying text.

See NASAA Comment Letter Regarding SBIs, supra note 18, at 9381.
[F]rom a broader perspective, it strikes us that this proposal may represent
a major conceptual change in the Commission's implementation of the Securities Act by providing for vastly different treatment of offers and sales.
While we cannot predict the possible consequences of such a fundamental
change, we .... think the Commission should proceed very carefully in
tampering with a regulatory approach which has served us well for almost
60 years.
See, e.g., 3A BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 11, § 6.09, at 6-29 to 6-30.
15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (1994).
Id.

564

Id.

565

Id.
ABA Comment Letter, supra note 488, at 22; see, e.g., 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.134-230.139

566

(1997).
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"offer" by excluding from the term's scope solicitations of interest
made in accordance with the Rule. As Linda Quinn explained,
"[T]he authority to define terms under the Securities Act has been
used by the Commission over the past sixty years to take communications outside the scope of [s]ection 5 where it believed the basic purposes of the Securities Act would be served."5 67 This history, in
conjunction with the express language of section 19(a), establishes
that the Commission possesses the authority to draft and adopt the
Rule.
If adopted, proposed Rule 135d, like Rules 135a-c, would enable
an issuer that has fully complied with the Rule to disseminate certain
prefiling publicity without violating section 5. The Commission's proposal to exclude testing-the-waters activity from the definition of "offer" via the creation of Rule 135d is analytically sound and consistent
with how it has previously chosen to legitimize pre-filing publicity
under the securities laws. 56 8 Therefore, if adopted, the proposal properly exempts solicitation materials from the requirements of section 5.
Enacted after the publication of the Testing Release, the NSMIA
confers further authority on the Commission to adopt proposed Rule
135d. New section 28 of the Securities Act, which grants the SEC general exemptive authority, empowers the Agency to exempt issuers that
test the waters from the requirements of section 5(c).569
Furthermore, the SEC has not abused its authority. The Commission has not unilaterally adopted a rule and foisted it upon the public.
Rather, it has worked cooperatively to draft a rule that attempts to
help issuers, protect investors, and strengthen the capital markets.
The extensive comment period and consideration of NASAA's proposal exemplify the Commission's efforts to involve others in the
rulemaking process. Demonstrating its careful deliberation, the Commission has still yet to act with respect to the proposal.
2.

Epitome of Gun-Jumping

Skepticism as to the Commission's authority to promulgate Rule
135d perhaps arose because of the proposal's far-reaching implications. Soliciting indications of interest before an IPO is precisely the
type of conduct that section 5(c) was designed to address. As Part I
discussed, the Commission and the courts have interpreted the term
"offer" very broadly. 570 Section 2(3) "scarcely could define the term
'offer' more broadly than it does." 571 For the purposes of section 5,
567

Quinn, supra note 549, at 28.

568

See supra text accompanying notes 566-67.

569
570
571

See supra text accompanying notes 542-43.
See supra notes 32-55 and accompanying text.
Coffee, supra note 464, at B4.
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the courts and the SEC have construed an "offer" to include prefling
publicity that does not constitute an "express offer," but "contribute [s] to conditioning the public mind or arousing public interest in
the issuer or in the securities of an issuer."57 2 An issuer that tests the
waters will not eschew "arousing public interest" in its issue, for a
favorable reception to its potential offering is precisely what the issuer
desires. It is difficult to conceive of how a well-prepared solicitation
via a radio or television advertisement, a cold call, or a personal visit to
a prospective investor would not have the effect of at least "conditioning the public mind," if not "arousing public interest." The coupon,
which an investor can complete and return to the issuer, memorializes
the "arous[al]" of its interest. Therefore, the proposal is inconsistent
with section 5(c) of the Securities Act. The Commission clearly lacks
the authority to adopt on its own a revision to section 5(c), which
would require Congressional approval. The SEC was forced to adopt
a testing-the-waters rule by a different avenue.
Furthermore, the current rules and regulations promulgated
under the Securities Act do not provide a safe harbor for solicitations
of indications of interest before a registered IPO. Rule 135, which
allows issuers to publicize certain information without triggering section 5, cannot shield testing-the-waters activities. The testing-the-waters proposal establishes only minimum requirements for the
solicitation materials, permitting an issuer to communicate or publicize unlimited information by any means available, including direct
contact with investors, as long as the information is factually accu5 74
rate. 573 This goes far beyond the publicity that Rule 135 permits.
Similarly, proposed Rule 135d authorizes an issuer to disseminate
prefiling publicity that is much more detailed and potentially more
5 75
harmful than that permitted under Rules 135a-c.
3. Effective Repeal of Section 5(c)
Therefore, in order to adopt a rule that permits testing-the-waters
before registered IPOs, the SEC needed to invoke its rulemaking authority 76 to propose a new exception to the gunjumping prohibition.
The Commission justified this exception on the ground that it would
572 Publication of Information Release, supra note 34, at 3149.
573 Rule 254, the NASAA model, and proposed Rule 135d all require issuers to make
certain disclosures in the solicitation document or scripted broadcasts, but do not limit
what they may impart to prospective investors via solicitation documents, broadcasts, or
oral communications beyond the requirement of factual accuracy. See Keller Enterprises
No-Action Letter, supra note 249, at 78,752 ("Rule 254(b) (2) (iv) does not limit the information that may be included in Rule 254 materials[;] ....
[i]nstead, Rule 254(b) (2) (iv)
sets forth the minimum amount of information that must be provided.").
574 See supra notes 48-57 and accompanying text.
575 See supra text accompanying notes 59-60.
576
See supra text accompanying notes 562-64.
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help many small businesses unable or unwilling to incur the substantial compliance costs and burdens of conducting a registered IPO
without some confidence that its offering will sell. 577 Despite the legit-

imacy of this claim, the broad definition of "offer" in section 2(3),
case law, and SEC releases reviewed in Part I reveal that "in the past
this rationale would not have justified a rule that amounts to an effec5 78
tive administrative repeal of Sec [tion] 5(c) in the case of IPOs."
The problem is that the exception has such broad ramifications
that it swallows up the rule codified in section 5(c). The fundamental
policy aim of the Securities Act is the protection of investors. 579
Therefore, a proper exception to a rule can be justified only (i) if the
exception represents a limited intrusion upon the policy underlying
the rule or (ii) if the exception is adopted because a competing interest in certain cases justifies trumping the policy behind the rule.
In response to these two justifications for a proper exception to
section 5 (c), this Note begins with the assumption that the key to securities regulation, and to the success of the securities industry, is the
maintenance of the balance between facilitating capital formation and
protecting investors. 580 Therefore, one must try to assess the proposal's impact on issuers and investors based on an analysis of the proposed rule, as drafted,58 ' and on the empirical data regarding testingthe-waters activity under Rule 254 and other state-adopted rules. 582 If

proposed Rule 135d (i) is unlikely to compromise investor protection,
and (ii) is likely to effectuate the goal of improving small businesses'
access to capital with only a minimal impact on investor protection, it
is a proper exception to section 5(c). This Note concludes that testing the waters under proposed Rule 135d, as drafted, does not meet
these two criteria. In short, proposed Rule 135d appears to tilt the
balance too far in favor of issuers, which is neither a limited intrusion
nor a satisfactory result, even if the proposal helps businesses raise
capital. Consequently, testing the waters is not an exception to secTesting Release, supra note 8, at 86,886.
578 Coffee, supra note 464, at B4. For a discussion of how a repeal of section 5(c) to
allow testing the waters before registered IPOs may usher in other changes to the registration process, see infra Part V.B.4.
579 See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
580 The SEC believes in the same fundamental assumption. See, .g., Proposing SBIs
Release, supra note 3, at 82,483. As discussed above in Part IV.D.2, there is currently some
skepticism with respect to the value of the gunjumping proscription. The gun-jumping
prohibition remains valuable only if it successfully protects investors. Skeptics contend
that the ban on gunjumping may harm investors by denying them access to significant
information. See supra text accompanying note 555. Therefore, much like advocates of the
gunjumping prohibition, these skeptics emphasize the importance of this balance; however, they disagree as to the means to achieve it.
581 See infra Part V.B.
582 See infra Part V.C.
577
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tion 5(c), but rather, a repeal of the statute, its related case law, and
58 3
SEC rules and interpretive positions.
B.

The Impact of the Proposal on Paper
1. Issuers

The value of proposed Rule 135d to issuers varies depending on
the nature of the issuer. For example, a large company that has an
established customer base and a market following and is contemplating a registered IPO valued at $15 million'orhigher probably does not
need to test the waters. 58 4 Such a company probably already knows
the extent to which the market is interested in its IPO. Further, this
larger business can engage an underwriter who has experience in ascertaining public interest. 58 5 This company can probably also secure
583 A possible response to this claim that testing the waters under proposed Rule 135d
is irreconcilable with section 5(c) is that the gunjumping prohibition is obsolete, and
therefore unnecessary. See supra note 546 and accompanying text. The Advisory Committee, for example, questioned the benefits to investors of the gunjumping prohibition. See
supra text accompanying notes 554-55. Although an assessment of the value of the prohibition is beyond the scope of this Note, it is important to show that this possible response
may be infirm, for a determination that the gunjumping ban is unnecessary does not necessarily translate into support for proposed Rule 135d. A careful reading of the Advisory
Committee Report reveals that the Committee and similar skeptics should actually oppose
proposed Rule 135d if it inadequately protects investors. The Advisory Committee was
concerned that the prohibition may harm investors by "chil[ing] or delay[ing] the disclosure [by issuers] of some company-related information that is beneficial to the marketplace." Advisory Committee Report, supra note 553, at 88,444 (emphasis added). In the
Advisory Committee Report, "[t]he Committee unanimously recommend[ed] that the
Commission act promptly both to strengthen existing investor safeguardsand to reduce the
costs of corporate capital formation in the United States." Id. at 88,404 (emphasis added).
Therefore, given that the Committee sought to improve investor protection, if proposed
Rule 135d lacks enough safeguards that offer this protection, the Committee should oppose the proposal in spite of the likely reduction in the costs of capital formation.
Further, the Advisory Committee Report suggests that the Committee's skepticism
largely does not apply to gunjumping before a registered IPO. The Advisory Committee
expressed its skepticism as to the need for the prohibition in light of issuers' mandatory
'ongoing" disclosure responsibilities under the Exchange Act. Id. at 88,444. This argument does not apply to gunjumping prior to a registered IPO because a private company
considering a registered IPO is typically not required to comply with the Exchange Act
until after the offering. The Advisory Committee Report does not discuss whether testing
the waters under proposed Rule 135d represents impermissible gunjumping because
under the Advisory Committee's recommended "'company registration' [system an] eligible issuer is [technically] always in registration, and hence 'gun jumping' in violation of
[section] 5(c) simply does not occur." John C. Coffee,Jr., 1933 Act Deregulation:A Guidefor
the Perplexed, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 26, 1996, at 5, 6.
584
See Stephen I. Glover, In ProposalsDesignedfor Small Businesses, the SEC Would Permit
Issuers to Test the Waters' and Would Shorten HoldingPeriodsfor Restricted Securities, NAT'L LJ.,
Aug. 21, 1995, at B6; see also ABA Comment Letter, supra note 488, at 21 (explaining that
issuers that can now obtain "a firm commitment from a responsible underwriter" will probably not use Rule 135d).
-585 See Glover, supranote 584. For a discussion of the advantages of hiring an underwriter, see supra text accompanying notes 474-78.

544
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a firm commitnent underwriting whereby the underwriter agrees to
586
buy the stock and resell it to the public.
The proposal may also be unnecessary for a large private company with institutional shareholders because the company itself may
be able to measure the likely appeal of a potential offering to these
and other prospective institutional investors. 587 Indications of interest
by institutional investors are significant because such investors generally purchase the vast majority of the stock offered in an IPO. 588 In
addition, if a small company intends to conduct a larger IPO, then the
company may be able to attract an underwriter if there is a strong
likelihood that the offering will sell. As a rule of thumb, as a company's chances of engaging an underwriter increases, the necessity for
testing the waters decreases.
Nevertheless, a company that can attract an underwriter may still
want to test the waters before it invests considerable time and resources into planning to go public. For example, a business may want
to test the waters among its customers and current private shareholders before shopping for an underwriter. If they do not express interest, the market is likely to be uninterested as well. In the case of a best
efforts underwriting, a company would surely benefit from soliciting
indications of interest in reliance on proposed Rule 135d 58 9 because

an underwriter is not obligated to sell the securities unless it finds
enough purchasers to buy either all of the securities or an amount set
forth in the underwriting agreement. The results of testing the waters
may also give the company a comparative basis for evaluating the underwriter's views regarding market interest in an offering. In addition, if a company has tested the waters and received promising
indications of interest, it may be able to negotiate a lower underwriting commission.
The proposal should be extremely helpful to a smaller company,
lacking a market, that wants to avail itself of the advantages of going
public. 590 Regulation A, which exempts offerings up to only $5 million, is of limited use to small businesses. 591 Rule 254 currently forces
a small business to choose between either testing the waters and conducting an inadequately small offering, or depriving itself of the opportunity to test the waters and conducting an expensive, registered
See supra notes 489-90 and accompanying text.
See Elgin, supra note 479, at 14.
588 See Coffee, supra note 464; Zweig & Spiro, supra note 25, at 84 (reporting that institutions have the opportunity to purchase nearly sixty percent of the garden variety IPO,
and around eighty percent of a "hot deal").
589
See ABA Comment Letter, supra note 488, at 21.
590
See Glover, supra note 584. For discussion regarding these advantages, see supra
text accompanying notes 79-88.
591
See supra text accompanying notes 222-26.
586
587
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IPO that may prove unsuccessful. Rule 254 thus greatly restricts a
small business's opportunity to test the waters.
Registration is very expensive and burdensome for small businesses. 592 Testing the waters under proposed Rule 135d should help a
company make a cost-effective decision whether to take itself public.
This is especially important because IPOs above Regulation A's ceiling
of $5 million, but below $10 million are often too small to attract underwriters, particularly larger ones with established reputations. 59 3 As
a result, a company may consider self-underwriting the offering. Testing the waters should help a small company decide whether to proceed with a self-underwritten IPO, 594 which is an exceedingly difficult

undertaking for a small company. If a company does consummate a
self-underwritten IPO, the stock may ultimately underperform because it "is likely to lack professional sponsorship in the financial community and may have a weak or inactive aftermarket." 595 Alternatively,
testing the waters may help those small businesses that are unable to
engage an underwriter and intending to self-underwrite, because a
favorable response may play a role in convincing an underwriter to
sell the offering. 59 6 In addition, a positive response to a company's
testing-the-waters efforts may enable it to enlist the aid of a venture
capital firm. Underwriters should be more willing to sell an IPO to
which a venture capital firm has committed.
. The argument that proposed Rule 135d is unnecessary because
underwriters are available to evaluate market interest 597 thus does not
pass muster. As discussed above, even a company capable of engaging
an underwriter may still wish to test the waters. Moreover, many small
companies, which would benefit from underwriters' assistance, will be
unable to secure the services of an underwriter. Principals of a business may lack the expertise to determine whether its IPO would sell;
however, if a company cannot attract an underwriter, it has no choice
but to try to test the waters itself. Similarly, the position that proposed
Rule 135d would help only companies contemplating marginal offerings that are not worthy of the capital markets5 9 8 is untenable. This
reasoning presupposes that any issue an underwriter does not agree to
underwrite is marginal and ill-suited for the market. This generaliza592

See supra Part II.B.1.

593

See supra text accompanying note 223.
See Elgin, supra note 479, at 17.

594

SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 78, at 10.
596 See 3A BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 11, § 5.05, at 5-67 (discussing how Rule 254 may
help an issuer attract an underwriter); Elgin, supra note 479, at 17 (quoting a lawyer with
IPO expertise who commented, "'Testing the waters could help, but the key is still finding
an underwriter'").
597 See, e.g., SIA Comment Letter, supra note 472, at 3-4.
598 See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 470; Keating Comment Letter, supra note 467, at 1.
595

546
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tion, if taken to its logical conclusion, leads to the inequitable result
that issuers unable to engage underwriters should not receive assistance to conduct registered IPOs.
Testing the waters should help both potential issuers, that is, businesses that do not proceed with a registered IPO, and actual issuers,
which represent businesses that do. A potential issuer of any size benefits tremendously when it tests the waters under proposed Rule 135d
and concludes, due to a poor response to its solicitation efforts, that it
should not commence an IPO. The potential issuer has spent relatively little money to test the waters, and saved considerable time and
money by deciding not to expend resources on an IPO with dubious
prospects. If the SEC repeals the general solicitation prohibition, it
will pave the road for an issuer to use the information it gains from
testing the waters to offer securities pursuant to Rules 505 and 506.5 99
There are also the intangible benefits of communicating with current
private shareholders, customers, and institutional investors. A company that tests the waters may learn where it has disappointed shareholders or customers, enabling it to improve its operations. Further,
the company may take advantage of such input to restructure the of60 0
fering so that it appeals to potential investors.
An issuer that decides to proceed with an IPO would similarly
profit from proposed Rule 135d. As a result of its testing-the-waters
activities, an issuer can conduct a better cost-benefit analysis in considering whether to proceed with a registered IPO. Testing the waters
may give an issuer the confidence it needs before commencing a registered IPO. As discussed earlier, a positive response to the issuer's solicitations may enable it to engage an underwriter or improve its
bargaining power with an underwriter. Furthermore, testing the waters should help the underwriter (or the issuer in the case of a selfunderwriting) to sell the securities more efficiently. The solicitation
process and, in particular, the coupons interested investors return,
should provide the issuer with a list of prospective investors who are
already familiar with, and interested in, the offering. In addition,
communicating with prospective investors may help an issuer or underwriter to price the offering 60 1 and to determine the appropriate
size of the offering. Finally, like potential issuers, actual issuers enjoy
599
600

See supra text accompanying notes 427-30.
The Commission's determinations on the issue of integration and solicitation affect

this potential opportunity. In its comment letter, the ABA looks forward to the opportunity when issuers can discuss the various ways to structure the offering with investors: "Particularly if the integration/general solicitation problem.., is dealt with, it would permit
issuers to engage in discussions with prospective institutional investors to determine
whether a public offering, Rule 144A transaction, off-shore sale or conventional private
placement would make the most sense." ABA Comment Letter, supra note 488, at 21.
601 See Elgin, supra note 479, at 14.
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the intangible benefits of communication with private shareholders,
customers, and institutional investors.
In sum, businesses that lack an established market need a testingthe-waters rule to determine whether it is in their economic self-interest to undertake a registered IPO. Proposed Rule 135d was designed
to, and should succeed in, giving many more issuers access to public
60 2
markets, thereby raising much needed capital more cost-effectively.
Proposed Rule 135d expands upon the inadequate utility of Rule 254
by permitting foreign and domestic businesses of all sizes to test the
waters. In addition, the proposed amendments to Rule 254 will enable more issuers to test the waters before a Regulation A offering.
The proposal, as drafted, dives the prospective issuer substantial flexibility in determining how to test the waters. Moreover, the Commission insulated issuers by prescribing the antifraud provisions of the
federal securities laws as the "standard of liability" 603 rather than section 11 or 12(a) (2) liability. 60 4 Compliance with the proposed rule
imposes minimal burdens and costs on a prospective issuer. In short,
proposed Rule 135d goes to great lengths to help issuers.
2.

Underwiters

Underwriters' concerns regarding proposed Rule 135d clarify the
Rule's potential impact on both issuers and investors. Investment
bankers conveyed opposition to proposed Rule 135d before the Commission even published the Testing Release. 60 5 The SIA comment letter suggests that underwriters are concerned that principals of
companies, inexperienced in measuring the interest of the market,
will be unable to test the waters accurately. 60 6 Additionally, because of
their eagerness to go public, these principals may find it difficult to be
objective in assessing the level of investor interest. 60 7 A solicitant may
mistake potential interest for definite interest. Owners and managers
of small businesses, unlike professional underwriters, are also typically
unfamiliar with the numerous federal and state securities regulations
with which they must comply.60 8 As a result of such an issuer's inabil-

ity to test the waters with accuracy and objectivity, companies will decide whether to proceed with a registered IPO on the basis of possibly
unreliable information. This may lead to unsuccessful offerings. If a
company solicits indications of interest and fails to comply with a requirement of proposed Rule 135d or violates a securities law, it may
602
603
604

605
606
607
608

See NYSBA Comment Letter, supranote 487, at 1.
Id.
See supra text accompanying note 399.
See Toward Model for Company Registration, supra note 456, at 709.
SIA Comment Letter, supra note 472, at 3-4.
See id.at 4.
See id.
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forfeit the opportunity to rely on the Rule or expose itself to substantial liability.
These concerns also shed light on the impact the proposal may
have on investors. Unsophisticated investors are at the mercy of companies that test the waters, especially by means of cold calls or personal visits. The risk that an investor will suffer from puffing or
overreaching at the hands of a company testing the waters is much
higher than if a professional underwriter is testing the market. An
issuer's failure to comply with the Rule or other securities laws not
only subjects the issuer to liability, but also exposes investors to fraud
and misrepresentation. Investors may also lose in the long run. Consider a situation where the principals of a business have tested the
waters, but solicited an insufficient number of prospective investors,
focused only on individual investors rather than institutional investors, misconstrued the responses to the solicitation, or exaggerated
the level of investor interest. Assume that these deficiencies in the
solicitation process were careless or unintentional errors, reflecting
only the inexperience or overeagerness of the solicitant. The company then proceeds with a self-underwritten (or perhaps even a best
efforts underwritten) registered IPO on the basis of the response to its
solicitations. The stock of the company may not sell, which would
drive the price down, thus hurting investors who have already
purchased shares. This may lead to "a dilution of confidence in capi60 9
tal markets."
Proposed Rule 135d may have a limited effect on underwriters. A
potential issuer will typically rely on an underwriter to prepare and
sell the IPO if the issuer can engage one. In most cases, underwriters
will still conduct their own analyses regarding market interest in light
610
of the "'no consummation, no compensation' [industry] practice."
Therefore, an issuer's testing-the-waters activity may at best supplement an underwriter's analysis of investor interest. Although underwriters may be unhappy about competing with entrepreneurs over
assessing market interest, they will not free ride on the results potential issuers report. This should better protect both issuers and investors because the combination of the results from an issuer's testingthe-waters measures and an underwriter's analysis is more likely to
lead to an accurate determination of market interest than an underwriter's analysis alone. If a potential issuer's testing-the-waters efforts
enable it to engage an underwriter, proposed Rule 135d benefits
underwriters.
On the other hand, underwriters may suffer to a minor extent
from proposed Rule 135d. It is possible that the proposal will lead to
609
610

Id.
Id. at 3.
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a greater number of self-underwritten offerings, if companies gain
confidence in their ability to solicit indications of interest with accuracy. If many of these self-underwritten offerings are in fact ill-advised, then the greater number of failures of such IPOs may decrease
confidence in the capital markets. This development, in turn, may
harm underwriters. Further, if the proposal leads to a series of failed
offerings, the fear of a failed offering may dissuade companies from
conducting registered IPOs that would require the services of underwriters. Alternatively, unsuccessful self-underwritten offerings that follow testing the waters may encourage other, issuers to engage
underwriters.
Absent a testing-the-waters rule for registered IPOs, companies
turn to underwriters or other professionals with similar expertise to
determine market interest. Proposed Rule 135d gives issuers the opportunity to compete with underwriters in this evaluation. 61 ' It would
seem that underwriters' vast resources and experience would ensure
that they are better equipped to gauge investor interest. However, in
the case of a small business without a market, it is conceivable that the
company's communications with its private shareholders and customers may yield accurate results. Underwriters' techniques for determining if an IPO will sell may be ill-suited to smaller offerings or offerings
by companies in particular industries. Therefore, companies that test
the waters under proposed Rule 135d may alter the current practices
of underwriters. In sum, these possible effects on underwriters are
somewhat attenuated; however, recognition of these effects highlights
how the proposal may neither satisfy issuers nor investors.
3. Investors
A testing-the-waters rule necessitates some compromise of investor protection. Nevertheless, the Commission, in drafting proposed
Rule 135d, attempted to avoid this compromise. Throughout the
Testing Release, the Commission explained that it sought to maintain
investor protection. 61 2 Nonetheless, while the proposal provides investors with greater protection than Rule 254, it still leaves them too
vulnerable.
611

For a recommendation that the Commission follow the ABA's suggestion to add

language to the Rule that would expressly permit underwriters to test the waters on an
issuer's behalf, see infra Part V.F.3. If the final rule does permit underwriters to test the
waters for issuers, underwriters will certainly benefit from both the additional business and
the higher likelihood of a successful offering.
612 See, e.g., Testing Release, supra note 8, at 86,886 (reiterating that "[ iln considering
whether to provide a 'test the waters' process for registered IPO's [sic], the Commission is
committed to assuring that the interests of investors are not compromised"); id. at 86,890
(seeking comment on "whether the proposed... rule is... in investors' interest in the
context of registered IPOs"); id. at 86,892 (reiterating that the Commission designed the
rule with an eye towards "not sacrificing investor protection").
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For example, proposed Rule 135d improved upon Rule 254's provision of investor protection by introducing a full compliance standard. 613 The full compliance standard protects investors because it
forces issuers to comply with the existing safeguards.
There are additional potential benefits to investors. Potential investors, including customers, private shareholders, and institutional
investors, will learn of investment opportunities before the rest of the
market. Although the public can inspect the solicitation document or
script of the broadcast submitted to the SEC, oral communications
with issuers may help solicited investors become aware of more valuable information. As a result, they may be in a better position to evaluate the offering's appeal. This is especially beneficial if the IPO looks
destined to be a hot deal. In addition, if an investor returns a coupon
to the issuer, he or she may have a better opportunity to purchase
shares once the securities are offered.6 14 Although, as mentioned previously, institutional investors purchase most of the shares offered in a
registered IPO,615 a completed coupon may help an individual investor buy into the offering.
Furthermore, the solicitation process may enable prospective investors to influence the price and structure of the offering. 616 This is
particularly true in the case of institutional investors. After consulting
with prospective institutional investors, an issuer may adjust the price
and structure of the offering in order to cater to the preferences of
interested investors. Current private shareholders and customers may
benefit from the opportunity for increased interaction with management. In explaining the reasons for their interest or lack of interest in
a registered IPO, shareholders and customers may induce the com617
pany to make changes that help them.
Despite these potential benefits, proposed Rule 135d is more
likely to harm investors. Because the proposal is modelled on Rule
254, many of the potentially harmful effects on investors will sound
familiar. 618 Issuers will solicit individuals, some of whom will be unsophisticated investors. These investors are those whom the SEC is primarily concerned with protecting. The susceptibility of
unsophisticated investors is even greater in the case of an IPO where
business owners or managers, who may also be somewhat unsophisti613
614

See supra text accompanying notes 446-51.
Of course, an issuer is not obligated to sell securities to an investor who has re-

turned a coupon.
615 See supra note 588 and accompanying text.
616 See supra notes 600-01 and accompanying text.
617 This is the mirror image of the argument that issuers can improve themselves
through the closer interaction with current shareholders and customers that testing the
waters necessitates.
618 See supraPart III.B.
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cated, are especially eager to sell the offering. 61 9 Solicitants may also
lack familiarity with securities laws designed to protect investors. 620 In
fact, there is a genuine danger that the individuals who test the waters
62
on behalf of potential issuers will sell the securities to investors. ' Of
course, this would directly violate section 5 because the solicitant will
have sold the securities in advance of the effective date of a registration statement.
Nearly every provision of proposed Rule 135d that benefits issuers
has a potentially harmful concomitant effect on investors. For example, the proposal's high level of accessibility to issuers may be detrimental to investors. The SEC could have further shielded investors by
incorporating a bad boy disqualification provision. 62 2 Further, the
tone of the Testing Release and the comments thereto suggest that
the Commission may wish to extend testing-the-waters privileges to issuers contemplating Regulation D and other exempt offerings. 623 In
the case of a Rule 504 offering, for instance, a potential issuer will
often solicit unsophisticated individual investors. 6 24 Such investors
are more susceptible to overreaching and puffing.
In addition, the flexibility of the proposed rule, while advantageous to issuers, may hurt investors. During the solicitation process,
issuers may make any accurate statement. 62 5 Extremely optimistic projections, for example, may not constitute a materially inaccurate or
misleading statement that triggers antifraud liability. Therefore, there
is the danger that those who test the waters "will unduly hype the issuer ...or [engage in] ...other abusive practices. ' 62 6 The danger is
that "allowing the issuer to attempt to pre-sell the deal invests enormous discretion in the one participant (the issuer) who is exempt
from the suitability and other self-regulatory standards of the NASD
aptd the stock exchanges, but who has the greatest incentive to
7
cheat." 62
Moreover, proposed Rule 135d(a) (2) requires only very limited
disclosure. 628 In most cases, investors will have very little information
to review in determining whether they are interested. 62 9 The proposal
See supra text accompanying notes 512-14.
620 See Hearings on H.R 2981, supranote 102, at 48; supra text accompanying note 513.
621 See supra text accompanying note 514.
622 See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 230.262 (1997); NASAA Proposed Statement of Policy, supra
note 302, at 2542; infra Part V.F.3.
623 Testing Release, supra note 8, at 86,887 n.19, 86,890-91.
619

624

See supra text accompanying note 247.

625
626

See supra text accompanying note 398-99.
Clover, supra note 584, at B6.
Coffee, supra note 583, at 6.

627
628

See supra text accompanying notes 392-98.
629 But see Advisory Committee Report, supra note 553, at 88,448 n.43 (conveying the
sentiment of a Committee member who is "'thoroughly convinced that a one-page pro-
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also accords issuers substantial flexibility as to the means by which
they may test the waters. 630 Unsophisticated investors are especially
vulnerable when they receive cold calls or personal visits, which the
proposal permits. The SEC did not limit what an issuer may communicate in a solicitation by telephone or in person. 63 ' In addition,
when an issuer tests the waters via a cold call or a personal visit, investors will usually not have a copy of the submitted testing materials to
63 2
review during or after such a solicitation.
As discussed above, in order to provide the maximum benefit to
issuers, the proposal imposes minimal burdens and costs on an issuer
seeking to test the waters. 6 33 Once again, this benefit is at the expense
of investor protection. For example, proposed Rule 135d(a) (3) requires the issuer to submit a copy of the solicitation materials only to
the SEC. 634 It does not require the issuer to "officially file[ ]" the
materials with the Commission. 635 Further, the proposal does not require the SEC to review the solicitation materials before an issuer
utilizes them to solicit indications of interest. 636 In fact, an issuer may
wait to submit a copy to the Commission until the first day on which it
uses the materials to test the waters. 637 In addition, given that the
proposed rule requires an issuer to submit only materials that are substantively different from those submitted in the past,638 there is an

even greater chance that the SEC staff will not review the testing
materials. In the absence of Commission review, an investor thus has
little assurance, other than the threat of liability for fraud under the
securities laws, that the materials are accurate or complete. The fact
that an issuer need not deliver a copy of the solicitation document to
a prospective investor whom it solicits compounds the problem. 639 Investors thus may not have anything in writing to review. Moreover, an
individual investor is unlikely to inspect a copy of the materials submitted to the Commission.
spectus would actually give investors more information and more protection and not
less'").
630

See supra text accompanying notes 414-15.

The proposal also prescribes somewhat different disclosure requirements for written solicitation materials than for oral communications. See SIA Comment Letter, supra
note 472, at 4-5.
The proposed rule requires only that the issuer submit the written solicitation
632
materials to the Commission to be available for public inspection. See Testing Release,
supra note 8, at 86,889 & n.38.
633
See supra Part V.B.1.
634
See Testing Release, supra note 8, at 86,893 (proposed 17 C.F.R § 230.135d(a) (3)).
635
Id. at 86,889 n.38 (emphasis added).
636
See id. at 86,888.
637
See id. at 86,893 (proposed 17 C.F.R1 § 230.135d(a) (3)).
638
See supra text accompanying note 408.
639
See supra text accompanying notes 250-51 (discussing the solicitation materials in
connection with Rule 254); supra notes 403, 632 and accompanying text.
631
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The proposal also fails to fully protect investors after the issuer
has tested the waters. Proposed Rule 135d(a) (5) protects investors by
precluding an issuer from testing the waters after it has filed a registration statement. 640 However, NASAA's concern regarding the coolingoff period between the final solicitation and the date on which an
issuer can commence sales under Rule 254641 also applies to proposed
Rule 135d. The current proposal provides that an issuer must wait
twenty calendar days after its final publication or delivery of solicitation materials before it can sell the securities. 642 Although oral communications probably pose the greatest danger to investors, proposed
Rule 135d(a) (6) addresses only "publication or delivery," 64 3 seemingly
not requiring issuers to wait twenty days after oral testing-the-waters
solicitations. This omission in the cooling-off period provision increases the chances that an investor will decide whether to purchase
securities on the basis of the issuer's oral representations.
Finally, the prescription of the antifraud provisions of the federal
securities laws as the standard of liability ultimately compromises investor protection because of the difficulties confronting plaintiffs that
seek to bring a Rule lOb-5 private action. 644 By removing testing
materials from the section 2(10) definition of a prospectus, proposed
Rule 135d(c) insulates issuers from liability under section 12 (a) (2) of
the Securities Act.64 5 Only the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws would protect investors. Imposition of liability under section 12(a) (2) might dissuade issuers from testing the waters without
consulting with lawyers. Although this heightened standard would deter issuers from testing the waters, it would also reduce the likelihood
of fraudulent, misrepresentative, or incomplete statements in the testing materials. Once again, there is a tradeoff.
J These individual concerns regarding insufficient investor protection add up to the larger fear that investors will not read the prospectus, and specifically, the mandatory disclosure within it.646 The salesoriented prefiling solicitation, which is designed to capture a potential
investor's interest, in conjunction with the short forty-eight hour period reserved for investors to read the prospectus before brokers or
dealers must mail a confirmation of sale, increases the danger that
investors will disregard the prospectus. The drafters of the Securities
640
641
642

See Testing Release, supranote 8, at 86,894 (proposed 17 C.F.R § 230.135d(a) (5)).
See supra text accompanying notes 252-54.
See Testing Release, supranote 8, at 86,894 (proposed 17 C.F.R. § 230.135d(a) (6)).

Id.
See supranote 257 and accompanying text.
See Testing Release, supra note 8, at 86,889, 86,894 (proposed 17 C.F.R.
645
§ 230.135d(c)).
646 See Coffee, supra note 60, at 1153.
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Act intended for section 5(c) to prevent this very result.64

[Vol. 83:464
7

Proposed

Rule 135d thus "represents a major retreat from the old orthodoxy,
which insisted that the prospectus be the only selling document that
the investor saw prior to the effectiveness of the registration statement. '648 If adopted, the proposal "seems likely to convert the prospectus into little more than a memento of the transaction." 649 The
ultimate concern is that investors will decide to purchase securities
based on the issuer's sales-oriented prefiling solicitations rather than
on a careful reading of the prospectus. If investors rely on prefiling
solicitations, investors may be more susceptible to fraud and
misrepresentation.
The foregoing discussion is not intended to suggest that the Commission modify every provision of the Rule that might harm investors. 650 This would of course dissuade issuers from testing the waters.

Rather, the foregoing assessment demonstrates that, in its current
form, the proposal goes too far in sacrificing investor protection.
4.

The Registration Process-A Slippery Slope

The proposal will not change the current registration process for
a registered IPO. 6 51 The Commission reassured the public in the
Testing Release that the proposal would preserve all of the safeguards
that protect investors during full or short form registration.6 5 2 This
assurance rests on a key assumption: the investor will read the
prospectus.
Nevertheless, the SEC is currently re-evaluating the relevance of
the Securities Act, and appears to be leaning towards further deregulation of the registration process. 655 For example, the Advisory CoinSee supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
Coffee, supra note 60, at 1153.
649 Coffee, supra note 583, at 6.
650 For example, this Note argues that the Commission adopted the proper standard
of liability even though it does not protect investors as well as sections 11 or 12(a) (2). See
infra Part V.F.5.
651 See Testing Release, supranote 8, at 86,890; AIMR Comment Letter, supranote 496,
at 3.
652
Testing Release, supra note 8, at 86,890. According to the SEC,
647
648

[the) proposal[ ] would not alter the type and amount of information available to investors in connection with an IPO. Issuers making use of the proposed "test the waters" procedure would continue to be subject to all the
current IPO disclosure requirements, and IPO registration statements
would continue to be subject to Commission staff review if the issuer determined to proceed with a registered offering after soliciting investor
interest.
Id.
653 See Securities Act Concepts and Their Effects on Capital Formation, Securities Act
Release No. 7329, [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 85,843, at
88,598 (Sept. 12, 1996); Effect of 1933 Act Concepts on Capital Formation, Securities Act
Release No. 7314, [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 85,823, at
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mittee recommended to the Commission the development of "a
company-based registration system" that would dramatically change
the registration process. 654 This system would include, among other
things, the elimination of the section 5 (b) (2) prospectus delivery requirement.65 5 Proposed Rule 135d, if adopted, may be the first step
towards further deregulation.
Although currently applicable only to registered IPOs, the Commission may-ultimately extend testing-the-waters privileges under proposed Rule 135d to other issuers. In the Testing Release, the SEC
656
already considered allowing a Regulation D issuer to test the waters.
In the future, the Commission may permit any issuer contemplating a
public offering to test the waters. For example, a small issuer, that
went public in 1998 with relatively few shareholders and a very specialized practice may wish to access the public markets again some years
later. Such a company may have difficulty assessing market interest.
Therefore, the Commission may decide to allow it to test the waters.
The Commission thus may be proceeding down a slippery slope.
With proposed Rule 135d, the SEC has begun chiseling away at the
safeguards that the registration process currently provides to protect
investors. The testing-the-waters proposal, as drafted, effectively repeals section 5 (c) because it permits issuers to "offer" securities before
filing a registration statement. 657 A relaxation or elimination of the
prospectus delivery requirement, which protects investors after an issuer has filed a registration statement during the waiting period, may
follow. Such deregulation is more likely after the NSMJA. The grant
of general exemptive authority and the authority to preempt state regulation of many securities offerings 65 8 will enable the Commission to
further deregulate the registration process for not only registered
IPOs, but all public offerings.
5.

CapitalMarkets

Proposed Rule 135d should benefit the capital markets to the extent issuers rely on the Rule and properly assess market interest while
distributing accurate information to investors. The proposal should
"prove beneficial to the capital raising markets due to the increased
88,279 (July 25, 1996); Advisory Committee Report, supra note 553; Coffee, supra note 60,
at 1144; McDonough, supra note 546; Coffee, supra note 583; Quinn, supra note 549.

654

Advisory Committee Report, supra note 553, at 88,404.

655 See id. at 88,447-48. The Fields Bill also contained legislation that would, in effect,
end the prospectus delivery requirements under the Securities Act. Fields Bill, supra note
226, at 25-26.
656
See supra text accompanying note 623.
657

See supraPart V.A.3.

658

See supranote 226; supra Part III.C.3.
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efficiency that ought to follow its utilization." 659 If an issuer tests the
waters and consummates a successful registered IPO, the capital markets have matched legitimate issuers with interested investors. The
public markets benefit from the increase in investor confidence. Investors may in turn invest more money in the stock market. In addition, successful IPOs encourage other issuers to pursue this avenue of
raising capital. 660 In "potentially opening up those markets to more
risk averse entities," 66 1 the proposal may help startups in important
growth industries such as technology to raise capital. This provides
the public with a wider array of investment opportunities.
Even if a business decides, as a result of unenthusiastic investor
response, not to conduct a registered IPO, the capital markets benefit.
A company that cannot drum up interest among its customers and
private shareholders is unlikely to enjoy greater success with outside
investors. Therefore, proposed Rule 135d may prevent companies
that are not ready for a registered IPO from attempting to raise capital
via this route, filtering out poor offerings that ultimately may hurt the
health of the capital markets.
Consequently, if the proposal fails to filter out inferior offerings,
the capital markets may suffer. 662 If a company tests the waters, erroneously concludes that the market is interested in its offering, and
then proceeds to offer the securities, this may lead to an unpopular
offering that harms the capital markets. Further, ifan issuer misrepresents information in its solicitation materials and purchasers invest in
reliance on the issuer's representations and incur substantial losses,
investor confidence in public markets deteriorates. 66 3 As Congress explained in 1980, "'reform' that results in undermining investor confidence in the integrity of the marketplace would have an effect
precisely the opposite of its intended benefits on capital formation."6 64 Pervasive fraud surrounding the capital markets "hurt[s] is-

suers every bit as much as investors. '665 The impact of the proposal
on capital markets is thus largely a product of how well the Commission balances issuers' needs with investors' needs. If the Commission
balances these respective interests, the capital markets will benefit
from the facilitation of capital raising. However, given that the proposal appears to compromise investor protection, it may harm these
markets.
659
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See supra notes 91-92 and
NYSBA Comment Letter,
See SIA Comment Letter,
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See id.
S. REP. No. 96-958, at 5 (1980).
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NASAA Comment Letter Regarding SBIs, supra note 18, at 9374.
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accompanying text.
supra note 487, at 1.
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6. Synthesis
Businesses, especially smaller enterprises, need the opportunity
to test the waters. Proposed Rule 135d, on paper, appears likely to
achieve its objective of enabling businesses to determine cost-effectively market interest in a registered IPO. This will improve access to
the capital markets and facilitate the raising of capital. However, the
proposal, as drafted, does not go far enough to ensure achievement of
the second objective, namely, that the proposal must not "caus[e] investors to overlook the full disclosures mandated by the federal securities laws."

'6 66

The Impact of the Proposal in Light of Experience Under
Rule 254 and Other Testing-the-Waters Rules

C.

The above analysis of the proposal's "on paper" impact on issuers
and investors represents only half of the requisite analysis. Since August 1992, small businesses have had the opportunity to test the waters
in reliance on Rule 254. Similarly, several states have adopted or experimented with various testing-the-waters rules. Some states have
adopted rules that conform to Rule 254, while others follow the
667
NASAA model, and still others have rules that differ from both.

Proposed Rule 135d closely resembles Rule 254. In order to properly
assess the impact of proposed Rule 135d, the Commission must evaluate the impact Rule 254 and state-adopted testing-the-waters proce668
dures have had on issuers and investors.
1. Postponement of Decision
The Commission should not adopt a testing-the-waters rule until
at least the end of 1997. This would afford the SEC, NASAA, and the
states the opportunity to assess the impact of Rule 254 on issuers and
investors over a five year period.
2.

Review of the EmpiricalData

Responses to the proposal suggest that businesses approve of the
testing-the-waters nle.669 However, as of the Testing Release, relatively few small businesses had tested the waters either under Rule 254
666
667
668

Testing Release, supra note 8, at 86,890.
See supra notes 273-75, 327-33 and accompanying text.
See supranotes 327-33 and accompanying text. The SEC should also assess to what

extent the "general announcement" provision of section 25102(n) of California's Corporations Code has helped issuers, and whether it has undermined investor protection. See
supra note 330. A study of its impact after the SEC's adoption of Rule 1001 in May 1996
may be especially insightftl. See supra note 330.
669
See Elgin, supra note 479, at 14; American Society of Corporate Secretaries Com-

ment Letter, supra note 486, at 1-2.
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or the NASAA model.670 In contrast to the SEC, NASAA at least recognized the insufficiency of the data. 67 1 The benefits may be insufficient to justify the extension of testing the waters because so few
businesses have availed themselves of it so far. There may be important reasons why more small businesses have not relied on Rule 254,
which, on paper, appears very appealing for small businesses.
There is little information available to the public to explain why
Rule 254 "has generated only a lukewarm response." 672 Perhaps the
lack of coordination of state securities laws with the federal Rule has
precluded many small businesses from relying on Rule 254.673 Perhaps the Commission needs to market the availability of the Rule to
small businesses. The Commission designed the Rule so that small
business owners do not need to retain lawyers to solicit indications of
interest. As a result, it is probable that most small business owners are
unaware of the opportunity. The SEC must identify the reasons for
Rule 254's unpopularity because the same reasons may discourage
businesses from using proposed Rule 135d. If few issuers similarly rely
on proposed Rule 135d, the potential risks to investors are difficult to
justify.
In addition, the Commission should attempt to determine if businesses relying on Rule 254 were able to assess market interest with
accuracy. This determination includes the very important assessment
of whether testing the waters under Rule 254 dissuaded issuers from
an offering that was likely to be unsuccessful. 674 A proper appraisal of
Rule 254's impact on issuers must go beyond an analysis of the rule
"on paper," which suggests that Rule 254 should have helped more
businesses.
The Commission must also attempt to better ascertain how Rule
254 and the states' testing-the-waters rules have affected investors.
The SEC must probe deeper to learn if investors have suffered as a
result of testing the waters. 675 The Commission has apparently acknowledged that businesses that have tested the waters have engaged
in an unexpectedly high amount of "'puffing."' 67 6 Investors can easily
See supra text accompanying notes 334-37, 342-43.
See supra text accompanying note 337.
Glover, supra note 584, at B6.
A prepared statement by a representative of National Small Business United, an
organization representing more than 65,000 American small businesses, states that "[ b ] oth
federal and state securities laws make it difficult for a business owner to 'test the waters.'"
Hearings on H.R 2981, supra note 102, at 47. This statement suggests that the differences
between the two sets of laws may have frustrated small issuers interested in testing the
waters.
674 See supranotes 372-73 and accompanying text.
675
For a discussion of the difficulty of determining the impact of testing the waters on
investors absent complaints or lawsuits, see supra Part III.C.4.
676 McGill, supra note 374, at 24.
670
671
672
673
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suffer as a result of such conduct. If the Commission concludes that
prefiling solicitations under Rule 254 leave investors too vulnerable to
fraud or misrepresentation or that they tend to supplant the offering
circular as the controlling basis for purchasing securities, it must add
further safeguards.
3.

Method

The Commission can obtain the foregoing types of information
only through careful cooperation with NASAA, state securities regulators, small businesses, and investors. The Commission should establish a committee with the responsibility of assessing the impact of Rule
254 on issuers and investors for the purposes of revising or adopting
proposed Rule 135d. The Commission already moved in this direction when representatives of the SEC and NASAA discussed their reactions to testing the waters in April 1996 at the Annual Conference on
Uniformity of Securities Law. 67 7 The committee's objective would be
to recommend a proposal that would best enable issuers to solicit indications of interest with accuracy with the least threat to investor
protection.
4.

Summary

The SEC should not adopt a testing-the-waters rule that applies to
registered IPOs until it has scrupulously examined the empirical data
regarding the various testing-the-waters rules. 678 By the end of 1997,
the Commission will have two more years of additional data to review.
Until the SEC establishes the adequacy of Rule 254's safeguards, it
should err on the side of investor protection.
In fact, in order to invoke its general exemptive authority under
new section 28 of the Securities Act to exempt testing the waters
before registered IPOs from the section 5 requirements, the Commission must demonstrate not only "that such exemption is necessary or
appropriate in the public interest," but also that it "is consistent with
the protection of investors." 679 Therefore, the SEC should continue
to resist the temptation to exercise this authority with respect to proposed Rule 135d until it has conducted a review approximating that
outlined above.
For now, the proposal appears "appropriate in the public interest." However, it would seem that proposed Rule 135d does not go
far enough beyond Rule 254 to ensure investor protection.
See supra text accompanying notes 530-31.
678 Once again, the SEC should also review data regarding issuers' and investors' experiences under the California exemption. See supra note 330.
NSMIA, supra note 22, at 3424 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77z-3 (Supp. II 1996)).
679
677
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The Coordination Problem Revisited in Light of the NSMIA

As with Rule 254, there has been concern that a lack of coordination with state securities laws may render proposed Rule 135d ineffective. 680 One authority maintains that the success of a testing-thewaters rule for registered IPOs is contingent on "the cooperation of
NASAA and the blue sky administrators, or preemptive legislation
from Congress."' 68 1 In its comment letter, NASAA indicated its support for a testing-the-waters rule for registered IPOs, but one that conformed to its model.68 2 Despite the SEC's efforts to fulfill its
responsibilities under section 19(c) of the Securities Act, 68 3 the two

sides still stand apart.
The NSMIA constitutes the aforementioned "preemptive legislation." 684 Under new section 18 (a) (1) (B), no state securities "law,
rule, regulation, or order, or other administrative action . . . requiring, or with respect to, registration or qualification of securities.., or
...securities transactions . .. shall directly or indirectly apply to a
security that ... will be a covered security upon completion of the

transaction." 68 5 Securities offered in a registered IPO will usually represent "covered securit[ies] upon completion of the transaction." After the completion of a registered IPO, the securities will typically fall
within the first level of the definition of covered securities: securities
that an issuer lists, or is authorized to list, on the New York or American Stock Exchanges, the NASDAQ National Market System, or a na68 6
tional securities exchange with equivalent listing criteria.
Therefore, federal securities regulations preempt state regulations
that apply to securities offered in a registered IPO that are to be listed,
or authorized to be listed, on a national securities exchange, as required by section 18(b) (1).
While the NSMIA does not preempt state securities laws regarding testing the waters before a Regulation A offering, 687 it thus resolves the coordination problem with respect to proposed Rule 135d.
Nevertheless, the Commission should still seek the support of NASAA
and the states. To the extent that states are in favor of proposed Rule
135d, more issuers are likely to avail themselves of the opportunity to
test the waters. Opposition from the states could undermine the full
680

See 3A BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 11, § 6.09, at 6-28.

681

Id.

682 See supra text accompanying note 519; see also supra Part III.C.1 (comparing
NASAA's model rule with Rule 254); supra Part V.B.4 (comparing NASAA's model rule
with proposed Rule 135d).
683 See supra note 276 and accompanying text.
684
See supra text accompanying note 681.
685
686
687

NSMIA, supra note 22, at 3417 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77r(a) (Supp. II 1996)).
See id. at 3418 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b) (1) (Supp. I 1996)).
See supra Part III.C.3.
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potential of the Rule. As a result, the SEC should consider adding
further safeguards to its proposal to secure NASAA and state support.
E.

Availability of Testing the Waters to Larger Businesses
1. Asymmetrical Result Under Rule 254

Because larger businesses generally need to raise more capital
than the Regulation A ceiling permits, the restriction of the availability of testing the waters to Regulation A offerings effectively deprived
larger businesses of this opportunity. If a large, private business seeks
to tap the public markets to raise capital, it typically conducts a registered IPO. Therefore, given that (i) smaller businesses are much
more likely to conduct a Regulation A offering than larger businesses
and (ii) testing the waters under federal law is currently available only
to issuers considering a Regulation A offering, small businesses currently have an advantage unavailable to larger businesses.
2.

Correction of Asymmetry

Proposed Rule 135d corrects this asymmetrical result. In the
Testing Release, the SEC explained that the proposal would help "persons that are small entities, as defined by the Commission's rules."6 88
However, the SEC elaborated that proposed Rule 135d would do
more than help small businesses. According to the SEC, the proposal
"would affect small entities in the same manner as other registrants.
The proposed rule and amendments . . . are designed to decrease
potential costs to all issuers, including small businesses." 6 9 Proposed
Rule 135d thus departs from Rule 254's focus on issue size and seeks
to help issuers of any size determine whether conducting a registered
IPO of any size is cost-effective.
3.

Approval of the Correction

Despite its assertion that the proposal's purpose is to help "all
issuers," the Commission has not ruled out the possibility of limiting
access to the Rule to small business issuers. The SEC asked commenters if "the rule [should] be limited to small business issuers." 690
Such a limitation would be unwise.
The history of small businesses and Rule 254 demonstrates the
merits of allowing larger issuers to test the waters. The Commission
introduced a testing-the-waters rule in 1992 that applied only to Regu688 Testing Release, supra note 8, at 86,892; see also SEC, Initial Regulatory Flexibility
Analysis (1995) (on file with the SEC) (explaining how the proposal will decrease costs for

issuers).
689
Testing Release, supra note 8, at 86,892 (emphasis added); see also Initial Regulatory
Flexibility Analysis, supra note 688 (assessing how the proposal will help issuers).
690
Testing Release, supra note 8, at 86,888.
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lation A offerings because (i) the Commission was committed to revamping Regulation A, (ii) small businesses were struggling to raise
capital, and (iii) Regulation A was considered the most cost-effective
means of providing assistance. In contrast, registered IPOs were a
more expensive avenue of capital formation that small businesses
would find more difficult to pursue. Therefore, in 1992, the Commission adopted Rule 254 and not a corresponding rule that applied to
registered IPOs. At the time, Rule 254 appeared to be an efficient way
to help small businesses.
In the early 1990s, small businesses suffered while larger businesses were somewhat less vulnerable to the economic woes troubling
the country6 91 because larger businesses had capital-raising alternatives that were not as available to small businesses. In contrast to small
businesses, larger companies usually have established customer bases
and can therefore assess whether there is investor interest in the company before commencing an IPO. Further, larger businesses typically
have more success than their smaller counterparts in attracting underwriters. In other words, the SEC adopted Rule 254 rather than a
broader rule because small businesses considering Regulation A offerings experience far more uncertainty with respect to market interest
than larger enterprises. The SEC's decision was a response to the
troubles of small businesses; it did not reflect a generalization that
small businesses, compared to large businesses, are less likely to harm
investors when testing the waters.
In fact, small business owners who are overexcited, financially unsophisticated, and unacquainted with the miscellaneous securities regulations pose a greater risk to investors. 692 In addition, small business
owners contemplating a Regulation A offering will usually first solicit
friends, family, customers, suppliers, and current private shareholders. 693 These types of prospective investors may be the most likely to
disregard the prospectus and rely on oral representations. When
small businesses test the waters, the potential impact on investors is
not without its dangers.
In contrast, larger businesses are often more experienced in investment matters. They invariably have in-house counsel or outside
691
692

See supra Part II.B.5.
See SIA Comment Letter, supranote 472, at 3-4; supra text accompanying notes 511-

14, 619-21.
693
See Hearings on H.R. 2981, supranote 102, at 46 (relating how entrepreneurs often
go to family and friends for funds); Laing, supra note 151, at 21 (predicting that entrepreneurs who would test the waters were previously "unable to get friends [and] ... relatives
... to buy into their dreams"); Kevin G. Salwen, SEC Acts To Aid Smal Business on Financing,
WALL ST.J., Mar. 12, 1992, at A3 (explaining that small businesses that rely on Regulation
A typically first try to raise funds from family and friends); Remarks by Arthur Levitt, supra
note 372, at *5 (relating how a small business that relied on Rule 254 solicited indications
of interest from its customers).
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lawyers who provide advice regarding compliance with federal and
state securities regulations. In preparing for a registered IPO, a larger
company can usually engage a professional underwriter that should
attempt to ensure that the company does not commit fraud, practice
puffing, or misconstrue the market reaction to the solicitation. 694 In
addition, although a large business may solicit indications of interest
from individual investors, institutional investors purchase the majority
of shares in a registered IPO. 6 95 Institutional investors are generally
more sophisticated and, therefore, do not require the same level of
protection as individuals. For example, a number of people beyond
the person solicited will have input into the institutional investor's final decision.
Consequently, it is very difficult to justify the denial of testing-thewaters privileges to businesses (small or large) that are interested in
conducting registered IPOs. As Section C of this Part explained
above, the Commission must reevaluate Rule 254 to determine its impact on issuers and investors. If the Commission concludes that issuers should continue to have the opportunity to test the waters before
Regulation A offerings, it should allow large businesses considering
registered IPOs to test the waters even though they may not have as
great a need to test the waters as small businesses before Regulation A
offerings. This is especially true because it appears that testing the
waters in advance of a registered IPO is less likely to harm investors
than solicitations before a Regulation A offering. It is also conceivable
that a large business in an obscure industry, for example, both lacks a
steady customer base from which it can assess potential investor interest and cannot engage an underwriter. For such a business, testing
the waters before a registered IPO could be very important. Furthermbre, successful consummation of registered IPOs by large companies also benefit investors and capital markets.
For the foregoing reasons, even if the Commission, in reliance on
section 28 of the Securities Act, raises the Regulation A ceiling, 696 enabling potential issuers to test the waters before offerings of up to ten
or fifteen million dollars, it should still permit larger issuers to test the
waters prior to registered IPOs. Testing the waters benefits all issuers
and, as the subsequent Section demonstrates, can be consistent with
an adequate level of protection for investors.

694 Studies have confirmed that smaller issues have historically been greater sources of
fraud than larger issues. See Seligman, supranote 75, at 33-36. For a discussion of reasons
why an issuer may desire to test the waters even if it can hire an underwriter, see supra Part
V.B.1.
695 See supra note 588 and accompanying text.
696 See supra note 226.
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Proposed Safeguards
1. Single Testing-the-Waters Rule

As the preceding subsection suggests, the purpose of testing the
waters, as well as the potential problems arising therefrom, remain the
same for both Regulation A offerings and registered IPOs. As a result,
this Note recommends that the Commission should work with NASAA
to adopt a single testing-the-waters rule, codified both as new Rule
135d and revised Rule 254, applicable to both Regulation A and registered IPOs.
The idea of a single testing-the-waters rule has roots in the Testing Release. The Commission's proposed amendments to Rule 254 in
the Testing Release foreshadow a linking of the two rules. The SEC
asked commenters "whether proposed Rule 135d should be used for
'testing the waters' with a view to either a registered or a Regulation A
offering, thus replacing Rule 254."697
The new rule should contain language that is appropriate for
both registered and Regulation A offerings. 6 98 The only difference
that should remain between new Rule 135d and revised Rule 254 is
the current first clause of Rule 135d(a), which reads, and should continue to read, "For purposes only of Section 5 of the Act."699 Rule 254
does not include this language because Regulation A offerings are exempt from section 5. The rule should create a safe harbor for prefiling solicitations of indications of interest made in contemplation of
either a Regulation A offering or registered IPO. If the SEC decides
to permit issuers to test the waters before Regulation D offerings, the
proposed single rule, which would require further revision, should
also govern.
A single rule could facilitate the Commission's efforts to preempt
70 0
state securities regulations regarding all testing-the-waters activities.
The SEC could accomplish this goal by expanding the definition of
"qualified purchasers" in new section 18(b) (3) to include all eligible
purchasers who were offered securities to be sold pursuant to a Regulation A offering.70 1 This definition would correct the current incon697

698

Testing Release, supra note 8, at 86,890.
For example, Rule 254(b) (3) currently provides that "[s]olicitations of interest pur-

suant to this provision may not be made after the filing of an offeringstatement." 17 G.F.R.
§ 230.254(b) (3) (1997) (emphasis added). On the other hand, proposed Rule 135d(a) (5)
requires that "[s]olicitations of interest in reliance upon the provisions of this section are
not made after the filing of a registrationstatement under the [Securities) Act." Testing
Release, supra note 8, at 86,894 (proposed 17 C.F.R. § 230.135d(a) (5)) (emphasis added).
699 Testing Release, supra note 8, at 86,893 (proposed 17 C.F.R. § 230.135d(a)).
700 Currently, federal securities regulations do not trump state regulations regarding
testing the waters before Regulation A offerings. See supra Part III.C.3.
701 This definition would apply to testing the waters under Rule 254 because solicitations of indications of interest pursuant to Rule 254 constitute an offer. See supra text
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sistency, which appears to retain blue sky laws with respect to testing
the waters before a Regulation A offering, but not before a registered
IPO.
The Commission and state securities regulators should therefore
benefit from the adoption of a single testing-the-waters rule. A single
rule should be more administrable than the present approach, which
involves two distinct rules that are similar, but subtly different.7 0 2 The
casual observer may even overlook the differences. A single rule
would eliminate the potential for any confusion and may also pave the
road for further regulatory simplification. For example, it may lead to
relaxation of the integration rules. It would also eliminate the need
for the proposed revisions to Rule 254 which the Commission discussed in the Testing Release. In addition, the efficiencies that may
result from the codification of a single testing-the-waters rule may encourage more states to support the rule.
Issuers and investors may also prefer a single testing-the-waters
rule. Small issuers and their lawyers should appreciate the convenience of having all of the provisions of the rule before them, as opposed to searching for cross-referenced provisions.70 3 As a result, an
issuer will never risk consulting the wrong rule regarding testing the
waters. If the rule is successful, the Commission may extend its scope
to cover other exempt offerings, such as Regulation D offerings.
2.

Background

These proposed safeguards use proposed Rule 135d as a foundation. Proposed Rule 135d is preferable to Rule 254 as a base for a
more balanced, accessible testing-the-waters rule because it provides
slightly more protection than its Regulation A equivalent through its
full compliance requirement.7 0 4 Proposed Rule 135d is also an allinclusive rule. By contrast, Rule 254 has several cross-referenced provisions.7 0 5 Furthermore, proposed Rule 135d retains enough proviaccompanying notes 213, 460. The definition does not need to include purchasers solicited in connection with a registered IPO because the national securities exchange/NASDAQ level of covered securities applies to the securities offered in most registered IPOs.
See supra Part V.D. For a discussion of the Commission's authority to amend the definition
of qualified purchasers, see supra text accompanying notes 359-61.
702 For a comparison of proposed-Rule 135d with Rule 254, see supra Part IV.B.4.
703 See infra note 705 and accompanying text.
704 See supra text accompanying notes 446-51.
705 For example, Rule 254(d) references integration under Rule 251(c). Similarly,
Rule 251(a) identifies classes of issuers that cannot rely on Rule 254; the bad boy disqualification provision of Rule 251 (a) (6) in turn refers the reader to Rule 262, which references
numerous securities rules and regulations. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.254(d), 230.251(c),
230.251(a) (6), 230.262 (1997).
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sions of Rule 254 so that an empirical study of the effectiveness of
70 6
those provisions is still valuable.
This Section does not attempt to advance an entire alternative to
the proposal. Moreover, it does not suggest additional incentives for
issuers because the current proposal already disproportionally favors
issuers. A fair and effective testing-the-waters rule needs further safeguards for investors beyond what either Rule 254 or proposed Rule
135d currently provides. These additional safeguards cannot be too
onerous on issuers, for this would discourage them from testing the
waters and would undercut the rule's goal. In fact, some of the proposed safeguards actually benefit issuers as well. 70 7 This Section borrows heavily from NASAA's work in this area, returning to some of the
provisions in its model rule. 70 8 However, some of the proposed safeguards discussed below go beyond what NASAA has recommended.
3.

Eligibility of Issuers

Proposed Rule 135d precludes a blank check company and a
penny stock issuer from testing the waters in reliance on the Rule "be70 9
cause of the substantial abuses that have arisen in such offerings."
The Commission asked commenters, "Are there additional classes of
issuers that should be excluded ...because of the ...potential for
abuse?" 71 0 The next question posed was "Should any of the exclusions
in the NASAA draft policy statement be specifically incorporated into
the proposal?" 7 11 NASAA answered the first question in the affirmative, responding that, pursuant to section (1) (i) of the NASAA policy
7 12
statement, the states had excluded bad boys from testing the waters.
The standard for disqualification under section (1) (i) was whether
"[t]he offeror does not know and in the exercise of reasonable care,
could not know that" any of the aforementioned entities was subject
to the specified remedies or sanctions. 713 In response to the Commission's first question, it is clear that such conduct constitutes "potential
for abuse" especially if the bad boy has violated laws or regulations in
See supra Part V.C.
See, e.g., infra note 725 and accompanying text (recommending that the rule expressly permit underwriters to test the waters).
708 For a review of NASAA's model rule, see supra Part III.C.1.
709
Testing Release, supra note 8, at 86,887.
706
707

710

Id.

Id. at 86,887-88.
NASAA Comment Letter Regarding Testing Release, supranote 327, at 13,052-53.
Section (1) (i) identified these bad boys as "the issuer or any of the issuer's officers, directors, ten percent shareholders or promoters" who are subject to any of the specified remedies or sanctions identified therein. NASAA Proposed Statement of Policy, supra note 302,
at 2542. Violations of federal or state laws or securities regulations that resulted in these
remedies and sanctions are of primary concern.
713
NASAA Proposed Statement of Policy, supra note 302, at 2542.
711
712
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567

connection with a securities offering. The answer to the second question is therefore also in the affirmative.
The SEC has adopted Rule 251(a) (6), disqualifying bad boys
from conducting a Regulation A offering, which in turn prevents
them from testing the waters under Rule 254.714 Under Rule 262,
the issuer, any of its predecessors or any affiliated issuer... [or] any
director, officer or general partner of the issuer, beneficial owner of
10 percent or more of any class of its equity securities, any promoter
of the issuer presently connected with it in any capacity, any underwriter of the securities to be offered, or any partner, director or
officer of any such underwriter
that is subject to any of the remedies or sanctions listed therein is
715
disqualified from availing itself of the Regulation A exemption.
Rule 262 lists more conduct that triggers disqualification than section
(1) (i) of the NASAA rule does. The standard Rule 262 prescribes is
stricter than the one NASAA requires. Unlike section 1 (i) of the
NASAA model, under Rule 262, the Commission does not care
whether the offeror was aware of the proscribed conduct or whether it
reasonably should have known. 716 The rule under Regulation A is
that if the issuer (or other person identified in the Rule) is subject to
the specified remedies or sanctions, the issuer may not rely on the
exemption. 71 7 However, the SEC can waive the disqualification "upon
a showing of good cause and without prejudice to any other action by
''7 18
the Commission.
Both the Commission and NASAA thus recognized the importance of disqualifying small business issuers who were so-called bad
boys or affiliates of bad boys. The concern is that investors and capital
markets may suffer as a result of recurring improper conduct by these
bad boys. NASAA correctly asserted, "We see no real need to limit this
719 If
[bad boy disqualification provision] to small business issuers.1
the Commission has disqualified bad boys from testing the waters
under Rule 254, it should similarly preclude them from testing the
waters under proposed Rule 135d. Investors solicited before a registered IPO are as vulnerable to improper conduct as those solicited in
advance of a Regulation A offering. The adoption of a bad boy disqualification provision will deny some issuers access to the rule. However, the considerable protection provided to investors and capital
markets offsets this slight decrease in availability.
714

17 C.F.R §§ 230.251(a)(6), 230.262 (1997).

715

Id. §§ 230.262(a)-(b). The Rule also disqualifies bad boys from relying on a Rule

505 exemption. Id. § 230.505(b) (2) (iii).
716
See supra note 715 and accompanying text.
717
See 17 C.F.R. § 230.262 (1997).
718

I&

719

NASAA Comment Letter Regarding Testing Release, supra note 327, at 13,053.
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The Commission should therefore follow its example under Regulation A and adopt a bad boy disqualification provision. The provi-

sion should replicate Rule 262, prescribing its stricter standard rather
than the more liberal section (1) (i) of the NASAA rule. The latter
rule's focus on the offeror's knowledge or reasonable exercise of care
emphasizes the wrong point. Even if an offeror did not know of an
issuer's egregious violation of a federal securities regulation, that issuer, as opposed to the offeror, can still act in a manner that harms
investors. A testing-the-waters rule is risky enough for investors; the
Commission should reduce the potential risks by disqualifying issuers
who in the past have acted, or been connected to others who have
acted, unlawfully. The provision that gives the SEC discretion to waive
7 20
the disqualification protects issuers from an inequitable result.
The foregoing discussion hints at another problem with proposed Rule 135d's eligibility requirements which the SEC can cure by
adding another safeguard. Proposed Rule 135d(a) (1) states the eligibility requirements for an issuer to test the waters. 72 ' Rule 251(a),
which establishes the eligibility requirements for testing the waters
under Regulation A, similarly speaks only of issuers. 72 2 On the other
hand, the NASAA rule applies to "offer[s] ...of a security made by or
on behalf of an issuerfor the sole purpose of soliciting an indication of
interest in receiving a prospectus (or its equivalent) for such security." 723 In addition, NASAA's bad boy disqualification provision
7 24
speaks of the "offeror," as opposed to the issuer.
This Note recommends that the final testing-the-waters rule permit issuers and their agents to test the waters before a Regulation A
offering or registered IPO. One can imagine that the owner of a small
business or a foreign firm may want to test the waters, but lacks the
time or confidence to properly solicit indications of interest. 'The
owner may prefer to hire another individual or firm to test the waters
on his or her behalf. The rule should allow an issuer's agent, for example, a professional underwriter, to test the waters on behalf of the
725
potential issuer.
By incorporating language that enables an issuer's agent to test
the waters, the rule would help issuers by allowing them to concentrate on running their businesses while deferring to the experience of
professional underwriters and others to determine market interest.
Underwriters currently conduct their own analyses to measure inves720
721

722

See supra text accompanying note 718.
See Testing Release, supra note 8, at 86,893 (proposed 17 C.F.R. § 230.135d(a) (1)).
17 C.F.R. § 230.251(a) (1997).
NASAA Proposed Statement of Policy, supra note 302, at 2541 (emphasis added).

723
724 Id. at 2542.
725 The ABA recommended that the proposal expressly permit underwriters to test the
waters on behalf of an issuer. See supra text accompanying note 494; supra note 611.
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tor interest. If underwriters also test the waters, they are more likely
to accurately assess the extent of market interest. Therefore, extending availability of testing the waters to underwriters would more
efficiently and accurately indicate whether an issuer's offering will succeed, benefiting issuers and underwriters without imposing additional
costs.
This recommended addition to proposed Rule 135d is not only a
pro-issuer incentive, but also a safeguard that further protects investors. Underwriters are less likely than issuers to violate securities regu72 6
lations or engage in other improper solicitation practices.
Similarly, an independent agent who tests the waters may be less likely
than a principal to make overzealous solicitations or to exaggerate the
investor response to the solicitation. The combination of an underwriter's standard analysis and the results from its testing-the-waters efforts is more likely to filter out subpar offerings that will harm
investors. The application of agency law ensures that investors will
have a cause of action against the issuer if liability arises. Furthermore, many of the proposals discussed below will better enable investors to confirm and supplement oral representations an issuer's agent
72 7
makes.
4.

Content of Solicitation Materials

The more demanding the disclosure requirements are for the solicitation materials, the less likely a potential issuer is to test the waters. Accordingly, there is much support for the argument that the
testing-the-waters rule "would be most useful if the content of the solicitation material were left to the judgment of those involved in the
solicitation." 728 However, if an issuer makes only the minimum disclosures, prospective investors will lack sufficient information to make a
reasonable decision about whether to indicate their interest. 7 29 If an
investor communicates his or her interest to an issuer on the basis of
such limited disclosure, the response may be unreliable because the
investor may lose interest once the issuer makes more complete disclosure. Therefore, indications of interest by investors may lead the
issuer to conclude mistakenly that the market is interested in an offering when, in fact, investors are merely conveying preliminary interest
which may not survive fuller disclosure. This can create an unsuccessful offering that harms both issuers and investors: OA the other hand,
See supra Part V.B.2.
727 See infraPart V.F.7.
728 Sullivan & Cromwell Comment Letter, supranote 487, at 4.
729 As currently drafted, Rule 254 and proposed Rule 135d require an issuer only to
make certain required statements discussing the nature and effect of the solicitation and to
provide the name of the chief executive officer of the issuer and a brief general discussion
of the issuer's business and products. See supra notes 194, 392-97 and accompanying text.
726
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if issuers provide too much information in the testing materials, investors may mistake the solicitation document for a "solicitation in connection with a full-blown registered offering. 73 0 The SEC must strike
a balance between disclosing too little information and disclosing too
much.
Consequently, this Note recommends that the final rule incorporate several changes to the requirements in proposed Rule 135d(a) (2)
regarding the content of the solicitation materials. The rule should
require a more precise description of the business. 731 Second, it
should also provide that the issuer must disclose how it intends to use
the proceeds. 732 These two additional requirements will provide prospective investors with valuable information that will enable them to
make their indications of interest on a more informed basis. However, the rule should also limit the amount of permissible disclosure
by not permitting an issuer to include pricing, detailed financial, or
technical information regarding the potential offering. 733 At present,
the proposal allows issuers to include pricing information, unaudited
financials, and forward-looking statements. 734 However, these disclosures may be extremely speculative, especially in the case of a young
startup company. Providing too much financial information may confuse and overwhelm investors. Further, the inclusion of highly specific information may lead investors to think that the solicitation
document is a prospectus or an offering circular. 735 The omission of
pricing materials will make the testing materials somewhat less informative for potential investors. However, because the pricing information will certainly change by the time an issuer prepares a prospectus
or offering circular and investors will have the opportunity to review
the prospectus or offering circular, the omission of pricing information from the testing materials should not really deprive investors. In.
addition, the omission of pricing information should encourage interested investors to read the prospectus or offering circular, which will
include pricing details. Finally, the rule should require issuers to include in the testing materials a statement that would inform investors
that the SEC has neither reviewed the solicitation materials nor ap730 AIMR Comment Letter, supra note 496, at 5; see also supra note 629 (insisting that
minimal disclosure benefits investors).
See AIMR Comment Letter, supra note 496, at 4.
731
732
See id.
733 See id. at 5.
734
See Testing Release, supra note 8, at 86,888. An issuer that tests'the waters should

consider excluding forward-looking statements from the testing materials in order to avoid
triggering a possible duty to update these statements in the future should they become
materially inaccurate or misleading. For a discussion of this duty to update, see Jeffrey A.
Brill, Note, The Status of the Duty to Update, 7 CoRNELLJ.L. & PUB. POL'Y (forthcoming Winter 1998).
735 See AIMR Comment Letter, supra note 496, at 5.
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proved of the offering contemplated therein. 7 36 This statement,
which should appear in the form of a legend emblazoned on the front
page, should convey to investors the preliminary nature of the solicitation, reminding them that review by the Commission would be forthcoming once the issuer files a registration or offering statement.
The Commission should also require that if, after testing the waters, an issuer distributes a prospectus or offering circular to interested investors, it must include a separate section that identifies and
explains any material statements in the prospectus or offering circular
that differ from the representations in the testing materials that the
issuer used. In this way, the prospectus or offering circular would
alert investors to material misstatements or omissions in the testing
materials, and would reduce the likelihood that investors will rely
solely on these solicitations rather than on the prospectus or offering
circular when considering the offering.
5.

Standard of Liability

In accordance with Rule 254(a) and the note to proposed Rule
135d(a) (4), the solicitation materials would be subject to the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws. 73 7 Although this standard does not provide investors with as much protection as sections 11
or 12(a) (2),738 the ABA and NYSBA make convincing arguments for
retaining this standard.7 39 The imposition of section 11 or section
12(a) (2) liability would deter issuers from making false, misleading,
or incomplete statements in the solicitation materials. However, it
would also discourage issuers from relying on the rule and would increase compliance costs because an issuer is almost certain to consult
with an attorney to ensure that the solicitation does not render the
is§uer liable. In addition, after the NSMIA, the states, which have a
compelling interest in protecting investors who are residents, retain
jurisdiction to investigate and enforce violations of state antifraud regulations. 740 In light of these considerations, "[a] t this stage, it makes
sense to avoid over-regulation and allow issuers to experiment. If
abuses develop, the SEC can take steps to reform the rule and eliminate problems." 741
A requirement that an issuer include the solicitation materials as
part of the prospectus or offering circular for the registered initial
736 For a consideration of whether the Commission should be required to review the
solicitation materials before an issuer may use them, see infra Part V.F.6.
737 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.254(a) (1997); Testing Release, supra note 8, at 86,894 (proposed 17 C.F.R. § 230.135d(a) (4) note).
738 See supranote 257 and accompanying text.
739 See supranotes 503, 521 and accompanying text.
740
See supra note 347.
741 Glover, supranote 584, at B6.
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public or Regulation A offering is an example of a reform the SEC
could adopt if abuses in fact develop. 742 This measure would protect
investors because the testing materials would be subject to section
12(a) (2) liability743 since they would be included in a prospectus, as

defined by section 2(10). For a registered IPO, the incorporation of
the testing materials in the prospectus, which must be included in the
registration statement, would thereby subject the materials to section
11 liability. This proposal would enable all interested investors to review the testing materials that an issuer used to solicit indications of
interest. Investors originally solicited pursuant to the testing-the-waters rule would be aware of any material differences between the testing materials and the prospectus or offering circular because, as
proposed above, this Note recommends that the final rule require issuers to disclose in the prospectus/offering circular any such differences. 7 44 The filing of the solicitation materials as part of the
prospectus/offering circular would marginally add to an issuer's costs.
In most instances, the testing materials will not be lengthy, which
means that the cost of including them in the prospectus/offering circular should be low. Moreover, this cost increase would affect only
issuers who go on to pursue public offerings, not potential issuers who
test the waters and decide not to offer securities.
6.

Regulatory Submission Requirements

Determining the proper degree of regulation for testing the waters represents a dilemma for the Commission. Rule 254(b) (1) and
proposed Rule 135d(a) (3) require an issuer to submit a copy of the
solicitation materials to the SEC only on, or prior to, the first usage of
the materials for solicitation. 745 The Commission is not required to
review the materials. Investors would enjoy much more protection if
the final rule required issuers to file the testing materials with the
Commission, which, in turn, must review the materials before an issuer can use them to test the waters.
This revision would lead to higher compliance costs for issuers,
for the Commission would probably set a filing fee in order to recoup
the costs of staff review and correspondence with issuers. This would
prolong the length of the process, perhaps discouraging issuers that
seek a quick exploration of market interest.
742
The Commission considered in the Testing Release requiring an issuer to file the
testing materials as part of the registration statement if it proceeds with a registered IPO.
Testing Release, supra note 8, at 86,889.

743

See id.
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See supra p. 571.
17 C.F.R. § 230.254(b) (1) (1997); Testing Release, supra note 8, at 86,893 (pro-

posed 17 C.F.R. § 230.135d(a) (3)).
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In contrast, section (1) (c) of the NASAA model rule requires the
offeror to file any materials intended for use as solicitation devices
746
with the state securities administrator ten days before their first use.
In a comment to the Proposed Statement of Policy, NASAA explained
that "[t] he [Administrator] may or may not review the materials filed
pursuant to this rule."747 This would give states the discretion
whether to review the materials. This proposal would also forbid an
issuer or its agent from using any materials to test the waters that the
state securities regulator finds do not comply with the final testing-thewaters rule or other securities regulation. 7 48 Given that the NSMIA
did not remove the states' authority to collect filing fees, 749 a rule that
follows the NASAA example may be too costly, especially for issuers
seeking to test the waters in many states.
The final testing-the-waters rule should borrow from both examples. It should require submission of materials to the main office of
the SEC in Washington, DC ten days prior to usage. Applying an antifraud standard, the Commission's staff would be entitled, but not
required, to review the testing materials. 750 If the issuer failed to comply in any respect with the final testing-the-waters rule or other regulation, it would not be permitted to use the materials. Ten days should
afford the staff enough time to review the materials. Although the
ten-day requirement may postpone issuers' efforts to test the waters,
the compliance costs would remain low because issuers would not
need to wait for approval from the Commission and state securities
regulators.
The final rule should also eliminate the notes to Rule 254(b) (1)
and proposed Rule 135d(a) (3) which requires issuers to submit only
testing materials that are substantively different from or additional to
materials previously submitted. 75 1 This vague standard is unnecessarily confusing for issuers. Section (1) (d) of the NASAA model rule
eliminates this provision, requiring offerors to submit any amended or
additional materials with the state securities administrator five busiNASAA Proposed Statement of Policy, supra note 302, at 2541.
Id. at 2544 cmt. 2 (second alteration in original).
748 See, e.g., section (1) (e) of the NASAA model rule in NASAA Proposed Statement of
Policy, supra note 302, at 2541.
749
See NSMIA, supra note 22, at 3419-20 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77r(c) (Supp. II
1996)).
750 The Commission would also have the opportunity to review the solicitation materials if the final rule requires an issuer to file them as part of the prospectus/offering circular. See supra notes 742-44 and accompanying text. Furthermore, investors would know
746

747

that the Commission has not necessarily reviewed the testing materials because of the leg-

end recommended above. See supra text accompanying note 736.
751
17 C.F.R. § 230.254(b) (1) note (1997); Testing Release, supra note 8, at 86,894
(proposed 17 C.F.R. § 230.135d(a) (3) note).
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ness days before the first use of the materials. 752 A requirement that
issuers submit all testing materials to the Commission will further protect investors. The five-day period gives the SEC staff enough time to
review the updated or new materials. This requirement will add to
expenses only marginally, and it may encourage issuers to prepare the
original testing materials with greater diligence.
7. Delivery and Solicitation Procedures
As proposed Rule 135d intends, the final rule should give issuers
753
the opportunity to use a wide range of media to test the waters.
The testing-the-waters rule needs further safeguards to protect investors when issuers or their agents solicit indications of interest via a
telephone call or a face-to-face conversation. NASAA recommended
limitations on cold calling because it learned of abuse. 754 This would

excessively restrict an issuer's ability to test the waters. Rather, a less
restrictive solution is to provide investors solicited by telephone or in
person with more information.
The final rule should require that an issuer deliver to an interested investor a copy of the solicitation document no later than seven
days after soliciting that investor's interest via an oral communication. 755 This may even be preferable to delivery at the time of or

before the communication because, assuming there is not a follow-up
oral solicitation, an investor will have the opportunity to read the written document shortly after hearing the oral solicitation. The written
document, which an investor keeps and can later review, may become
more memorable than the oral representations. Given that an SEC
staff member may have reviewed the solicitation document and that
the solicitation document is in writing, it is less likely to be inaccurate
or misleading than an oral representation which the Commission cannot regulate.
In addition, the final rule should provide that during an oral solicitation, an issuer or its agent must, by the end of the communication, give the solicited investor the name of an individual who can
answer any questions in the future or reconfirm any information the
issuer's agent conveyed. This would be consistent with the current
requirements under both Rule 254(b) (1) and proposed Rule
135d(a) (3) that the issuer must identify in the solicitation materials
the name and telephone number of an individual who can answer
NASAA Proposed Statement of Policy, supra note 302, at 2541.
See Testing Release, supra note 8, at 86,888.
754 NASAA Comment Letter Regarding Testing Release, supra note 327, at 13,053.
755 Section (1) (f) of the NASAA model rule requires that the offeror provide the offeree with a current copy of the document no later than five days after a communication.
NASAA Proposed Statement of Policy, supra note 302, at 2541.
752

753
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questions about the materials. 75 6 This Note suggests that the final
rule require the contact person to be the owner, a director, an officer,
or a high level manager of the issuer. Although difficult to police, this
provision would prompt solicitants to give prospective investors the
name of a contact.
Finally, the testing-the-waters rule should add a requirement that
an issuer must maintain on file a copy of the solicitation document for
a specified period of time.757 Upon request from an interested inves-

tor, the issuer would be obligated to send a copy of the solicitation
materials free of charge. This would provide investors with yet another means of obtaining a copy of the solicitation document.
Although the requirement represents a minor inconvenience and expense for issuers, it is in their best interest to save a copy of the solicitation document as well.
8.

Cooling-Off Periods

The ultimate goal of all of these safeguards is to ensure that investors make a well-reasoned investment decision. A careful review by
the investor of the prospectus or offering circular contained in the
registration or offering statement is the best basis for such a decision.
In this way, the securities laws try to ensure that investors will have
time to read the prospectus. Investors currently have only forty-eight
hours to review the prospectus before brokers or dealers are required
to send a confirmation of a sale. 758 However, when an issuer or its
agent has solicited investors, they may need additional time to cool off
from the solicitation to review the prospectus. In the Testing Release,
the Commission acknowledged this concern and "requested [comment] as to the need for additional procedures to assure investors a
sufficient opportunity following a 'test the waters' solicitation to review and assess the fufll information about the issuer, its management,
the securities and the offering provided by the registration statement
and prospectus." 75 9
Sufficient investor protection requires additional procedures.
Section (1) (h) of the NASAA model rule provides for a cooling-off
period, lasting seven days after delivery of the prospectus to investors,
during which the issuer may not sell the securities. 7 60 In its comment
letter, NASAA reported that this cooling-off period has not been disadvantageous to issuers. 76 1 The final testing-the-waters rule should
See 17 C.F.R. § 230.254(b) (1) (1997); Testing Release, supra note 8, at 86,894 (pro756
posed 17 C.F.R. § 230.135d(a) (3)).
757
See Sullivan & Cromwell Comment Letter, supra note 487, at 5.
758 See supra note 524 (discussing Rule 15c2-8).
759 Testing Release, supra note 8, at 86,890.
-760 NASAA Proposed Statement of Policy, supra note 302, at 2541.
NASAA Comment Letter Regarding Testing Release, supra note 327, at 13,053.
761
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adopt a similar cooling-off period that would give investors a better
opportunity to review the prospectus.
Finally, the current twenty day cooling-off periods under both
Rule 254(b) (4) and proposed Rule 135d(a) (6)762 are insufficient. In
accordance with these Rules, an issuer may not sell securities pursuant
to an offering or registration statement until twenty days after the final publication or delivery of the solicitation document or broadcast
of the television or radio solicitation. 763 The duration of the coolingoff periods is adequate; the problem is that the Rules, strangely, do
not require an issuer to wait twenty days after an oralcommunication
with an investor. 76

Section (3) (b) of the NASAA model rule extends

the cooling-off period to cover oral communications by proscribing
issuers from selling securities "until at least twenty ... calendar days
after the last communication made in reliance on this rule."765 While
NASAA did not reiterate in its comment letter regarding the Testing
Release the need to expand the cooling-off period provision to include oral solicitations, AIMR advocated such an extension. 766 In
light of legitimate concerns regarding the lingering effects of oral solicitations, the final testing-the-waters rule should require issuers to
wait twenty calendar days after its final communication of any sort in
reliance on the testing-the-waters rule before it may begin to sell securities. This safeguard will protect investors should the Commission
decide to revise Rule 254(b) (3) and proposed Rule 135d(a) (5) to permit issuers to test the waters after filing an offering or registration
statement.
9.

Effect of Proposed Safeguards

The aggregate effect of these proposed safeguards, bolstered by
the full compliance standard, should provide investors with much
greater protection at an essentially negligible cost to issuers. These
added procedures also benefit issuers because they will enable them
to obtain more accurate information from investors, and thus increase
the likelihood of a successful offering. If an issuer solicits indications
of interest in reliance on the rule (including the proposed safeguards) and declines to proceed with the offering, it will have spent
little money relative to the potential expenditures of pursuing the of762 17 C.F.R. § 230.254(b) (4) (1997); Testing Release, supra note 8, at 86,894 (proposed 17 C.F.R. § 230.135d(a) (6)).
763 See sources cited supra note 762.
764 See AIMR Comment Letter, supra note 496, at 6; NASAA Comment Letter Regarding SBIs, supra note 18, at 9379.
765 NASAA Proposed Statement of Policy, supra note 302, at 2543-44 (emphasis
added).
766 AIMR Comment Letter, supra note 496, at 5-6.
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fering. Those issuers who consummate a successful Regulation A offering or registered IPO will recoup their costs.
The Commission would enjoy substantial benefits from adding
these safeguards. A single testing-the-waters rule would dramatically
improve the administrability of the process. Even more significantly,
these safeguards should garner the support of NASAA and state securities regulators because they either resemble the NASAA model rule
or otherwise improve investor protection. Therefore, a testing-the-waters rule that includes similar safeguards to those proposed in this Section may help to resolve the coordination problem confronting issuers
seeking to offer securities under Regulation A. It should also increase
the likelihood that issuers will test the waters under Rule 254 and proposed Rule 135d without harming investors in the process. Finally, a
testing-the-waters rule containing these or similar safeguards should
give the Commission greater confidence that the rule "is consistent
with the public interest and the protection of investors." 767 Such confidence would enable the SEC to exercise its apparent authority under
new section 18 of the Securities Act to adopt legislation preempting
state securities regulations regarding Regulation A offerings, which
would give issuers the opportunity to rely on Rule 254 to test the waters in all states.76 8 This confidence would also enable the Commission to exercise its general exemptive authority under new section 28
to exempt issuers that test the waters prior to registered IPOs in reliance on proposed Rule 135d from section 5.769
CONCLUSION

Congress enacted and has amended the Securities Act to, among
other things, protectinvestors before, during, and after IPOs. As SEC
Chairman Arthur Levitt has explained, "investor protection is the
SEC's most important priority. '770 At the same time, the Commission
seeks to facilitate the promotion of capital formation.
The Commission has struggled to maintain the balance between
encouraging capital formation and protecting investors in its efforts to
draft and adopt testing-the-waters rules. The innovative and contro767
768
769

NSMIA, supra note 22, at 3418 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b) (3) (Supp. II 1996)).
See id.; supra text accompanying notes 359-61.
See NSMIA, supra note 22, at 3424 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77z-3 (Supp. II 1996))

(granting the Commission this authority "to the extent that such exemption is necessary or
appropriate in the public interest, and is consistent with the protection of investors"); supra
text accompanying notes 541-44, 569.
770
Levitt Unveils Series of ProposalsDesigned To Improve CapitalFormation, 27 Sec. Reg. &
L. Rep. (BNA) 671, 672 (May 5, 1995); see also InvestorProtection Is First, supra note 376, at
297 (quoting SEC Chairman in March 1997 as stating that "[n] othing should come ahead
of investor protection in terms of what the [C]ommission does or how it operates'") (first
alteration in original).
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versial testing-the-waters concept permits a potential issuer to solicit
indications of investor interest during the prefiling period, that is,
before it incurs the considerable compliance costs that often preclude
or discourage smaller businesses from accessing the public markets.
Both of the Commission's rulemaking efforts to introduce testing the
waters have been problematic. Rule 254, adopted in August 1992,
represents the Commission's first experience with testing the waters.
Reliance on the Rule is limited to businesses, usually small entities,
that are considering a Regulation A offering. Rule 254 has three primary shortcomings. First, the scope of the Rule is too limited, rendering it unavailable to many potential issuers. Second, the Rule appears
ill-equipped to protect financially unsophisticated investors from the
sales-oriented overtures of inexperienced and overeager principals of
small businesses. Third, the utility of the Rule has been further limited because, in the absence of preemptive legislation regarding securities offered pursuant to Regulation A, the SEC has thus far failed to
coordinate the Rule with the securities laws of most states.
After prematurely declaring Rule 254 a success, the Commission
published the Testing Release in June 1995 in which it proposed to
extend the availability of testing the waters to businesses contemplating registered IPOs. The Commission hoped to increase access to the
booming IPO market. Proposed Rule 135d remedied the first problem experienced in practice under Rule 254. Under the proposal,
many more issuers would be able to test the waters. The proposal
deserves praise for extending to large businesses the opportunity to
test the waters before registered IPOs, for there had been no rational
justification for denying larger businesses access to testing the waters.
However, the Commission made little progress in the area of investor
protection. The controversial proposal currently caters to the needs
of issuers at investors' expense. A testing-the-waters rule is needed to
help businesses raise capital in a cost-effective manner. In the modem age, controlling the dissemination of information to investors is
admittedly difficult.77 1 Although some have maintained that this reality is grounds for further deregulation, the argument that more investor protection is necessary is more convincing. Moreover, the SEC
may again encounter difficulties securing wide-scale approval from
the states. Despite its authority to preempt blue sky laws regarding the
offering of what would typically constitute covered securities under
section 18, the Commission has neither adopted nor published an
amended version of proposed Rule 135d.
Nevertheless, the Commission's continued enthusiastic support
for a broader testing-the-waters rule and the availability of general ex771

See Quinn, supra note 549, at 28.
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emptive authority suggest that it will take measures to expand the
availability of testing the waters in the near future. The SEC may have
shelved adoption of proposed Rule 135d until the Agency can include
it as part of a more comprehensive revision of the Securities Act, such
as a company registration system. The Commission clearly has the authority to adopt a testing-the-waters rule. There is little doubt that in
relying on this authority, the Commission has thus far attempted to
draft a rule that would not compromise investor protection. 772 Current leading officials of the SEC staff remain committed to this
goal.

773

Proposed Rule 135d, as currently drafted, is irreconcilable with
section 5(c) of the Securities Act because it poses substantial risks to
investors that the potential benefits to issuers and the capital markets
cannotjustify. The proposal is such a broad rejection of section 5(c)
that, if adopted, it would radically change how issuers prepare for an
IPO during the prefiling period. Of perhaps still greater importance,
the proposal may represent the first step toward further deregulation
of the registration process. It is therefore especially necessary to install sufficient safeguards into a testing-the-waters rule, for further deregulation may leave investors even more vulnerable.
This Note recommends the adoption of a single testing-the-waters
rule that would apply to both short form registration and registered
IPOs. The principal distinction between this rule and proposed Rule
135d is the incorporation of additional safeguards that will protect
investors without significantly discouraging issuers from availing themselves of the rule. These safeguards would help the SEC to achieve
what should be its ultimate objective for testing the waters: to facilitate
the matching of quality potential issuers with investors, who, after
learning of an investment opportunity as a result of a prefiling solicitation of interest, will defer making investment decisions until they have
reviewed the mandatory disclosures in the prospectus. In addition,
these safeguards would help justify both an exercise by the Commission of general exemptive authority and further preemptive rulemaking. The former would further legitimize the adoption of the rule,
and the latter would increase the likelihood of its success. An effective
testing-the-waters rule will never be reconcilable with the interpretation of section 5(c) that has prevailed since 1933. However, if the
final rule provides investors with greater protection through the inclusion of additional safeguards similar to those suggested in this Note,
the rule will at least be consistent with the policy objectives guiding
the Commission and underlying section 5 (c).
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See supra note 612 and accompanying text.
See supra note 770 and accompanying text.
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